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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondents,
V.

)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT # 36055-2009

CLERKS RECORD ON APPEAL

)
ED SMITH AND CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
And through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,

Defendants-Appellants,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

VOLUME #3
Appeal from the District Court of the 5 th Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Camas
***************

HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE, DISTRICT JUDGE
***************
CHRISTOPHER SIMMS
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, ID. 83333

PAUL FmER
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520
BOise, ID. 83702

Attorney for Respondents

Attorney for Appellants
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
Attorney at Law
US Bank Bldg., Ste 209
191 Sun Valley Road
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, ID 83340
Tel: 208622 7878
Fax: 208 622 7129
ISB# 7473
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
GEORGE MARTIN,
Plaintiff,

)
)

)

and
MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,

v.
ED SMITH,
Defendant,
and
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO,
By and through the duly elected
Board of Commissioners in
their official and individual
capacities,
KEN BAXTROM,
BILL DAVIS, and
RON CHAPMAN,
Defendants.

Case No. CV-07-24

)
)
)
)

)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO RESPONSE
TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND PETITION BY ADDING TWO
ADDITIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S REPL Y TO RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
PETITION

COMES NOW PETITIONER, through his attorney of record and files this, his
Reply to Response to Motion for Leave to Amend Petition and in support thereof states
as follows;
1.

Defendant Camas County in it Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend cites four

Idaho cases to support its argument that this court should not exercise its discretion to
allow amendment. In fact each case supports the proposition that the court should in the
interest of justice exercise its discretion to allow amendment.
2.

Defendant cites Sinclair Mktg., Inc. v. Slepert, 107 Idaho 1000, 695 P.2d 385

(1985), in support of its argument to deny leave to file a second amended Petition. In
Sinclair, the Idaho Supreme Court held that " ... it was an abuse of the trial court's
discretion to deny the motion to amend the complaint. On remand the district court
should liberally allow for the amendment to the pleadings under I.R.C.P. 15(a)." id at
1006. The facts and underlying rationale were that Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to
Amend concurrently with a motion to amend partial summary judgment where the major
claim of liability for a debt remained pending. Similarly, in the case before the bench,
Plaintiffs underlying claim for declaratory relief springing from a series transactions or
occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading, and
preliminary injunctions entered herein, sought to be supplemented and which involve
common questions of law and fact.
3.

Defendant cites Baxter v. Carney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000) in support

of its argument to deny leave to file a second amended Petition.

In Baxter plaintiff

sought to add a third party after the date for trial had been set. The Supreme Court
upheld the District Court's ruling that "it would be unfairly prejudicial at this point to
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allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to add a new party and change the dynamics of the action
as it no\v stands." Id at 169. The Court reasoned that Defendants would be prejudiced by
the amendment. that the third party sought to be added was not a necessary party, and the
issues sought to be resolved were not directly related to the action against the Defendants.
In the instant case no prejudice will be caused to Defendant in allowing the amendment.
In fact resolution of the dispute will be expedited by allowing the amendment. It is true
that the issues raised by the proposed amendment could be litigated in a separate lmvsuit,
but why delay justice?

Why force these issues, arising from the same series of

transactions, into another court? Defendant could forever avoid justice by continuing to
illegally adopt the same flawed ordinances. All of this, at the wasted expense of Camas
County taxpayers.
4.

Defendant cites Black Canyon Raquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank,

119 Idaho 171, 804 P .2d 900 (1991) for the proposition that is not an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to deny a motion to file an amended complaint. This is an accurate, but
incomplete, statement of law.

In Black Canyon, the Court, recognized that, "In

determining whether an amended complaint should be allowed, where leave of court is
required under Rule 15( a), the court may consider whether the new claims proposed to be
inserted into the action by the amended complaint state a valid claim." Id at 175. The
tort claims raised by Plaintiff in Black Canyon, unlike those raised here. were
unsupported by law or fact, and were time barred. No such allegation is made in the case
before this honorable court.
5.

Finally, Defendant cites Hinkle v. Winey, 126 Idaho 993,895 P.2d 594 (Ct. App.

1995) in support of its argument to deny leave to file a second amended Petition. In
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Hinkle the District Court's denial of a motion for leave to amend \vas affirmed on appeal.
The Court decision was based mainly on the concern for delay in resolving the main issue
between the parties, right to possession of real property. Id at 997. The Court also noted
that the evidence relating to the proposed new claims was "entirely different from that
necessary for the original causes of action."
In the case at bar the evidence regarding the proposed new declaratory relief
claims is in most instances exactly the same genre of evidence used to prove the original
claims, because the Defendant has simply repeated the same abusive process. Finally, the
Hinkle Court determined that Plaintiff would not be prejudiced by litigating the proposed
new claims in separate litigation. Here, Plaintiff would be massively prejudiced if he is
forced to chase Defendants from one Court to another seeking justice for the very same
wrong. Defendant will incur additional damages in the form of continued uncertainty in
Camas County Zoning, continued subdivision approvals, continuing discriminatory
zoning and attorney fees.

Furthermore, Camas County tax payers would also suffer

further, additional and ongoing delay in final resolution of these issues and increased
attorney fees and costs.
SUMMARY

It is clear throughout the case law that although leave to amend is to be freely
given, I.R.c.P. 15(a), the decision to grant or refuse permission to amend is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court. It does not appear that the Courts have issued a clear
statement as to the criteria, elements or factors to be considered by the trial court in
exercise of its discretion. Criteria that have been considered are delay and prejudice to
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either party. In this case those factors favor Plaintiff and favor granting the Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Petition.
Defendants, spending the public fisc, should favor a speedy and economically
expeditious resolution of this claim, not delay and further litigation. Defendants will not
be caused prejudice, in the form of a delay in resolution of the underlying issue, in
granting the Motion. Plaintiff, on the other hand, will suffer justice delayed and possibly
forever denied if Defendants are permitted to simply adopt replacement ordinances and
put off until another day final determination of the legality of their actions.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff seeks to introduce wholly new factual allegations
under entirely new theories of law. This argument overlooks the basic fact that Plaintiff
seeks, in part, only to provide a remedy under this Court's Preliminary Injunction
preventing the Defendant from operating under the enjoined zoning ordinance.

The

Defendants' actions in adopting yet another amended zoning ordinance could legally and
logically only be based upon provisions of the enjoined ordinance.

Despite the

conclusion of trial on the original declaratory relief issues, the underlying issue, the
legality of Camas County's amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance
remains due to the actions of Defendant intentionally side stepping the order of this court.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court grant leave to file a Second
Amended Petition, as herein described.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this

/Q

day of

4d

2008, I served

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiff's Reply to Response to Motion for
Leave to Amend Petition by delivering same, via facsimile to Phillip J. Collaer, Attorney
for Defendant Ed Smith, 250 South Fifth Street, Ste. 700, P.O. Box 7426, Boise Idaho
83707-7426, facsimile number 208 344 5800, and Paul Fitzer, Attorneys for Camas
County Defendants 950 W. Bannock St., Ste 520, Boise, Idaho 83702, facsimile number
208331 1202.
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
Attorney at Law
US Bank Bldg., Ste 209
191 Sun Valley Road
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, 10 83340
Tel: 208 622 7878
Fax: 208622 7129
ISB# 7473
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
GEORGE MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
and
MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ED SMITH,
Defendant,
and
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO,
By and through the duly elected
Board of Commissioners in
their official and individual
capacities,
KEN BAXTROM,
BILL DAVIS, and
RON CHAPMAN,
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)
)
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)
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PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL
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)
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)
)
)
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PLAINTIFF"S POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

COMES NOW PETITIONER, through his attorney of record and tiles this, his
POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM in support of the relief requested in PlaintitTs
Amended Petition for Declaratory Judgment and in support thereof states as follows:
1.

This Court has been extensively briefed regarding the issues presented by the

pleadings and evidence herein. Plaintiff refers this Honorable Court, in addition to all of
the documentary evidence and testimony, to Plaintiffs Petition and Defendant Camas
County's Anslver thereto, Amended Petition and Amended Answer thereto; Defendant
Camas County and the Individual Members of the Camas County Board of County
Commissioners' Objection to Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order

and Preliminary Injunction and Plaint[ff's Response to Camas County Defendants
Objections to Application for TRO and Preliminary Restraining Order and Request for
Rule 1 I Sanctions; Plaintiff's Briefin Support ofApplicationfor Preliminary Injunction
Second Evidentiary Hearing, County Defendants Post-Hearing Memorandum (2d
Evidentiary Hearing), Plaintiff's Reply thereto, all relating to Defendant Camas
County's failure to maintain a reviewable record and Decision on Requirements of

"Transcribable Verbatim Record" and other Records for Purposes of a PreliminG1Y
Injunction: Defendant's Post-Hearing Alemorandum Objecting to Plainttff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction

(Conjlict-of-Interest Allegation), Plaintiff's Response to

Defendant Camas County's Post-Hearing A1emorandum Relating to Conflict
Allegation and Decision on Conflict of Interest Issue, for Purposes

(~r

(~r Interest

Preliminary

Injunction: Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of Documentary Evidence; and finally
Plaintiff's Trial Brief

PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM
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2.

The facts are no longer in dispute. After more than a full year of litigation, after

denials and evasive discovery responses and partial trial, Defendants entered into a
Stipulation of Facts. Plaintiff does not intend to repeat any statement of fact, recitation of
law or arguments previously advocated or rebutted in any of the referenced documents.
Plaintiff does ask the Court to consider the basic statement of law, that no
Comprehensive Plan or Zoning Ordinance can be amended other than through the
LLUPA process.

Therefore, any amendment to a Comprehensive Plan or Zoning

Ordinance that is null and void must logically also be null and void.

Given the

overwhelming evidence regarding the lack of reviewable record, conflict of interest,
failure to provide lawful Notice of Hearings and failure to consider the "substantive
dictates" of LLUPA, the real issue before the Court is the proper remedy.
3.

Plaintiff requests that the Court give consideration to all of the arguments, and all

of the evidence in support thereof, or lack thereof as the case may be, and to render
specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to each issue presented.

For

example, in the Court's Decision on Requirements of "Transcribable Verbatim Record"

and other Records for Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction care was given to specify the
documents and records that might satisfy the reviewable records requirements of LLUP A.
The Court ruled. for purposes of Preliminary Injunction, on the more limited issue of
failure to maintain a transcribable verbatim record, but indicated that unless Camas
County produced additional records an adverse Declaratory Judgment would issue. No
additional records were produced at trial.
Plaintiff also requests the Court consider the Camas County Defendants conduct
and positions taken throughout the proceedings. The Camas County Defendants have
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repeatedly attempted to mislead the Court by misstatements of fact and law. Early in the
proceedings, on or about May 14, 2007, Defendants filed

O~jection

to Plaint(/J's

Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction asserting the
Plaintiff had no rezone application pending, when in fact such an application was
pending. (See pg 7 Objection to Plaint(fJ's Applicationfor Temporary Restraining Order

and Preliminary Injunction)
In this same pleading the Camas County Defendants' request Rule 11 Sanctions.
In this regard the Defendants' make a host of unfounded allegations.

The most

groundless of these accusations was stated by Defense counsel as follows,

The allegation that the County failed to keep a trancribable
verbatim record of the proceedings at issue is laughable. Plaintiffs and
their counsel would have learned this if the ever had the bright idea to
check with the County to see whether the tapes exist before alleging they
don't exist. But they did not. The County did, in fact, keep a
transcribable record of every single public meeting and public hearing
on the amendment to the zoning ordnance and comprehensive plan.
This Court has made a finding of fact that all relevant proceedings were not recorded.
Thus verifying that Plaintiff's Attorney made the required inquiry, accurately determined
the facts, and law, and proceeding according to his ethical duties. Whereas the Camas
County Defendants and their attorneys, showing a complete lack of good faith and
candor, attempted to mislead the court and intimidate an opponent, demonstrating
disrespect for the legal system and a Rule 11 violation.
Idaho Code Section 12-117 provides for an attorneys fees award to the prevailing
party, and costs against a county, if a party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law. In Bogner v. State Dep't of Rev. and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859; 693 P.2d 1056,
1061 (1984) The Supreme Court described the purpose of the statute, as follows:
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We believe the purpose of that statute is two-fold: (1) to serve as' a
deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action: and

(2)

to provide a

remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial
burdens of defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct
mistakes agencies should never have made, "
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the statute is one which states that attorney fees
"shall" be granted if the action of the agency was groundless or arbitrary, Rincover v.
State Dep't of Finance, 129 Idaho 4442, 444; 926 P .2d 626, 628 (1996). In this case not
only were the Commissioners various actions violating LLUPA groundless, arbitrary and
self serving, their defense continued to assert and controvert issues without a reasonable
basis in law or fact throughout these proceedings.

Plaintiff respectfully requests this

Honorable Court to make a finding of fact and law that the Camas County
Commissioners "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law,"

Plaintiff further

requests this court set an evidentiary hearing to determine the proper amount for an order
awarding Plaintiff attorney fees and costs.

REMEDY
Due to the unusual procedural posture of this case the question of a proper remedy
remains,

The applicable statutes allow the Court to fashion a remedy providing for a

declaration either aftlrmative or negative in form and effect regarding the parties' rights,
status and other legal relations. I.e. Section 10-1201. The Declaratory Judgment Act is
" ... remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity
with respect to rights, status and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed and
administered." I.e. 10-1212. Plaintiff invites this Honorable Court to enter an order that
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\vill both terminate the present controversy and remove uncertainty in past and future
land use proceedings in Camas County.
Searching more broadly for statutory authority in fashioning a remedy, Title 30.
Corporations, provides some guidance. Reasoning that a County is a body corporate. the
Court, in addition to traditional equitable remedies and mandamus, may consider
appointment of a Special Master. In that all but one member of the Planning and Zoning
Commission, and all but one member of the Board of Commissioners is ineligible for
deliberation on amendments to the Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Map, given the Camas
County Defendants history of LLUPA process abuse, given that these Defendants have
ignored or avoided this Court's Preliminary Injunctions, a Special Master could insure a
lawful process in addressing an overhaul of the Camas County Comprehensive Plan and
or a major rezone application. if that is to occur in Camas County.
In summary, Plaintiff requests this Court enter an Order that includes the
following:
1.

Declaration that the Amendments to the Camas County Comprehensive Plan

adopted May 25, 2006, as Resolution 96, and as amended on March 29, 2007, and
amended again on May 12. 2008 as Resolutions 114 and 115, are all and each of them,
null and void.
2.

Declaration that the Amendments to the Camas County Zoning Ordinance,

adopted April 18, 2007 as Ordinance # 153, and later amended on May 12, 2008. as
Ordinance # 157 and the Zoning Designation Map adopted March 29, 2007. as Ordinance
#150, and later amended on May 12, 2008 as Ordinance # 159 are all and each of them,
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null and void. Furthennore. any and all subdivision application approvals. and building
pennit approvals. based upon said Ordinances must also be declared null and void.
3.

Enjoining Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of County

Commissioners from processing land use applications, including rezone applications,
subdivision applications, and/or building penn it applications, conditional use Pennit
applications, and or variance applications regarding any lands whose zoning or land use
designations were altered as a result of any of the above referenced voided Resolutions
and/or Ordinances, except to process applications that were pending prior to adoption of
those said Ordinances and/or Resolutions under the land use designation and zoning
designation in place prior to May 25, 2006.
4.

Appointment of a special master to oversee the undertaking of any large scale

amendments to the Camas County Comprehensive Plan and/or Zoning Ordinance and
Zoning Designation Map.

PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
A TTOREY
PLAINTIFF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this

/G....

day of

.:;; ~r'r

2008, I served

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs Reply to Response to Motion for
Leave to Amend Petition by delivering same, via facsimile to Phillip J. Collaer, Attorney
for Defendant Ed Smith, 250 South Fifth Street, Ste. 700, P.O. Box 7426, Boise Idaho
83707-7426, facsimile number 208 344 5510, and Paul Fitzer, Attorneys for Camas
County Defendants 950 W. Bannock St., Ste 520, Boise, Idaho 83702, facsimile number
208331 1202.
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-t-Paul J. Fitzer, ISB No. 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 W. Bannock SL Suite 520
Boise, 10 83702
Tel: 208/331/1800
Fax: 208/331/1202

Attorneys /iJr Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners. and Ed Smith in his
capacity as a member (~rthe Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOI\IES. LLC,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

)

Case No. CV-07-24

)

v.

)
)

ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
and through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM. BILL DA VIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY,
THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF
THE CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' POST
TRIAL BRIEF

Come now. Camas County. Idaho (the County). by and through its duly elected Board of
County Commissioners (the Board). Ken Backstrom. Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the
Individual Commissioners). by and through the County Defendants' legal counsel, Moore Smith
Buxton & Turcke. Chtd .. and submits its Post-Trial Brief.

\G\NA
DEFENDANTS TRIAL BRIEF -- 1

I.

BACKGROUND
In September 2005, the Camas County Board of County Commissioners (the "Board"')
directed the County Planning and Zoning Commission (the "Commission") to conduct a
comprehensive planning process in order to send the Board recommended changes to the County
zoning ordinance, zoning map. and comprehensive plan including its land use map. Over the
course of two years, the Commission and the Board conducted multiple \vorkshops,
informational sessions, public meetings, and public hearings. In adopting the Comprehensive
Plan including the Land Use Map ("Plan"), the Commission conducted public hearings on March
28. 2006. April 4 t\ 11 tho and 17th • 2006. Legal notices of the time and place of the hearings were
published in the Camas County Courier and the copies of the Plan and map were available for
review prior to the hearing. All public hearings were recorded. I Plaintiff attended and testified
at length at each and every hearing. The Commission recommended its approval to the Board on
April 17,2006. 2
The Board conducted a public hearing for the Plan including the land use map on May
17.2006 and thereafter deliberated on May 22 and 25, 2006 adopting the Plan on or about May
25.2006. See Resolution 96 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder. p. 344).3 To include

I See Planning and Zoning Tape Catalog (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 225). Additionally, the
actual tapes themselves are admitted into evidence as Defendant Camas County Evidence Exhibit T.

2

Planning and Zoning Commission: Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map:

Public Hearing - March 28, 2006;
Legal Notice - March 8, 2006 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 3)
Minutes - George Mal1in was in attendance and testified (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. (6)
Public Hearings April 4. 2006. April 11.2006, and April 17.2006;
th
Legal Notices - March 15. 22, and 29 th , 2006 providing legal notice for public hearings on April 4, II tho and 17 .
(Detendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 4. 6. and 7)
Minutes - George Mm1in was in attendance and testitied (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 99. 106.

109);
Commissioner's versions of the comprehensive plan land llse map provided to Board (Defendant Camas County
rvidence Binder p. 116)
Board of County Commissinners- Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map
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all land within the county, the Board conducted an additional public hearing on the Plan on
March 14, 200i which included the largely uninhabited northern portion of the county adopting
Resolution 103 on or about March 29, 2007. See Resolution 103 (Defendant Camas County
Evidence Binder p. 421).

Plaintiff attended and testified at all public hearings. All meetings

\vere recorded.
The Commission conducted public hearings with regard to the Zoning Ordinance and
Map on October 10 and 17, 2006, and the Commission thereafter deliberated and ultimately
provided its recommendation to the Board on October 24, 2006. Legal notices of the time and
place of the hearings were published in the Camas County Courier and the copies of the zoning
ordinance and map were available for review prior to the hearing. All public hearings were
recorded. Plaintiff attended and testified at each and every hearing. 5
The Board conducted a public hearing on March 14 and thereafter deliberated on March
19,26, 27, 29 and April 18, 2007 ultimately adopting the zoning ordinance (Ordinance 153) and
zoning map (Ordinance 150). Legal notices of the time and place of the hearings were published
in the Camas County Courier and the copies of the zoning ordinance and map were available for
Public Hearing - May 17.2006;
Legal Notice - April 26.2006 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 229)
Minutes - George Martin was in attendance and testified (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 30 I)
Tabled to May 22 and 25 meeting for Deliberation;
Resoultion 96 Adopted on May 25. 2006
Transcribable Record
(Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 333; Actual Audio Tapes admitted into
record as Defendant's Exhibit T.
-t Legal Notice February 21.2007 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 231)
Minutes - George Martin was in attendance and testified (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 327) tabled
until 3;(9. thereafter tabled unitI3/26. 3/27. and 3/29 for deliberation and adoption.
5 Planning and Zoning Commission - Zoning Ordinance and included Map

Public Hearing - October 10.2006: Tabled to Oct 17 th . 24th for continued public hearing and deliberation
Legal Notice - September 28.2006 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 17-18)
Minutes - George Martin was in attendance and testified (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 204-211.
214)
Recommendation of Commissioner provided to Board (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 212)
Transcribable Record - (See Planning and Zoning Tape Catalog (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p.
225): Additionally. the actual tapes themselves are admitted into evidence as Defendant Camas County Evidence
Exhibit T [sic]:
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review prior to the hearing.

All public hearings were recorded.

Plaintiff was present and

testified at all public hearings. 6 Plaintiff brings this action seeking to enjoin the County"s Plan
and Zoning Ordinance/Map by virtue of his status as a property owner in the County. Among his
contentions is that his property has been downzoned.

II.
ARGUMENT
A.
County-wide Comprehensive Plans, Zoning Ordinances, and Map are Legislative,
as opposed to Quasi-judicial, in nature and are thus not subject to LLUPA Judicial Review.
The Plaintiff in this cause of action appears to bring both a petition for judicial review
and a declaratory judgment action to enjoin the County's county-wide 1) Comprehensive Plan
and Land Use Map; 2) Zoning Ordinance; and 3) Zoning Map. The Supreme Court has recently
specifically precluded a plaintiff from clothing an action as a petition for judicial review but
seeking civil remedies via a declarative action, and vice-versa. See Euclid v. City o.fBoise, No,

6 Board of County Commissioners

Zoning Ordinance and Map
Public Hearing - March 14.2007: adjourned to 3/19. 3126. 3/27. 3/29 for deliberation
Legal Notice - February 21. 2007 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 231.233 Maps provided)
Minutes - George Martin was in attendance and testified (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 3327-331)
Tabled to May 22 and 25 meeting for Deliberation:
Sign in Sheets - (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 336-343)
Ordinance 150 Adopted on March 29. 2007 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 499) See p. 237 Legal
Notice
Transcribable Record
(Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 333: Actual Audio Tapes admitted into
record as Defendant's Exhibit T.
Public Hearing - April 18.2006: Zoning Ordinance
Legal Notice - March 28. 2007 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 236)
Minutes - George Martin was in attendance and testified (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 332)
Ordinance 153 Adopted on April 18. 2007 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 50 I) See p. 238 Legal
Notice
Transcribable Record ~. (Defendant Camas Coullty Evidence Binder p. 333: Actual Audio Tapes admitted into
record as Defendant's Exhibit T.
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The two actions cannot be combined. The Local Land Use

Planning Act Idaho Codes §67-6501 et seq. ("LLUPA") provides a limited remedy for certain
land use decisions in the form of judicial review. 8 Some land decisions are reviewable under
LLUPA: some are not.

In order to understand which means of review are available, it is

necessary to understand the distinction drawn by the courts between legislative and quasi-judicial
actions.

Such a distinction is crucial to determine the plaintiffs ability to challenge the

governmental activity in question, the due process rights afforded, and a court's standard of
review. If the governmental action is quasi-judicial, then it is subject to review under LLUPA.
However, if the activity is legislative, then such activity falls outside LLUPA's judicial review
protections and a court's review of such legislation is subject to very limited oversight.

"While

legislative actions by counties are subject to collateral actions such as declaratory judgments,
they cannot be attacked by petition for judicial review." Cowan v. Board (~lCom 'rs olFremont

County, 143 Idaho 501,512,148 P.3d 1247, 1258 (2006).

1.

Quasi-Judicial vs. Legislative Activity

The Courts tirst delved into this legal distinction in City of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63
Idaho 90, 117 P .2d 461 (1941) which held that zoning ordinances are subject to very limited
judicial review, due to their legislative nature. "Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of
the exercise of that discretion, unless arbitrary action is clearly disclosed." Grimmett, 63 Idaho at
92. 117 Idaho at 463; see also Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 511,
By alleging violations of LLUPA's judicial review provisions including 67-6521. 67-6535. 67-6536. Plaintiff is
seemingly seeking statutory injunctive relief pursuant to LLUPA clothed as a declarative action. The courts have
clearly prohibited plaintiffs from doing an end-around the judicial review provisions in favor of civi I actions. Bone
v. City ojLeH'iston. ] 07 Idaho 844. 693 P.2d ] 046 ( ]984). In this proceeding. in seeking LLUPA's judicial review
protections. Plaintiff has improperly submitted additional evidence and failed to follow Rule 84. IRep. Judicial
review actions must be confined to the agency record. Plaintiff has emphatically declared that the Plaintiff has
violated LLUPA's provisions. but failed to allege harm, substantial rights that have been prejudiced. or other
damages. See. Euclid, at 5. Thus. Plaintiff is precluded from seeking the judicial review provisions of LLUPA and
Defendant should be awarded attornev fees.
g LLUPA. in tllrn. incorporates lAPA:sjudicial review provisions. thereby bringing into play the familiar
"substantive evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious" tests.
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567 P.1d 1257. 1262 (1977) ("'Zoning is essentially a politicaL rather than a judicial matter, over
\vhich the legislative authorities have generally speaking. complete discretion".) Thereafter. the
Supreme Court clarified the distinction in Cooper v. Ada County Comm 'rs. 101 Idaho 407. 614
P .2d 947 (1980) which articulated:
It is beyond dispute that the promulgation or enactment of general zoning plans

and ordinances is legislative action. Dawson, 98 Idaho at 506, 567 P.2d at 1257;
Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243. 506 P.2d 470 (1973); Cole-Collister
Fire Protection District v. City 0.1' Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P.2d 290 (1970);
Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461 (1941). However, appellants
urge that a crucial distinction be drawn between a zoning entity's action in
enacting general zoning legislation and its action in applying existing legislation
and policy to specific, individual interests as in a proceeding on an application for
rezone of particular property .
. . , Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of
property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited
review, and may only attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse
of authority. On the other hand. a determination whether the permissible use of a
specific piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial
authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test.
Basically. this test involves the determination of whether action produces a
general mle or policy that is applicable to an open class of individuals, interests,
or situations, or whether it entails the application of a general mle or policy to
specific individuals, interests, or situations. If the former determination is
satisfied, there is legislative action; if the latter determination is satisfied. the
action is judicial.

Cooper. 101 Idaho at 409-410. 614 P.2d at 949-950.

See also Cmnln. 143 Idaho at 512. 148

P.3d 1258 quoting Burt, 105 Idaho at 67, 665 P.2d at 1075 ("Legislative activity by a county ...
is differentiated from quasi-judicial activity by the result: legislative activity produces a rule or
policy which has application to an open class of citizens whereas quasi-judicial activity impacts
specific individuals, interests, or situations.")
Action is legislative when it affects a large area consisting of many parcels of
property in disparate ownership .... Conversely, action is considered quasi-judicial
when it applies a general rule to a specific interest such as a zonmg change

DEFEND,\NT'S TRIAL BRIEF -- 6

atTecting a single piece of property, a variance, or a conditional use permit. ... It
is analogous to a general rezone which affects a large number of people-in this
case, mUltiple owners of multiple tracts of land approximating over eight hundred
individuals, each with varying affected interests and impacts, and which is highly
visible to the public. . .. The amendment of the plan and zoning of the annexed
property affects the interests of all persons in the city in some manner. Such
widely felt impact and high visibility is consistent with action deemed legislative.

Burt. 105 Idaho at 66, 665 P.2d at 1077: see also Dawson. 98 Idaho at 511, 567 P.2d at 1262. In
Cooper, the Court articulated that legislative actions are to be evaluated with a restricted
standard of review; as a form of judicial deference to legislative actions. See also Gay v. County

Commissioners of Bonneville County. 103 Idaho 626, 627, 651 P .2d 560, 561 (Idaho App. 1982).
"This restrained standard of review is appropriate to such legislative determinations as the
adoption of comprehensive plans or the enactment of general zoning ordinances:' Jd.

The basic

idea is that when a county or city takes action that affects a broad number of people, the action is
like that of a legislative body.

The remedy is political, not judicial.

"Legislative action is

shielded from direct judicial review by its high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory
that the appropriate remedy can be had at the polls." BlIrt v. City olJdaho Falls. 105 Idaho 65,
68,665 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1983) quoting Cooper, 101 Idaho at 410,614 P.2d at 950. While
legislative actions by counties are subject to collateral actions such as declaratory judgments,
they cannot be attacked by a petition for judicial review. Id: See also Scott v. Gooding County,
137 Idaho 206, 208, 46 P.3d 23, 25 (2002).

2.

The County's Actions are wholly legislative in nature

In the present action, the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, and zoning map are countywide legislation affecting the entire county. As general legislation pertaining to "many parcels
of property in disparate ownership", they are wholly legislative in character. Burl, 105 Idaho at
67,665 P.2d at 1075. This Court intimated that the zoning map is quasi-judicial in nature citing
the Cooper court's finding that the action of the Board of Commissioners in acting upon

re:::oning request was quasi-judicial in nature.
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By virtue of the word "rezone" this Court

determined that the proceeding was quasi-judicial in nature. Cooper is wholly different from the
present situation. In Cooper, the Appellants themselves had submitted an application to rezone
specific property. The Court held that the "application for rezone oL\pecffic property required a
decision in the nature of an administrative, quasi-judicial determination of individual rights:'

Cooper, 101 Idaho at 409.614 P.2d at 949 (Emphasis added). In contrast to Cooper, the County
zoning map does not affect a single piece of property pursuant to a specific application by a
specific applicant, but to the county as a whole.

As expressed in Burt, such actions are

legislative in nature and are not afforded judicial review under LLUP A.

B.
Statutory Remedies are Unavailable to Plaintiff: LLUPA does not provide Plaintiff
judicial appellate review in legislative, as opposed to quasi-judicial activity.
The legislative vs. quasi-judicial distinction is a product of over half of a century of case
law producing a fairly straightforward rule: If the action is quasi-judicial, then it is subject to
judicial review. If the action is legislative, then it falls outside the purview ofLLUPA'sjudicial
review provisions. Strangely, the legislature does not address the distinction in the text. and with
the most recent 2008 Supreme Court decisions. Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County. 145 Idaho
630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008) and Highland's Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958,
188 P.3d 900 (2008) even the Court seems to have ignored fifty years of jurisprudence in favor
of a basic statutory interpretation: LLUPA authorizes judicial review of five, and only five,
types of permits:

variances. special use permits, subdivisions. PUD's, and building permits.

Comprehensiye Plans, Land Use Maps. Zoning Ordinances, and Zoning Maps rezoning property
are not among the enumerated accepted bases for reyiew and are not subject to the statutory
judicial reyiew pWYisions of LLUP A.
"LLUPA grants the right of judicial review to persons who haye applied for a permit
required or authorized under LLUPA and were denied the permit or aggrieved by the decision on
the application for the permit." High/and's, 145 Idaho at 962. 188 P.3d 904. The PlaintitTs
action does not pertain to a specific application or permit filed by Plaintiff nor an adjoining
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landowner.

Plaintiff is not appealing the issuance or denial of a special use permit. building

permit. variance permit, PUD permit, subdivision permit, nor any other type of permit. Plaintiff
is not appealing the issuance or denial of an application for rezone, annexation nor any other
application.

Thus, the Plaintiff does not have the standing nor the statutory authority to

commence an action against the County seeking to enforce the due process protections and
substantive dictates under LL UP A's judicial review provisions including, but not limited to,
failure to maintain a transcribable record, failure to produce written findings of fact, conclusions
of law, conflicts of interest, due process considerations, and other "substantive dictates" alluded
to by the Plaintiff.

Awarding attorney fees to the City of Boise in Highland the Supreme Court

on June 18, 2008 held "[b ]ecause there is no statute authorizing judicial review of the City's
actions in this case, we dismiss the appeal."

1.

Idaho Code §67-6521: Plaintiff cannot maintain an action as an "affected person"
LLUPA limits a litigant's ability to seek judicial review allowing only an "affected

person" to seek judicial review as provided for in the Idaho Administrative Procedural Act
(lDAPA). See Idaho Code § 67-6521(1); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74,73 P.3d 84,
87 (2003).

An "affected person" is "one having an interest in real property which may be

adversely ({fleeted by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development." §676521(l)(a) (Emphasis Added).

Plaintiffs challenges under LLUPA must be denied as a matter

of law as: 1) the Plaintiff is not challenging the issuance or denial of a permit; 2) County-wide
legislation does not authorize development; and 3) the Plaintiff does not have an interest in
property \vhich may be adversely affected.
In Giltner, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs
petition for judicial revie\v holding that the IAPA and its judicial review standards apply only to
agency actions. and a county is a local governing body and not an agency for purposes of the
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("'IAPA'').

The plaintiff in seeking to overturn Jerome

County's comprehensive plan land use map. argued that it had statutory authority to appeal this
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legislative action pursuant to Idaho Code 67-6521 as an "afTected person". The Court disagreed.
The Supreme Court unequivocally held that an
ordinance amending the comprehensive plan map does not authorize any
development. A comprehensive plan is not a legally controlling zoning law, it
serves as a guide to local government agencies charged with making zoning
decisions. . .. Because the amendment to the comprehensive plan map does not
authorize development, [the plaintiff] is not an affected person under that statute.
Therefore, Idaho Code § 67-6521 does not provide any right to provide judicial
review in this case.

Giltner. 145 Idaho at 633,181 P.3d at 1241 (2008) at 3-4.
In Highland. the Supreme Court curtailed the appellate reVIew provISIons of LLUP A
even further in applying general zoning principles. i.e. the zoning code and map, to a specific
pIece

of

property.

In

Highland.

the

applicant

submitted

an

application

entitled

"annexation/rezone" seeking annexation to the City of Boise with a zoning classification of R-3,
or three units per acre. The property's vested existing zoning in the county would have allowed
densities of up to six units per acre. The city council approved the annexation of the property,
but instead of approving the requested R-3 zoning or even the existing R-6, the property was
zoned "A" (Open) permitting only one dwelling unit per acre. The applicant sought judicial
review under LLUPA for this "downzoning" of the property. The Supreme Court held that an
application did not involve the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing development. Because
there was no statute authorizing judicial review of Boise City's actions. the case was dismissed
and the Court awarded attorney fees to the City.
Rejecting the dissent's concern that such a ruling \vill prevent property o\vners from
obtaining judicial review of decisions rezoning their property, the Court succinctly stated that "it
will noC as affected land O\vners can seek relief through a declaratory judgment action as
demonstrated in JfcCuskey v. Canyon County. 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993).
In the present action, unlike in Highland. there isn't even an application for a rezone of
specific property.

The challenged legislative activity is the enactment of countywide

comprehensive planning and zoning. Such legislatiw activity is not afforded the due process
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protections of LLUPA as evidenced by the plain text of the statute which limits such judicial
review to the "issuance or denial of a permit authorizing development". ')

Thus. Plaintiff is

precluded from invoking LL UP A's appellate provisions. 10

2.

Transcribable Verbatim Record
Similarly, Plaintiffs challenge to the County's alleged failure to maintain a

transcribable record must fail. Idaho Code §67-6536 which provides in pertinent part:
In every case in this chapter where an appeal is provided for, a transcribable
verbatim record of the proceeding shall be made... . The proceeding envisioned
by this statute for which a transcribable verbatim record must be maintained shall
include all public hearings at which testimony or evidence is received or at which
an applicant or qtfected person addresses the commission or governing board
regarding a pending application or during which the commission or governmg
board deliberates toward a decision after compilation of the record.
(emphasis added), As discussed, there is no appellate review of the County's legislative activity
as it does not pertain to a permit. Additionally, Idaho Code §67-6536 mandates a transcribable
record only for a public hearing pertaining to a pending application at which an applicant or

ciffected person addresses the Board, evidence is received, or the Board deliberates. Per Giltner
and Highlands. there is no pending application in county-wide comprehensive planning and
zonll1g.
Lastly, the County has in fact maintained a record of all public hearings pertaining to
the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance. and map.

Pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6509, a

The objective of statutory construction is to derive the intent of the legislature. which begins \vith the literal
language of the statute. Where the language is unambiguous. the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body
must be given effect. there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction. and the courts shall
apply the plain meaning. Cowan v. Board o/Com 'rs o/Fremont County. 143 Idaho at 512. 148 P.3d 1258.

'i

10 The District Coul1 in its preliminary injunctive order suggests that Idaho Code §31-IS06 seems to make any order
of the Board subject tojudicial review. Actually. the statute provides that "[u]nless otherwise provided by law". an
aggrieved person may seek judicial review of a board's actions pursuant to IAPA. The Supreme Court in the 2008
decisions. Giltner and Highlal1d~, clearly provide that the judicial review provisions of LLUPA are strictly and
statutorily limited to five. and only five. applications for a permit. Thus. the specific. on point. LLUPA statute
trumps the general Title 31 provision granting review .. [ u jnless otherwise provided by law".
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"record of the hearings, tindings made, and actions taken" shall be maintained by the County.
Audio recordings were maintained and submitted into evidence representing each and every
public hearing for all the challenged legislation. See Planning and Zoning Tape Catalog and
Board of County Commissioner Tape Catalog, Defendant Camas County's Evidence Binder, p.
225-226,333 as well Defense Exhibit T, the audio tapes themselves.

3.

Written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
Idaho Code §67 -6535 provides that the approval or denial of any application provided for

in LLUPA be based upon standards as set forth in the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance.
and to be in writing.

Plaintiff asserts that this statute requires the County to issue written

findings of fact. conclusions of law for legislative actions such as comprehensive planning and
zoning. Thus, Plaintiff asserts that all decisions relating to a comprehensive plan and zoning
ordinances must be based upon standards set forth in ... itself: the comprehensive plan and
zoning ordinance. As the Supreme Court has made patently clear in Giltner and Highlands,
there must be an application or permit to invoke the quasi-judicial review provisions of LLUPA.
Here, there is none. Lastly, the zoning ordinance, map, and comprehensive plan are all written
documents which in and of themselves are public documents or records promulgated in a public
meeting and contained in the record. See Evans v. Teton County. 139 Idaho 71. 73 P.3d 84
(2003). Res Ipsa Loquitur: the thing speaks for itself.

c.

Declaratory Judgment Action Challenges to Legislative Activitv

Idaho Code § 10-1202 provides that:
"[a]ny person ... whose rights ... are affected by a .. , municipal ordinance .. may
have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ...
ordinance ... and obtain a declaration of rights ....
Because the Plaintiff is not challenging the issuance or denial of a permit enumerated in
LLUPA. judicial review per the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act and LLUPA is precluded.
Thus. the Plaintiff is limited to challenge. in the form of a declaratory judgment action. the
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legislative activity of the County itself which is subject to a much stricter burden of proof and
limited standard of review. To prevail, the Plaintiff carries the burden to provide a clear showing
that 1) there is a justiciable case or controversy; 2) that he has standing to bring a declarative
action: 3) that the ordinance in question was confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, and
CaprIClOUS; 4) that the Plaintitf has suffered actual harm or a substantial right has been
prejudiced; and 5) the nexus that this actual harm was caused by the County's actions.

1.

Preliminary Threshold Requirements: An Actual or Justiciable Controversy
As a matter of constitutional and state law, a declaratory judgment may only be rendered

vvhere an actual or justiciable controversy exists lodged by one who has suffered particularized
or personal harm that is different than that suffered by any other member of the public. Harris v.

Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984). Miles v. Idaho Power Co .. 116
Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989); Selkirk-Priest Basin Assoc., Inc. v. State ex reI. Batt,
128 Idaho 831, 834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996).
"Although the Declaratory ludgment Act, Idaho Code Title 10, chapter 12, bestows the
authority to declare rights, status, or other legal relations, that authority is circumscribed by the
rule that 'a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an actual or justiciable
controversy exists'." Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006)

quoting Harris, 106 Idaho at 516, 681 P.2d at 991. Generally, justiciability questions are
divisible into several sub-categories including, but not limited to standing and mootness. Id. See
also Miles. 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.2d at 761.

Thus, a preliminary consideration prior to

addressing potential challenges as to the validity of the ordinances is \vhether there is a
justiciable controversy:

1) Has the matter been rendered moot?

2) Does the Plaintiff have

standing to bring this cause of action; and. 3) Is the Plaintiff s requested relief a legally viable
and cognizable interest?
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a.

flfootlless

On or about May 12, 2008, the County adopted the 2008 Comprehensive Plan,
Comprehensive Plan Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map which by operation of law
repealed all predecessor ordinances and resolutions in conflict there\vith. As such, the remedy,
an injunction of the 2007 plans and ordinances, is merely academic as the present controversy
itself is thereby rendered moot in all respects. "A case becomes moot when the issues presented
are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Goodson v.
Nez Perce County Board of County Commissioners, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993 P.2d 614,616
(2000). "A case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will
have no practical effect upon the outcome." lei. See also Cowan, 143 Idaho at 509, 148 P.3d at
1255.

In Goodson, the plaintiffs alleged that procedural violations were committed in the

promulgation of a 1996 personnel policy manual. During the pendency of the cause of action,
the Board of County Commissioners adopted a 1997 version of the personnel policy manual.
The Supreme Court determined the cause of action was rendered moot. The adoption of the
1997 manual withdrew the application of the 1979 and 1996 versions of the manual and it was
therefore unnecessary for the court to determine whether the commission breached the
employees' contract by adopting the 1996 manual.
In C0>1Ian, the plaintiff argued that the board committed due process errors in granting an
application for a preliminary plat. The Supreme Court held that the Board's subsequent approval
of a second application for preliminary plat rendered the litigation concerning alleged procedural
and substantive violations committed in processing the first application moot. "Therefore, there
is no live controversy. and the plaintitr s arguments relating to the first application are moot:'

Id. Cowan, 143 Idaho at 509, 148 P.3d at 1255. "The appellants have received all the relief to
\vhich they might have been found to be entitled. Only hypothetical questions remain. It being
impossible for this court to grant appellants other or additional relief: we \vill not proceed to
formal judgment on the hypothetical issues but will dismiss the appeal." In Re Doe I. 179 P.3d
300.301 (2008) quoting Dorman v.

YOUI1f;,
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80 Idaho 435, 437.332 P.2d 480, 481 (1958).

In the present action, the Plaintiff has sought injunctive relief pertaining to the adoption
of the 2007 Zoning Ordinance and Map and Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map. Ordinance
No. 157 enacts a ne\v zoning ordinance repealing all prior zoning ordinances.
158 enacts a new zoning map repealing all prior zoning maps.

Ordinance No.

Resolution No. 15 enacts a new

comprehensive plan and land use map repealing all prior comprehensive plans.

Thus, the

Plaintiffs action to enjoin prior ordinances and resolutions shall be rendered moot as the remedy
for alleged errors committed in the 2007 ordinances have become hypothetical. As such, there is
no justiciable case or controversy and the case should be dismissed as a matter of law.

h.

Standing
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides authority for a court to render declaratory

judgments.

State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63. 69. 822 P.2d 960, 966 (1991). However, the

Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring the
action in the first instance. Selkirk-Priest, 128 Idaho at 834, 919 P.2d at 1035.

Standing,

meaning a party's right to seek judicial enforcement of a right, is a "fundamental prerequisite" to
invoking the jurisdiction of the courts. Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 800. 53 P.3d 1217.
1219 (2002). "It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to
invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing." Van Valkenhurgh v. Citizens for Term Limits,
135 Idaho 121, 125, 15 P .3d 1129. 1132 (2000). Standing is a component of the constitutionallybased case-or-controversy rule and the threshold necessary to obtain standing cannot be
legislated to require less than the constitutional test. ,Voh. 137 Idaho at 801. 53 P.3d at 1220. In
other words. the declaratory judgment act is not a forum for those \vith general complaints about
the conduct of one' s local governing board. When considering whether a party has standing. the
focus is on the party, not the issues the party raises. Jliles. 116 Idaho at 641. 778 P.2d at 763.
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the
court's jurisdiction has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the
presentation upon which the court so depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions." As rdined by subsequent reformation. this requirement
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of "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a "distinct
palpable injury" to the plaintifl but also a "fairly traceable" causal connection
between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.

ld. To satisfy the standing requirement, the Plaintiff must "allege or demonstrate an injury in
fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the
claimed injury:' ld. Or, put differently, the Plaintiff must possess a "personal stake" in the
controversy. See Rural Kootenai Org.. Inc. v. Board of Comm 'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 84 L 993 P.2d
596, 604 (1999). Indeed, the Plaintiff must show a "peculiar or personal injury that is different
than that suffered by any other member of the public." Selkirk-Priest, 128 Idaho at 834, 919
P.2dat 1035.
Where the courts have upheld the standing of a plaintiff in a land use matter. a central
factor in establishing standing was plaintiffs proximity to the affected areas coupled with a
particularized harm. In Cowan, an applicant wished to subdivide high density home sites on a
parcel immediately adjacent to Cowan's property; a predominantly rural low density area. Thus,
as the application concerned a specific parcel of property, the case was properly brought as a
petition for judicial review invoking increased scrutiny and protections. The Court determined
that Cowan had standing to bring the action as his property, immediately adjacent to the
proposed subdivision would be adversely impacted by a high density subdivision. In AlcCuskey,
the appellant challenged the Canyon County Zoning Ordinance because it downzoned his
property from heavy industrial to a rural residential. The court found that he had standing by
virtue of the actual downzone of his property.
In 5·;chncidcr, an adjacent land owncr to a proposed subdivision sought to enforce a road
easement through the subdivision. The adjacent landowner was held to have standing by virtue
of his literal connection to the proposed subdivision and the harm sutTered should he lose such
access to his property.

In Butlers v. Hauser, 131 Idaho 498, 501. 960 P.2d 18 L 184 (1998) the

plaintiff challenged a Latah County approval of an applicant's conditional usc permit to erect a
radio transmission tcmer. While an important factor, the Court reasoned that even the proximity
is not enough to achieve standing; that individualized harm was the paramount requirement:
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[A] grievance relating to status as an owner of land within a designated area does
not relieve a complainant of the necessity of demonstrating a "distinct palpable
injury" traceable to the challenged governmental conduct. It is the quality or
magnitude of the injury suffered which must differentiate a plaintiff from the
citizenry at large in order to confer standing. The situs of owned property in
relationship to an area touched by an ordinance is relevant to a standing inquiry
only insofar as the property's location exposes the landowner to peculiarized
harm.

ld. The court in Butters determined that the plaintiff had standing by virtue that she O\\<l1ed land
in close proximity to the tower; the tower loomed over her land; and its physical invasiveness
affected her enjoyment of her property.
Although the location of her property alone does not confer standing, the location
does expose her to peculiarized harm. In particular, Butters contends that she had
to spend $1,500 for a new telephone system to eliminate the tower's radio signal
from her telephone and that the tower's radio signal still broadcasts through her
daughter's compact disc system.

ld. In Bopp v. City a/Sandpoint, 110 Idaho 488. 716 P.2d 1260 (1986), the plaintitT challenged a
city ordinance vacating a public right-of-way in a bridge and the city's subsequent lease of the
underlying property for development of a shopping center. The Supreme Court held that because
Bopp, who owned no property adjacent to the vacated right-of-way. asserted no injury peculiar to
himself, but only such injury as was sustained by the general pUblic, he could not maintain the
declaratory judgment action.
In Young v. City of Ketchum. 137 Idaho 102.44 P.3d 1157 (2002), the Supreme Court
held that the plaintifTs lacked standing to challenge a services contract between the city and the
local chamber of commerce under which the chamber agreed to distribute tourist information and
promote the area. The city paid for those services from revenues raised by a local option tax. The
plaintiffs alleged that they vvere indirectly injured because: (a) the chamber's activities under the
contract would attract visitors and second homeo\vners. vvhich would drive up the plaintitTs' land
values. thereby increasing their real estate taxes: (b) the plaintiffs vvould ultimately pay the tax
because the businesses that ,vere taxed ,vould pass the cost on to their customers: and (cl the
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money that the city paid to the chamber under the contract would reduce the city's funds
available for essential services, causing the city to increase levies against the plaintiffs'
properties. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they "do not point to any
irtiury that is not shared alike by all citizens and taxpayers in the City nor have they alleged that
the relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury:' 137 Idaho at 106, 44 P.3d at
1161.

The Plaintiff has wholly failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the Comprehensive
Plan and Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map has caused him to suffer any
actual, threatened, or particularized harm. Plaintiff owns the following parcels of property in
Camas County:
1)

Property: forty acre parcel at 770 E. 240 N.
a. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned Agricultural (A);
b. After the amendments, the property was zoned Agricultural (A).
c. Result: No change.

2)

Property: twenty-nine acre parcel west of Soldier road.
a. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was Agricultural (A) allowing one
unit per twenty acres;
b. After the amendments. the property was zoned Residential, allowing one unit per
acre.
c. Result: the property was upzoned.

3)

Property: two one acre lots, Lots 3 and 4 Blk 5, within the existing, approved, and
platted Homestead Subdivision entitling one acre lots.
a. Prior to the 2007 amendments. the properties are zoned Agricultural Transitional
(AT):
b. After the amendments. the property was zoned Agricultural (AS) although such
zoning designations are some\vhat irrelevant in a legally vested, existing
subdivision.
c. Result: no change.
Other than his status as a county land owner. the Plaintiff has presented no additional

evidence tending to demonstrate how his property was actually or potentially harmed. Plaintiff
has failed to shc)\', that his property might be in a related proximity or is otherwise affected by
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the zoning change of an adjacent or related property.

Plaintiff claims that his property was

purchased ""vith the intention" of subdivision and development. Plaintiff testified that the only
harm suffered was his opinion that he now had increased competition in the development market.
He did not provide a basis to demonstrate that he has a cognizable substantial right or interest in
limited competition.
As Giltner and Highland suggest. a comprehensive plan. zoning ordinance, and zoning
map do not by their very legislative nature confer a right to develop. but are merely legislation
applicable to property county-wide. The state legislature granted local governing boards the
authority to exercise legislative judgment in determining the appropriate zoning designation
throughout its jurisdiction -

an individual has no right to a particular zone.

An applicant's

rights are determined by the zoning and other ordinances in effect at the time of application. See

South Fork Coalition v. Board (~l Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857. 861, 792 P.2d
882, 886 (1990).

The Plaintiff does not bring this declarative judgment action to appeal a

denied penn it or application.

Instead, he challenges the ordinances themselves.

Without an

application, there is no right to a particular zone; w"ithout a right to a particular zone, there can be
no injury. Had he demonstrated that his property suffered an injury, he might have a cause of
action via a declaratory judgment. However, he is merely attacking the validity of the County's
legislation by virtue of his status as a landowner in the County.

Plaintiffs harm is purely

speculative based upon a non-existent right and he does not have standing to bring this cause of
action.

2.

Restrained Standard of Review in Challenges to Legislative Actions
"Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity including

the board's application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinances:' Spencer v. Kootenai

County. 145 Idaho 448.180.184. P.3d 487. 491 (2008).

In making the determination [whether the zoning ordinance can be upheld],
hO\vever, we note that our review of decisions of zoning authorities is limited.
Zoning is essentially a politicaL rather than a judicial matter, over which the
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legislative authorities have, generally speaking. complete discretion ... , It is not
the function of this Court or of the trial courts to sit as super zoning commissions.

Dawson Enterprises. Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 511, 567 P .2d 1257, 1262 (1977).
Legislative actions are to be evaluated with a restricted standard of review; as a fom1 of judicial
deference to legislative actions. Cooper, 101 Idaho at 410, 614 P.2d at 950: Gay v. County

Commissioners of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 627 651 P.2d 560, 561 (Idaho App. 1982).
Judicial review of legislative actions of a local zoning board is limited to a review of whether the
action is arbitrary and capricious. Cooper, 101 Idaho at 409,614 P.2d at 949. Courts are not
justified in preventing the enforcement of a legislative enactment by declaring it invalid unless it
is a clear violation of some provision of the Constitution. It is not for the Court to endorse or
criticize the value of specific legislative enactments, because the political process is better suited
to contend with the complex questions of public policy and competing social interest.
"Legislative action is shielded from direct judicial review by its high visibility and widely felt
impact, on the theory that the appropriate remedy can be had at the polls:' Burt, 105 Idaho at 68,
665 P.2d at 1078 quoting Cooper, 101 Idaho at 410,614 P.2d at 950. In the absence of some
procedural, statutory, or constitutional flaw in the ordinance, the party challenging a zoning
ordinance must demonstrate that it bears no "substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare." Dmt'son, 98 Idaho at 511, 567 P.2d at 1262. "This restrained
standard of review is appropriate to such legislative detenninations as the adoption of
comprehensive plans or the enactment of general zoning ordinances," Burt, 105 Idaho at 68, 665
P.2d at 1078.
"The burden of proving that thc ordinance is invalid rests upon the litigant who attacked
the validity of the ordinance." Dawson. 98 Idaho at 511. P.2d at 1262.
A strong presumption exists in favor of the validity of local zoning ordinances.
The burden of proving that the ordinance is invalid rests upon the party
challenging its validity and the presumption in favor of validity can be overcome
only by a clear showing that the ordinance as applied is confiscatory, arbitrary,
unreasonable. and capricious. Where there is a basis for a reasonable difference
of opinion. or if the validity of legislative classification for zoning purposes is
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debatable. a court may not substitute its jUdgment for that of the local zonIng
authority.
Sprenger, Grubb, & Associates v, City

(~lHailey,

127 Idaho 576. 581 903 P.2d 741. 745 (1995);

see also Burt. 105 Idaho 66. 665 P,2d 1076; Cowan. 143 Idaho at 509, 148 P.3d at 1255. ("In
such instances, the decision will not be disturbed absent a clear showing that it is confiscatory,
arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious." )

3.

Actual Harm
Thus, the Plaintiff bears the burden to present clear evidence that the Comprehensive

Plan and Zoning Ordinance are confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious in violation
of constitutional or statutory principles. Additionally. however, the Plaintiff bears the burden to
demonstrate a nexus; that such error caused the plaintiff actual harm or prejudiced a substantial
right of the Plaintiff.
While real or potential harm is sufficient to have standing to bring a declarative action,
Plaintiff cannot meet his burden unless he can clearly demonstrate that he has suffered actual
harm.

Even in quasi-judicial proceedings protected by LLUPA requires such actual harm.

"Only those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental
rights. not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy ... ," See Idaho Code §676535(c). Further, even if the Plaintiff can demonstrate that the County committed error, such as
a defective notice, the error alone cannot serve to enjoin the County's zoning ordinances and
comprehensive plan. Plaintiff must show error and demonstrate the proper nexus that the error
actually caused his alleged harm or prejudiced his substantial rights. COl ran. 143 Idaho at 513,
148 P.3d at 1259.

He must demonstrate that any errors committed in enacting the

comprehensive plan or zoning ordinances. as applied to his property. was confiscatory, arbitrary,
unreasonable. and void. 5j)renger, 127 Idaho at 751, 903 P.2d at 586,
Plaintin"s prope11y remains unchanged. He has provided no evidence tending to shoyv
harm of any kind.

Increased competition does not provide a basis of actual harm.
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He has

provided no evidence tending to show that adjacent properties \vere upzoned to his detriment.
He has provided no evidence to show that his property has been downzoned. In short, Plaintiff
appears to be seeking injunctive relief pursuant to a petition for judicial review as opposed to a
civil declaratory action in vvhich damages are alleged and proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.

D.
Plaintiff's Declarative Action Challenges to the Validitv of the Ordinance must fail
as a matter of law
1.
Procedural Due Process - Notice and an Opportunity to be heard
Quasi-judicial actions are subject to strict due process constraints requmng that an
affected person is afforded some process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived
of his rights in violation of state or federal constitutions. In a quasi-judicial zoning decision, in
order to meet constitutional due process requirements, an individual must be provided with
notice and an opportunity to be heard. This is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Plaintiff is not an
affected party pursuant to LLUP A.

Thus, Plaintiff is not afforded stricter constitutional due

process protections. Nonetheless, the adoption of comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and
maps do have statutory notice and hearing provisions such that the failure to adhere to such
statutory requirements could deny an affected party notice and opportunity to be heard.
For example in AfcCuskey, Canyon County issued a stop work order to the plaintiff who
was building a gas station on land recently do\vnzoned from industrial to residential.

The

plaintitI sought a declarative judgment declaring the ordinance downzoning his property void
because he had not received notice of the hearing.

The Idaho Supreme Court agreed on

procedural grounds holding that the Plaintiff was challenging the enactment of the ordinance as
opposed to an argument that the authorities made the wrong decision.

Further, as the zoning

ordinance affected the plaintiffs land, i.e. the downzoning was a particularized harm, McCuskey
was entitled to mailed notice of the hearing pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6511 (b). Of import to
note, the court did 110t substitute its judgment as to whether the property should have been
dowl1zoned. Further. the court did not simply find that the county failed to follo\v procedural
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statutory guidelines.

Rather. the court limited its reVIew as to \vhether the plaintiff I) had

suffered harm; 2) was entitled to notice; and 3) had received notice. If all three elements were
met, then and only then, did the court have the power to void the county's legislation due to its
statutory procedural error.

Q.
Plaintiff's Claim that he was denied due process for the Comprehensive Plan and
Zoning Ordinance and Map Public Hearings
Idaho Code §67-6509 provides the notice and hearing requirements necessary to adopt

or amend a comprehensive plan II and, by reference from Idaho 67 -6511, a zoning ordinance. 12
The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission conducted at least one public
hearing in adopting the Comprehensive Plan including the land use map in which interested
persons had the opportunity to be heard. In fact, the planning commission conducted multiple
hearings on the comprehensive plan on March 28, 2006, April

4th,

II t,\ and 1ih, 2006. Legal

notices of the time and place of the hearings were published in the Camas County Courier and
the copies of the plan and map were available for review prior to the hearing.

All public

II Idaho Code §67-6509 provides for the following requirements:

I) The planning and zoning commission shall conduct at least one public hearing in which interested
persons shall have an opportunity to be heard:
2) Notice of the time and place and a summary of the plan shall be published in the official newspaper at
least tlfteen (15) days prior to the hearing;
3) Notice of intent to ... amend the plan shall be sent to all political subdivisions providing services within
the planning jurisdiction, including school districts, at least fifteen (15) days prior to the public hearing.
4) If the commission recommends a material change to the proposed amendment considered at the hearing,
it shall give notice of its proposed recommendation and conduct another public hearing unless the
governing board conducts a subsequent public hearing. I f so. notice of the planning and zoning
commission recommendation shall be included in the notice of public hearing provided by the governing
board.
S) The County shall keep a record of the hearings. findings made. and actions taken by the commission.
6) The board may also conduct at least one (I) public hearing using the same notice and hearing procedures
as the commission.
7) The governing board shall only hold said public hearing after receiving the commissions'
recommendation.
8) If the governing board makes a material change in the recommendation or. further notice and hearing shall be
provided before the governing board.
12 Idaho Code ~67-6511 provides that the board may amend its zoning ordinance by adhering to the notice and
hearing requirements of 67 -6509 as well as other posting requirements with regard to Loning district changes.
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hearings were recorded. Plaintiff attended and testified at length at each and every hearing. The
planning commission recommended its approval to the board on April 17.2006.
The Board of County Commissioners conducted a public hearing for the comprehensive
plan and land use map on May 17, 2006 and thereafter deliberated on May 22 and 25, 2006
adopting the comprehensive plan on or about May 25, 2006. Resolution 96 (Defendant's Trial
Exhibits. p. 416). To include all land within the county, the board conducted an additional public
hearing on the comprehensive plan to include the largely uninhabited northern portion of the
county and adopted Resolution 103 on or about March 29, 2007 which is mostly uninhabited
public land. Plaintiff attended and testified at all public hearings. All meetings were recorded.
The Planning and Zoning Commission conducted at least one public hearing in adopting
the zoning ordinance and map in which interested persons had the opportunity to be heard.
Public hearings were held on October 10, 2006, October 17. and the commission thereafter
deliberated ultimately providing its recommendation to the Board on October 24, 2006. Legal
notices of the time and place of the hearings were published in the Camas County Courier and
the copies of the zoning ordinance and map were available for review prior to the hearing. All
public hearings were recorded.

Plaintiff attended and testified at length at each and every

hearing.
Plaintiff was afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and presented considerable
evidence over the course of several years worth of public workshops. meetings, and ultimately at
every public hearing.

He did not ever miss a public hearing.

Plaintiff alleges numerous

procedural errors pertaining to the enactment of comprehensive plan and land use map and
petitions this court to void the County's legislation.

If any alleged procedural errors were

committed. Plaintiff \\holly fails to demonstrate any violation of his right to procedural due
process.

He points to nothing in the record which indicates that his substantial rights were

prejudiced by virtue of a procedural error: Sj)encer, 145 Idaho at 453. 180 P.3d at 492. He fails
to show that he was not afforded a meaningful and adequate opportunity to be heard. !d.
('011'(/11.

the court noted:
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[TJhe Board concedes that both notices were defective. Nonetheless, Cowan has
failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by either
defective notice. First, Cowan's counsel attended the ... hearing and submitted a
brief objecting to notice. Moreover, Cowan spoke against the application at that
hearing. Therefore, even if the notice were defective, Cowan has failed to
demonstrate how this defect prejudiced his substantial rights since he clearly had
notice of the meeting.

Co·wan. 143 Idaho at 513,148 P.3d at 1259. PlaintifTattended and testified at all public hearings
before both the planning and zoning commission hearings and at the board hearings and thus had
actual notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Plaintiffs actual notice and attendance
act as a waiver to the County's alleged defective notice. The nexus connecting any alleged
procedural error and substantive right of the PlaintifT is simply not present. 13

b. Conflict of Interest - Denial of Due Process?

In order to overturn the County's legislative activity, Plaintiff bears the burden to
demonstrate that a substantial right was prej udiced or he suffered actual harm due to a County
board or commission member's conflict of interest. Idaho Code §67-6506 provides that areas or
interests of the County shall be broadly represented on the commission. It further provides that
members of the planning and zoning commission and the county board shall not participate in
any proceeding or action when he has an economic interest in the procedure or action. As with
other due process challenges discussed, the Plaintiff bears the burden to not only demonstrate
that a conflict of interest exists but also that a substantial right of the Plaintiff has been
prejudiced; that he has suffered actual. particularized harm as a result of this contlict of interest;
i.e. a nexus between the alleged contlict of interest and the prejUdice or particularized harm
sutTered by Plaintiff.

1:\ Plaintiff additionally alleges that the County did not send notice to all political subdivisions providing services in
the planning area. Again. should sllch a procedural error exist Plaintiff must carry its burden to show how this
defect prejudiced his substantial clue process rights. Again. the nexus of the defect precipitating or causally relating
to his particularized injury is absent
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In Jfanookian v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697 (1987), the applicant sought a conditional
use permit to construct an electrical transmission lines. Three potential routes "vere identified to
locate the lines: 1) the "Idaho Power route" which ran through property owned by two of the
planning and zoning commissioners; 2) the "desert route" which runs away from the planning
commissioners' property; and 3) the route ultimately approved by the planning and zoning
commissioners, the "toe of the hills route", which crossed the property owned by the plaintiffs.
The court reasoned that utility transmission lines, either the Idaho Power or Desert route
impacted the Commissioners' land both physically and visually and thus constituted an economic
interest. Similarly, the chosen route impacted the plaintiffs property.
The present action is distinguishable from Afanoonkian. In l\Ianoonkian, the properties
owned by the planning members were the subject of a specific application.

The members

specifically diverted attention from their own properties which would have suiler particularized
harm.

Instead, the plaintiff s property was burdened.

Thus, there was a causal and spatial

connection, a nexus, between the respective properties as possible locations for the power lines.
In contrast. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he has suffered actual, particularized harm.
His properties remain unaffected, even benefited, by the zoning map.

There has been no

evidence presented that suggests a nexus, a spatial proximity, or some interest between the
Plaintiff s property and the Board and Commission members.
Seemingly, the County members are deemed to have a conflict of interest causing harm
to Plaintiff merely because they are property owners within the County. County members are
required to reside in the County to even be eligible to serve as a public servant. This author's
review of the case law fails to identify a case that holds that. in the adoption of county-wide
zoning legislation which affects all properties within the county of disparate O\vnership among
an entire class of citizens, a contlict of interest is nonetheless deemed to exist by virtue of the
commission members' mere ownership of property within the jurisdiction.

The evidence

demonstrates that the governing board member properties were zoned as pm1 of a county-wide
zoning plan based upon independent. historical. sound planning principles. There is no evidence
suggesting that a change in zoning designations "vere motivated by an eC01101l11C interest
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resulting in an economic benefit to the board members or harm to the plaintiff The Plaintiff's
property is not adjacent to, in the vicinity of, nor does it bear any relationship to the
governmental members' property other than being located within the same county and identified
on the same county-\vide zoning map.

Plaintiff must show a nexus, a causal connection

demonstrating that he suffered actual harm by virtue

(~l

the board members' ownership of

property elsewhere in the County. Spencer, 145 Idaho 453,180 P.3d 492; Cowan, 143 Idaho at
513, 148 P.3d 1259. Neither of these elements have been met. Idaho Code §67 -6506 has never
been applied to a legislative action.

Such an application undermines the value of having

interested land owners within the community serve as public servants; a requirement for county
boards and even for the judiciary.

2.

Substantive Statutory Challenges Pursuant to LLUPA: Res Ipsa Loquitur
Plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to be heard in the adoption of the county

legislation. In fact, he has testified at length at the myriad of informational meetings, workshops,
public meetings, and ultimately public hearings during the course of several years' worth of
comprehensive planning undertaken in the adoption of the comprehensive plan, zoning
ordinance, and zomng map.

He has attended every public hearing and more informational

meetings and workshops than anyone else in the County including the governmental members
themselves.

The simple truth is that the Plaintiff a local developer, fundamentally disagrees

\vith the direction that the elected officials have undertaken in the zoning process. He does not
feel that the elected officials have the proper professional credentials to undertake a legislative
comprehensive planning process. The courts have addressed these issues before. In Spencer, the
court provided: "[C]ontrary to Spencer's assertion, due process does not require any particular
technical or educational background on the part of the decision-maker." Spencer. 145 Idaho at
455, 180 P.3d 487 494. The Board members are elected ofticials engaged in their legislative
function. Failing at the election polls. Plaintiff now turns to the Court to invoke his political and
legislative aspirations. As Burt and subsequent cases have staunchly held. "legislative action is
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shielded from direct judicial review by its high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory
that appropriate remedy can be had at the polls:' Burt, 105 Idaho at 66, 665 P.2d at 1076.

a.

Idalto Code 67-6508: The Comprehensive Plan
Turning to the courts, the Plaintiff nonetheless alleges that he has sufficient standing and

suffered such harm that he may lodge statutory challenges to county legislation.

The vast

majority of Plaintiffs elicited testimony and argument rests upon his allegation that the Planning
and Zoning Commission and the Board failed to properly enact its Comprehensive Plan pursuant
to the "substantive dictates" of Idaho Code §67-650S.

Said Section provides that the

comprehensive plan itself shall be based on planning components including property rights,

population, school facilities and transportation, economic development, land use, natural
resources, hazardous areas, public services and facilities, recreation, special areas, housing,
community design, and implementation. The text of Idaho Code 67-650S is plain and clear: the
plan shall include these elements. Yet, PlaintifT s argument seems to center upon the particular

education levels of the planning members and what they specifically discussed at the open
meetings. The testimony revealed that the planning and zoning members and the board members
did in fact consider the efficacy of the comprehensive plan, page for page, and simply did not
feel that the text itself needed significant revision from the original 1997 enactment. 14 The main
focus of the plan revision was the land use map itself. The fact that the Plaintiff, who testified at
length over the course of several years, disagreed is simply not relevant. The comprehensive
plan is in compliance with Idaho Code §67-650S. As the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur so
provides, the thing speaks for itself as it the required planning components. S'ee Delendant
('wnw; County's Eridence Binder. p. 3./5-,/20.

b.

The Comprehensive Planning Process

11 In 1997. the County enacted its Comprehensive Plan utilizing exper1s and other professionals to enact said plan.
The testimony revealed that the county did not feel that the plan needed to be scrapped: that the findings in the 1997
plan were still viable and timely. Thus. the vast majority of the workshops, informational meetings. and testimony
at the public meetings and hearings centered on the land use map as opposed to the text.
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Idaho Code

~67-6508

also provides that the commission shall conduct a comprehensive

planning process to prepare, implement, and update its comprehensive plan. Similarly, Idaho
Code §67-6507 identifies the powers of the planning and zoning commission in relation to the
planning process. It provides that the commission shall provide for citizen meetings, hearings,
surveys, or other methods to obtain advice on the planning process and implementation of the
plan.

Thereafter, the section provides that the commission may, or in other words, has the

discretion to, consult with public officials or other professional organizations, conduct
informational meetings, etc.
Over the course of two years, the commission conducted a comprehensive planning
process updating the comprehensive plan. The commission and the board conducted multiple
infonnational workshops, public meetings, and numerous public hearings in considering an
amendment to the comprehensive plan. Even a brief perusal of the minutes or, or if the court
should wish to listen to the hundreds of hours of testimony and deliberation, the planning
commission and the Board received countless testimony and advice from citizens, governmental
agency's providing services, and experts including planners, developers, legal consultants, etc. as
to the proper course the County should undertake in the adoption of the comprehensive plan,
land use map, zoning ordinance, and map.
Even in quasi-judicial proceedings, the Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment
for the governmental entity and shall defer to the factual determinations of the governing body
unless they are clearly erroneous, even where there is conflicting evidence before the governing
body so long as the determinations are supported by evidence in the record. Spencer, 145 Idaho
at 452, 180 P.3d at 491.

In legislative actions, the governing board's decision shall not be

"disturbed absent a clear shovving that it is confiscatory, arbitrary. unreasonable or capricious:'

Burt. 66. 1076.

Further. in order to overturn the Board's action. this Court would have to find

that the Board erred and then that a substantial right of the Plaintiff has been prejudiced by the
County's alleged error. Spencer. 145 Idaho at 457. 180 P.3d at 497.

The Plaintiff has not

provided evidence and cannot bear its burden to demonstrate the County did not sufficiently
conduct a comprehensive planning process or how a comprehensive plan with a t:1Ulty planning
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component prejudices his substantial rights. A comprehensive plan confers no property right. It
applies county-\vide to mUltiple properties.
Even if this \vere a quasi-judicial proceeding, the County's determinations are binding on
this Court provided there is substantial and competent evidence. Spencer. 145 Idaho at 456, 180
P.3d at 495. Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance. but more than a scintilla. Id
Such a burden is met if reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder. Id.
In legislative actions, the court has even less or "limited" review.

Affording the legislative

branch nearly complete discretion. a plaintiff must make a clear showing that the comprehensive
plan is confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious. Dawson. 98 Idaho at 506, 567 P.2d
at 1257.

Additionally, a party seeking to attack a comprehensive plan must demonstrate that

this error has caused him actual harm.
The County conducted a comprehensive planning process.

A reView of the record

demonstrates many years of input, testimony, and consideration of the Comprehensive Plan and
its included land use map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map. The Plaintiff brings this action,
not to repair an actual particularized harm suffered, but to have this Court substitute its own
judgment for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff was provided a meaningful opportunity to present testimony
at all levels. His remedy is more appropriately to be felt at the polls.
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III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiffs cause of action
be dismissed: that the Court submit its Judgment upon said claim against the County pursuant to
IRCP 54(b), and that Defendant be awarded attorney fees.

Dated this

--,i
v ~

day of September. 2008.

MOORE SMITH BUXTON

&

TURCKL CHTD.

Attorney for the County Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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sr~

VS

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoinl~n
this _ __
day of September. 2008 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner:

Christopher P. Simms
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, ID 83340

Mail
Fascimile
Hand Service

Vh/ United Stales mail

Paul
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IN THE DISTRICT COllRT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 81 . INE COUNTY

GtT0\,+s

C®
GEORGE MARTIN.

)

)

) Case No.: CV -2007-24

Plaintiff,

)

and
MARTIN CUSTOM HOMES. LLC,
vs.

)
) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
) LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED
) COMPLAINT
)
)

)

ED SMITH.
Defendant
and
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO,
By and through the duly elected
Board of Commissioners in
Their official and individual capacities,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

KEN BAXTROM.
BILL DAVIS, and
RON CHAPMAN

)
)
)
)

Defendants.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The procedural history and present posture of this case is particularly
important with regard to this motion. In his original complaint, Nlartin
brought causes of action against Camas County seeking judgment declaring
that certain zoning ordinances passed by Camas County in 200612007 \vere
Order on

Plain(ifr~

Motion for Leave

to

File Amended Complaint -- I

invalid and violated existing law. Combined with the original declaratory
judgment are claims by which Martin seeks civil damages against Ed Smith
individually, and the Camas County commissioners in their official

capacities.
The court has heard the declaratory judgment action over the

200612007 amendments in toto. In the process of getting to trial on this first
declaratory judgment action, the court has issued 2 injunctions, one
determining that the Board of Commissioners of Camas County failed to
keep a trancribable verbatim record, and the other determining that conflicts
of interest existed. Evidence obtained during hearings over these preliminary
injunction issues were combined with trial evidence pursuant to IRCP
65( a)(2).

Trial was held on this first declaratory judgment issue in Camas
County on August 20, 2008. Post trial briefs are currently being submitted,
and the court will take the matter under advisement immediately. By
agreement of counsel, all claims for money damages against all defendants
have been reserved for a subsequent trial at a later time, and those issues

have not yet been set/or trial.
On August 8, 2008, shortly before trial, Martin filed a lvlotion/or

Leave to Amend Petition by Adding Two Additional Causes a/Action. This
motion was submitted on briefing submitted post-trial. This motion seeks to
add new claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as a part of the existing
case, as to new ordinances passed by Camas County in 2008. It also seeks
to add new civil damages claims against Camas County, and the Board 0/

Cornrnissioners in their individual capacities, for violations of Section 1983

Order

011

Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint -- 2

of the Civil Rights Act, alleging both due process and equal protection
violations. As noted, the existing pending civil damage claims against these
same defendants have been split off from the declaratory judgment claims by
agreement of counsel, and have not yet been set for trial.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
One of the pending issues is whether the court should allow plaintifT
to amend his complaint, post-trial, on the declaratory judgment issues, to
incorporate new matters that have occurred since the original filing.
Although not specifically addressed by the parties, (because both parties
have taken an "all or nothing approach" to the proposed pleading
amendment) a separate issue is whether the court should allow a partial
amendment to the complaint as to the civil damage issues that are still
pending for trial. Another issue, addressed but unclear, is whether the court
can bifurcate the declaratory judgment issues, that have already been tried,
from the pending civil damages issues for purposes of an appeal, so that the
parties can get a resolution of the declaratory judgment issues at the
Supreme COUli, without having to wait for trial on civil damage issues that
have little in common factually or legally with the declaratory judgment to
be rendered.
The starting point for this analysis is IRCP 15. The court recognizes
under Rule I5(a) that in the ordinary case, if a trial is not pending, or there is
no prejudice, leave to amend should be freely given. The court also
recognizes this is a discretionary decision. Jones v. Watson 98 Idaho 606,
570 P.2d 284 (1977), Hines v. Hines 129 Idaho 847,934 P.2d 20 (1997).
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Plaintiff l\;lartin argues under Rule 15( d) that the amendment here
should be allowed as his new pleading involves occurrences or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be amended. That
much is true. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the evidence
necessary to address these new claims is entirely different from the original
cause of action, that the trial on the original cause of action has already been
held (at least as to the declaratory judgment issues), and thus any
amendment will open up new avenues of discovery and delay, citing Black

Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc, v. Idaho First National Bank 119 Idaho 171,
804 P.2d 900 (1991), and Hinkle v. Winey 126 Idaho 993, 895 P.2d 594 (Ct.
App. 1995).
The court finds that the new allegations, at least as to the declaratory

judgment causes of action, are based on events that have happened since the
filing of the original complaint, but they will involve new evidence, new
discovery, and application of new legal theory or principles. To elaborate,
plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint, as to the relief seeking

declaratOlY judgment, that Camas County failed to properly enact
ordinances, and conduct administrative hearings involving zoning
amendments passed in 2008. Although it is true that plaintiff's original
complaint alleged some of the same general sort oflegal defects as to
ordinances and hearings conducted in 2006 and 2007, the defects alleged in
the proposed amended complaint are not founded on the same facts as the
prior complaint- indeed, they are founded on allegations as to what Camas
County did or did not do in passing the 2008 amendments. The court can
tell, simply from the attachments submitted with the Verified Application for
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Temporary Restraining Order, and the allegations of the new complaint, that
Camas County utilized a ditTerent, more thorough process in 2008 than it did
with the 2006, 2007 amendments. Whether this process (in 2008) was
adequate will not involve an examination of the same questions raised in the
attack on the 2006, 2007 ordinance amendments. It may involve some of the
same or similar questions, but it is apparent that it will involve, at a
minimum, new discovery based on new facts and events, and the application
of some different legal principles. This is not as straightforward as Camas
County simply putting a new coat of paint over old defects. Moreover, the
declaratory judgment issues raised by the initial complaint have already been
tried, and briefed, and those matters are due to be taken under advisement
forthwith by the court. Finally, akin to the situation in Hinkle v. Winey,
supra, there is no showing of any prejudice to Martin if he is required to
resolve these new declaratory judgment claims in a separate action. This is
where they would be best resolved. As will be more fully addressed below,
there is simply no good reason to tie these new declaratory judgment claims
in with the old ones.

I

The motion for leave to file an amended complaint with regard to new
claims for declaratory judgment is DENIED.
The next issue is whether the new civil claims set forth by Martin in
his proposed amended complaint (violation of due process and equal

I Although in his proposed amended complaint Martin makes an alternative claim for a Petition for Judicial
Review. his pleading does not seem to address the judicial review factors. Whether it does or does not is of
no moment. however. as the Idaho Supreme Court recently determined an action for Judicial Review
could not be combined with a civil action. Euclid Arcf1uc Trust v. Cit)' o./Boisc Supreme Court Opinion No.
107. Docket No. 33974. filed Sept 23. 2008. Accordingly. this COllrt need not address where that
particular allegation falls under this motion.
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protection rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983) should be treated differently
than his claims for declaratory relief. As noted, these claims are directed at
the members of the Camas County Board of Commissioners personal!.v and
individually. Also as noted, tv1artin has existing civil damage claims against
Ed Smith and Camas County seeking money damages, which claims are not
currently set for trial and remain pending. These civil rights claims allege
violations of Martin 's rights from both the 2006/2007 amendments to the
county zoning, and the 2008 amendments as well. As such, if the cOUli did
not allow the amended complaint as to the alleged violations occurring in
2006/2007, Martin would probably lose the right to bring them. That is,

insofar as alleged violations are alleged to have occurred in 200612007, they
either needed to be brought along with the original claims made in this case,
or they would likely be barred. See Duthie v.Lewiston Gun Club 104 Idaho
751,663 P.2d 287, (1983) (Res judicata principles operate to prohibit
subsequent claims as to not only that which was litigated, but also to every
matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.)
A second reason to treat these allegations differently from the new
declaratory judgment claims is these involve questions of money damages,
are triable to a jury Uury trial is requested in the proposed amended
complaint), and there is no reason to require or allow two separate suits for
money damages between the same parties on the same facts.
The third reason to treat these claims differently is that there is no
viable claim of prejudice that can be made by the defendants. No trial date
has been set on the civil damage claims. Rule 15 (a) requires leave to amend
be freely given vvhen justice so requires, and the court determines, for the
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reasons set forth above, at least with regard to the civil damage5,' claims. that
justice requires leave be granted to amend the pleadings to allow the civil
rights claims to be pled and proved along with the other civil damage claims
now pending. See Sinclair A1ktg., Inc. v. Slepert 107 Idaho 1000, 695 P.:2d
385. The motion to amend with regard to the new civil damage claims is
GRANTED.
Finally, Camas County has raised in its brieting the necessity or
advisability of having the court issue a Rule 54(b) certificate as to the
declaratory judgment issues resolved or to be resolved by the trial held in
August 2008. Camas County has already tried to appeal those issues once,
and the court has addressed this issue previously on the record with the
parties. As this issue implicates the procedure and posture of this case (the
court is in the process of rendering judgment on the declaratory judgment
claims, there may be a new declaratory judgment action filed, and a civil
trial for damages is still pending) this issue needs attention from both the
court and the parties. The court will make no rulings on this issue at this
point, but wants the parties to carefully consider their positions here.
From the court's perspective, it makes perfect sense to celiify the
issues resolved by the declaratory judgment trial for appeal pursuant to Rule
54(b). They are unconnected legally from the civil damage claims, as they
involve entirely different questions of law. The declaratory judgment trial,
(and preliminary injunctions) revolved primarily around the failure to keep a
transcribable verbatim record, whether county officials are exempt from
contlict of interest statutes if their activity is "legislative" as opposed to
"quasi-judicial", and such things as whether a written recommendation was

Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended

sent or received from the P&Z Commission to the Board before zoning was
changed. The civil damage claims will involve a jury trial, at least in part,
and will not occur for some period of time. Of equal significance, any
decision rendered by an appellate court in Idaho as to \vhether some of the
conduct of county ot1icials (e.g.- the effect of alleged conflicts of interest) is
exempt from some provisions of law because it falls under the umbrella of
"legislative activity", or whether certain civil claims are viable under the
circumstances alleged can only help here. If guidance on the declaratory
action already tried comes before the civil trial on damages, it can only helpnot only the parties involved in this litigation but throughout Idaho. The
legal issues raised by the declaratory judgment are important questions that
need resolution-the sooner the better. If guidance is not forthcoming before
the civil trial, the parties are no worse off. If this court certifies those
declaratory judgment issues for appeal, and they are not appealed, they
become the law of the case, and the only issues that could be appealed later
would be those raised by the civil trial. In short, there are many good reasons
to certify a forthcoming judgment on the declaratory judgment issues, and
scant few to wait for the results of a relatively unconnected civil trial.
Finally, any issues as to claims or entitlement as to attorney fees should
probably be reviewed, resolved, and determined at this juncture rather than
after a civil trial, and a separate analysis conducted on the civil issues when
they are resolved. Any claims for attorney's fees against the county at this
point, and attorney's fees under civil damage claims that might be made
later, will likely involve completely different analyses under completely
ditferent statutes and standards, and the same is true under the appeal
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process. Combining those issues will only make them more complex and
harder to resolve in the future.
Having made those observations, the court is concerned about the
application of Rule 54(b )(2) to this case. As the court has indicated, the court
would be reluctant to stay the civil trial until after an appeal of the
declaratory judgment issues, which would seem to be the result mandated
by Rule 54 (b)(2) . . The court believes the best course of action is if the

parties stipulate that the declaratory judgment issues already tried will be
certified for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), that any discovery conducted in
the declaratory judgment action need not be repeated for purposes of the
pending civil action, that the issues on the civil damage claims involve a
"separate action" under the meaning or Rule 54(b )(2), the civil action for
damages will not be stayed pending appeal of the declaratory judgment
issues, that the court may determine prevailing parties, attorney's fees, and
costs upon the declaratory judgment action upon entry of a judgment in this
case, and that there will be a separate and independent review of the
attorney's fee issue in the civil action once it is resolved. How you wish to
treat attorney's fees incurred to date that may relate solely to the civil action
is up to you. The court is not ordering any of this at this time; it is only
making suggestions as to what the most expedient and et1icient method of
handling the case may be.
Although the head note under Rule 54(b )(2) says the exact opposite,
the procedure allowing an appeal with a Rule 54 (b) certificate, with a

bifurcated separate iSSlle- a separate third par(Y' claim, was allowed in
Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen 107 Idaho 541, 691 P.2d 787
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(App.1984). What is unclear is whether this particular provision of 54(b )(2)
was in effect at that time, or came after the decision. If the parties fail to
stipulate, the cOUli does not know yet what action would be appropriate, but
a stipulation of some SOli would eliminate uncertainty and avoid expensi\'e
legal maneuvering on these procedural issues.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DA TED THIS _ _ day of October, 2008.

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of OCTOBER. 2008, I caused to be
served a true copy of the foregoing ORDER ON APPEAL. document by the method
indicated below. and addressed to each of the follO\ving:
Christopher P. Simms
US Bank Building, Suite 109
191 Sun Valley Road
PO Box 3123
Ketchum. ID 83340

U.S. MaiL Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Ovemight Mail
FAX

Phillip J. Collaer
250 South Fifth SL Suite 700
PO Box 7246
Boise. ID 83707-7426

xu.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Ovemight Mail
FAX

Paul Fitzer
950 W. Bannock S1.. Ste 520
Boise, ID 83702

;< U.S. MaiL Postage Prepaid
'Hand Delivered
_ Ovemight Mail
FAX

Deputy Clerk
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Paul 1. Fitzer, ISB 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/33111202
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES,LLC,

)

)

Case No. CV-07-24

)

Plaintiffs,

v.
ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
and through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

VERIFIED SECOND AMENDED
ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS CAMAS
COUNTY, THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS
OF THE CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, AND ED
SMITH IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
MEMBER OF THE CAMAS COUNTY
PLANNING AND ZONING
COMMISSION

In its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, served on the
County Defendants on October 8, 2008, this Court denied in part and granted in part the
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Petition.

Plaintiff included as an attachment to said

motion, his proposed amended pleading. To date, the Plaintiff has not served County Defendants
vvith the amended pleading reflecting the Court's Order. Erring on the side of caution, County
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Defendants hereby submit its response to Plaintiffs' proposed Second Amended Petition for
Breach of Contract, Tortious Interference with Contract, For Declarative Relief, Damages for
Violation of Procedural & Substantive Due Process Rights and Equal Protection of the Law. In
so doing, Defendants Camas County, Idaho (the "County"), by and through its duly elected
board of county commissioners, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the Individual
Commissioners) and Ed Smith, in his capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and
Zoning Commission (collectively, County Defendants), by and through their attorneys of record,
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, hereby submit this Second Amended Answer in
conformance with the Court's Order.

I.

ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITION
The County Defendants admit, deny, and allege as follows:

Facts Common to all Counts & Jurisdictional Statement
1.

County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny Plaintiffs

Paragraph 1, 2, and 4, and therefore deny.
2.

County Defendants admit paragraph 3.

3.

With regard to Paragraph 5, County Defendants admits insofar as the legislative

actions of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and/or Camas County Board of
County Commissioners in enacting the County's comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, and
map occurred in Camas County but denies the remainder of the paragraph.
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4.

County Defendants deny Paragraphs 6 and 7.

COUNT I - BREACH OF CONTRACT
5.

As Count 1 does not pertain to nor is it relevant to the County Defendants, County

Defendants are not required to answer.

However, to the extent that any such claim can be

asserted against County Defendants, Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are denied in
their entirety.

COUNT II - TORTIOUS INTERENCE WITH CONTRACT
6.

County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny Paragraph 16, 17,

18, 20, and 21 and therefore deny same.
7.

County Defendants deny paragraph 19,20,22, and 23.

COUNT III - Petition for Declarative Judgment
8.

Count III has already proceeded to trial before the Court and is awaiting the

Court's final order and IRCP 54(b) certification of final judgment. Therefore, Defendant is not
required to submit an additional amended answer as to Count III. To the extent that any such
allegations remain, (due to the pending nature of the Court's Order and 54(b) certification),
County Defendants deny each and every allegation alleged by Plaintiff unless specifically

AMENDED ANS WER -- 3

admitted herein including but not limited to. all allegations pertaining to Count III (Paragraphs
24-47) .

COUNT IV - Declarative Relief May 12, 2008 Comprehensive Plan & Zoning Ordinance
Amendments
9.

In its Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, served

upon County Defendants on October 8, 2008, the Court specifically denied Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to Amend Petition as it pertains to this Count. Therefore, the matter is stricken from the
amended pleading and County Defendants are not required to answer this Count. To the extent
that any such allegation pertains to a triable issues, County Defendants deny each and every
allegation not specifically admitted herein including any and all allegations alleged in Count IV
(Paragraphs 48-66).

COUNT V - Violation of Procedural and Substantive Due Rights [sic]
10.

With regard to Paragraph 67, Defendant admits that Plaintiff does own property

within the County, but denies the remainder of the paragraph.
11.

With regard to Paragraph 68, Defendant admits that Plaintiff was a part of the

comprehensive planning process utilized in the amendment of the comprehensive plan and
zoning ordinance and map as Plaintiff attended and/or testified at every public hearing, meeting,
informational session. and workshop, but denies the remainder of the paragraph.
12.

County Defendants deny paragraphs 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, and 78.
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13.

With regard to Paragraph 71, Plaintiff does not appear to assert a factual allegation,

but rather assets a legal conclusion and therefore no response is required.

To the extent a

response is required, deny.
14.

With regard to Paragraph 72, Plaintiff does not appear to assert a factual

allegation, but rather assets a legal conclusion and therefore no response is required. To the
extent a response is required, deny.

COUNT VI - Equal Protection of Law
15.

County Defendants deny paragraph 79, 80, 81, and 82.

16.

[Prayer] Deny and affirmatively allege that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition is

wholly devoid of any merit whatsoever and that the County Defendants are entitled to costs and
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117 because this action has been brought without a reasonable
basis in fact and law.

II.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
First Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in their favor and
against the County Defendants.

Second Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Third Affirmative Defense
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Plaintiffs' claims are barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel.
Fourth Affirmative Defense
Any injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are a direct and proximate result of their own actions
or omissions.
Fifth Affirmative Defense
Any injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are a direct and proximate result of the acts or
omissions of others for whom the County Defendants are not liable.
Sixth Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the requirements of Title 6, Chapter 9, Tort Claims
against Government Entities.
Seventh Affirmative Defense
County Defendants have immunity pursuant to I.C. §§ 6-904(1), 6-904(3), and 6-

904B(3).
Eighth Affirmative Defense
County Defendants are not liable for punitive damages pursuant to I.C. § 6-918.
Ninth Affirmative Defense
The Plaintiffs have not suffered actual ham1 or a violation of a fundamental right as
required by I.C. § 67-6535.
Tenth Affirmative Defense
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The Plaintiffs' alleged claims are properly before the District Court of the United States
as said claims have original jurisdiction over such federal questions of law and therefore such
civil action should be removed to the United States District Court.

III.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, the answering County Defendants request that the Plaintiffs take nothing by
their Petition and each cause of action pleaded therein; that the County Defendants be awarded
their reasonable costs and attorney fees under I.e. §§ 12-117, 12-120,12-121. and 6-918A; and
that the Court provide the County Defendants any further relief as may be just and equitable.
Respectfully submitted this ___ day of October, 2008.

MOORE SMITH

B XTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

Paul . itzer
Att neys for County Defendants
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
)
County of Camas
Ken Backstrom, being duly sworn, states as follows:
That he is the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioner for the County of Camas,
representing the County Defendants in the above-entitled matter; that, as such, he has read the
foregoing document, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be tnte and correct to
the best of his knowledge;

KenBackstrom, Chairman
Camas County Board of County Commissioners
~r ~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this -'--"-"-- day of October, 2008.

., .".

~-:~~,~--£c<
~L=:::'
(~/ -~.: _LA-.
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing
My Commission Expires: 5:""<..0 -,:;LCd I ()
..-

~

...

.... .-

TRACY 0, GILL
Notary Public
Stote of Idaho
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***
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer was this ___~-I- day
of October, 2008 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner:
Christopher P. Simms
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, ID 83340

Via United States mail
Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON JULIAN

& HULL, LLP

P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707

Via United States mail
Hon. Robert Elgee
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers)
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110
Hailey, ID 83333

Via United States mail
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PAUL 1. FITZER, ISB No. 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-1800
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202

c;.

Attorneys for Defendant Camas County

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO
GEORGE MARTIN and
MARTIN CUSTOM HOMES, L.L.C.,
Plaintiffs
v.
ED SMITH and
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by and through the
duly elected Board of Commissioners in their
official capacity, KEN BACKSTROM,
BILL DAVIS, and RON CHAPMAN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Case No. CV -'---'--'NOTICE OF REMOVAL

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Defendants Camas County, Ed Smith in his capacity as
a member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and
Ron Chapman (the Individual Commissioners), by and through their attorney of record, Paul 1.
Fitzer, removes the above-captioned action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1446(b). The
basis for removal is that this Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c. § 1331 of this civil
action brought in state court. The Plaintiff's Second Amended Petition for Breach of Contract,
Tortious Interference with Contract, For Declarative Relief, Damages for Violation of Procedural &
NOTICE OF REMOVAL - 1

Substantive Due Process Rights and Equal Protection of Law asserts a civil action arising under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.

On October 8, 2008, the District Court for the

Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho In and For Camas County in its Order on Plaintiffs
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint ordered that Plaintiff was entitled to assert a civil
action against the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
As directed by the United States Courts District of Idaho Clerks Office, Petitioner files
herewith copies of the amended pleadings filed in the state court, the Fifth Judicial District's
Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, a supplemental civil cover
sheet, a copy of the Fifth Judicial District Court for Camas County Docket Sheet (ROA Report)
for CV -2007 -0000024, and the appropriate filing fee, all in accordance with Local Rule 5 .1 (d)
and other applicable rules.
A copy of the Notice of Removal has been provided to all adverse parties and filed with the
Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County
of Camas. It is acknowledged that this Notice of Removal is signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

s-' day of November, 2008.

NOTICE OF REMOVAL - 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
REMOVAL was forwarded to the following parties by the method stated below on November,
2008.

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law
U.S. Bank Bldg., Suite 209
191 Sun Valley Road
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

Phillip J. Collaer
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
PO Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707

District Court Clerk
Fifth Judicial District
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield, Idaho 83327

NOTICE OF REMOVAL - 3

~.S.Mail
__ via Hand Delivery
_ _ via Overnight Delivery

~"~ail
_ _ via Hand Delivery
_ _ via Overnight Delivery

~S.Mail
_ _ via Hand Delivery
_ _ via Overnight Delivery
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George Martin, etaL

VS.

Ed Smith, etal.

George Martin, Martin Cu:;tom Homes, L.I. C. vs. Ed Smith, Camas County Board of Commissioners
Date

Code

User

5/412.007

NeOt::

KORRI

New Case Filed - Other Claims

KORRI

Filing: A 1 ~ Civil Complaint. More Than $1000 No Robert J Eigee
Prior Appearance Paid by: Martin, George
(plaintiff) Receipt number: 0000435 Dated:
5/4/2007 Amount $88.00 (Check)

APEn

KORRI

Plaintiff: Martin, George Appearance Christopher Robert J Eigee
P_ Simms

SMIS

KORRI

Summons Issued X2

5/10/2007

APEH

KORRI

Defendant Camas County Board of
Robert J Eigee
Commissioners Appearance Stephanie J. Bonney

5/15/2007

OBJG

BOBBIE

Objection To Plaintiffs' Application For a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injuction

KORRI

Filing: 11A - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than Robert J Eigee
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Defendant Smith. Ed Appearance Phillip J
Collaer
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6(1/2007

AN'!;.iW

KORRI

Answer to complaint and demand for Jury Trial

Robert J Eigee

6/5/2007

HRVC

KORRI

Hearing result for Order to Show Cause held on

Robert J Elgee

5/23/2007

Judge
Robert J Elgee

Robert J Elgee

Robert J Elgee

0710312.00702:00 PM: Hearing Vacated
6/6/2007

OSC

KORRI

HR:;iC

KORRI

Order To Show Causetemporary restraing order,
preliminary injunction

Robert J Eigee

Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause

Robert J Eigee

07/03/200702:00 PM)
6/11/2007

NOTC

KORRI

Notice of service

Robert J Eigee

6/13/2007

RE:;iP

KORRI

Plaintiffs response to def CCounty's objection to
Plantiff application forTRO & Pre Injunction &
request for Rule 11 Sanctions

Robert J Eigee

MI~;C

KORRI

Correction of inadvertant typogrphicaVclerical
error in petition

Robert J Elgee

HRSC

KORRI

Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause

Robert J Elgee

06127/200701:00 PM) In Camas County
6/14/2007

MOTN

KORRI

Motion for a more definite statement

Robert J Eigee

6/18/2007

RESP

KORRI

Response to CCounty defendants mtn for more
definete statement & demand for default
judgment

Robert J Eigee

612012007

ANSW

BOBBIE

6121/2007

SMIS

BOSBIE

612212007

SMRT

KORRI

AFSV

KORRI

Answer Of Defendants Camas County. The
Robert J Eigee
Individual Members Of The Camas County Board
Of County Commissioners. Ed Smith In His
Capacity As A Member Of The Camas County
Planning And Zoning Commission
Summons IssuedX2
Robert J Elgee
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Robert J Elgee
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Case: CV-2007 -0000024 Current Judge: Robert J Elgee
George Martin, etal.

VS.

Ed Smith, eta\.

George Martin, Martll1 Cu'stom Homes, L.l. C. vs. Ed Smith, Camas County Board of Commissioners
Date

Code

User

6/26/2001

MOThl

BOBBIE

Motion To Quash Subpoena

SUSI

BOBBIE

Subpoena Issued

CMIN

KORRI

Court Minutes Hearing type: Order to Show
Cause Hearing date: 6/27/2007 Time: 1:00 pm
Audio tape number: 301

Robert J Eigee

SUBt~

BOBBIE

Subpoena Returned

Robert J Elgee

AFSfi:

BOBBIE

Affidavit Of Servicel Robert Rodman

Robert J Elgee

HRHD

KORRI

Hearing result for Order to Show Cause held on

Robert J Eigee

6127/2007

Judge

X

Robert J Eigee
Robert J Elgee

061271200701:00 PM: Hearing Held In Camas
County

7/6/2007
7/13/2007

MEMO

KORRI

Memorandum

Robert J Eigee

NO~,V

BOBBIE

Notice Of Service

Robert J Elgee

APFL

BOBBIE

Verified Application For Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction relating To
Destruction Of Public Records

Robert J Eigee

NO-;-C

KORRI

Notice of non opposition to plaint.motion for
Robert J Eigee
enlargment of time to respond to def smith 1set of
interrogatories, ect

MOTN

KORRI

Plaintiffs motion for enlargment of time to respond Robert J Eigee
to defendant smiths 1st set of interogatories

RE~)P

KORRI

Plaintiffs response to post hearing memo
supporting county defendants' objection to
plaintiffs app. for TRO & Preliminary injunction

Robert J Eigee

M01iN

KORRI

Motion to strike & objection to Plaintiffs' Verified
application for aTRO & Pre-Injunction relating to
destruction of public records

Robert J Elgee

OB,JC

BOBBIE

Objection To Plaintiffs' Verified Application For A
Temporary Restraining Order And Preliminary
Injunction Relating To Destruction Of Public
Records

Robert J Eigee

AFFD

BOBBIE

Affidavit Of Dwight Butlin In Support Of
Robert J Eigee
Defendants' Objection To Plaintiffs' Verified
Application For A Temporary Restraining Order
And Preliminary Injuction Relating To DestruCtion
Of Public Records

1120/2007

Cf\'IIN

KORRI

Court Minutes

Robert

7/24/2007

HF:SC

BOBBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled

Robert J Eigee

7/16/2007

7/19/2007

J Eigee

09/25/200701 :00 PM) EVidentuary Hearing In
Camas Cou nty.
BOBBIE

7/27/2007

OnDR

BOBBIE

Rf:SP

BOBBIE

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J Elgee
OrderDenying Plaintiffs' July 13, 2007 Verified
Robert J Elgee
Application For Temporary Restaining Order And
Preliminary Injunction Relating To Destruction Of
Public Records
Plaintiff's First Set Of Requests For ProdUction Of Robert J Eigee
Documents ProdUction Of Documents
Propounded To Camas County Defendantvj

10/2112098 01 :.07 FAX 2087642349
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late

Code

User

1113/2007

DEOP

BOBBIE

Decision On Status Of Camas County Planning
And Zoning Commission For Purposes of a
preliminary Injunction

3/22/2007

STIF

BOBBIE

Stipulation To Enlarge Time For County
Robert J Eigee
Defendants To Respond To Plaintiff's First Set Of
Requests For Production Of Documents

B124/2007

NSRII

BOBBIE

Notice Of Service Of Plaintiffs Response To
Interrogstorries And Requests For Production Of
Doucuments Propounded By Defendant Smith

Robert

9/10/2007

NO~:\I

BOBBIE

Notice Of Service Of Plaintiffs First Set Of
Interrogatories and Requests For Production Of
Documents Propounded To Defendant Smith

Robert J Elgee

9/11/2007

NOSV

BOSBIE

Notice Of Service

Robert J Elgee

9/1212007

OBJC

BOBBIE

Objection To Notice Of Hearing Scheduled For
September 25, 2007

Robert J Eigee

9/14/2007

ORDR

BOBBIE

Order Vacating hearing

Robert J Eigee

9/18/2007

NO-'C

KORRI

Robert J Elgee
Notice of service of supplemental response to
interrogatories propounded by def Camas County

sunl

KORRI

Subpoenalssuedx5
butJin,rodman,gregory,Clint krahn, f.r8ennett

Robert J Eigee

NOTC

KORRI

Notice of service

Robert J Elgee

NOTC

KORRI

Notice of service

Robert J Eigee

MOTC

BOBBIE

Plaintiffs Motion To Compel Camas County
Defendants To Fully Respond To Requests To
Produce Documents & Issue Sanctions For
Failure To Respond

Robert J Eigea

NOHG

BOBBIE

Notice Of Hearing-Paintiffs Application For
Robert J Eigee
Preliminary Injunction and on the Merits Of
Request For Injunctive Relief Related To Conflict
Of Intrest Claims

NCHG

BOBBIE

Notice Of Hearing-Plaintiffs motion To Compel
Robert J Eigee
Camas County Defendants To Fully Respond To
Request To Produce Documents

HRVC

B0881E

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
09125/2007 01 :00 PM: Hearing Vacated
Evidentuary Hearing In Camas County.

Robert J Elgee

HF:SC

BOBBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
11/13/2007 01 :00 PM) Amended Notice of
Hearing.

Robert J Eigee

M[~MO

BOBBIE

Post Hearing Memorandum Supporting The
County Defendants Objection To Plaintiffs'
Application For A Temporary Restraining Order
And Preliminary Injunction

Robert J Eigee

CI)NT

KORRI

Continued (Hearing Scheduled 11f13/2007
03:00 PM) Amended Notice of Hearing.

Robert J Eigee

MI::MO

KORRI

Plaintiffs reply to cc def post hearing memo

Robert J Eigee

Ar:FD

KORR!

plaintiffs affidavit in support

912112007
101512007

10/9/2007

10/1612007

Judge
Robert J Eigee

J Eigee

Robe~

ee

r~j Lt L:J
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Judge

Date

Code
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10/16/2007

NOTG

KORRI

Notice of hearing

Robert J Eigee

HRSC

KORRI

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
10/23/200710:00 AM) By phone

Robert J Eigee

MOT~J

BOBBIE

Robert J Eigee
Motion To Strike Affidavit Of George Martin In
Support Of Plaintiffs Post-Hearing Memorandum
(Second Evidentiary Hearing)

MEMO

BOBBIE

Memorandum Supporting Motion To Strike
Affidavit Of George Martin In Suppoert Of
Plaintiff's Post Hearing Memorandum (Second
Evidentiary Hearing)

Robert J Elgee

10/24/2007

MOrN

BOBBIE

Plaintiff's Motion For Enlargement Of Time
To Respond To Defendant Camas County's
Supplementallnterogatories And First Request
For Production Of Documents

Robert J Eigee

10125/2007

NOTC

KORRI

Notice of service

Robert J Eigee

10/31/2007

NOSV

BOBBIE

Notice Of Service X2

Robert J Eigee

11/612007

SUE:P

BOBBIE

Subpoena issued X5

Robert J Eigee

11/8/2007

MOTN

BOBBIE

Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Amend Petition

Robert J Elgee

11/9/2007

COt,IT

KORRI

Continued (Hearing Scheduled 11/13/2007
01:00 PM) Amended Notice of Hearing.

Robert J Eigee

SUBI

BOBBIE

Subpoena Issued X2

Robert J Eigee

CM:'N

KORRI

Court Minutes Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled
Hearing date: 11/13/2007 Time: 1:00 pm Audio
tape number: 2007-11-13

Robert J Eigee

HR"tO

KORRI

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
11/13/200701:00 PM: Hearing Held Amended
Notice of Hearing.

Robert J Eigee

11/16/2007

HRSC

BOBBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/11/200701 :00
PM) Motion For Leave To Amend Petition &
Cont On Application For Preliminary Injunction

Robert J Eigee

1211012007

MOTN

KORRI

Motion to continue Hearing

Robert J Elgee

OFDR

KORRI

Order granting Camas Countys motion to
continue hearing

Robert J Eigee

HP'r\D

BOBBIE

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
10/23/200710:00 AM: Hearing Held By phone

Robert J Eigea

HF:HD

BOBBIE

Hearing result for Motion held on 12/11/2007
01:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion For Leave To
Amend Petition &
Cont. On Application For Preliminary Injunction

Robert J Elgee

CHilN

BOBBIE

Court Minutes

Robert J Eigee

Or1:DR

BOBBIE

Order Granting Leave To Amend Petition For
Declatory Judgement

Robert J Eigee

Ai'IICO

BOB81~

Amended Petition for Breach of Contract

Robert J Eigee

10/2212007

11/1312007

12111/2007

12/13/2007

ylt-f
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)ate

Code

User

12/20/2007

HRSl::

BOBBIE

amended Notice Of Continued Hearing
Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 02126/2008
01 :00 PM) Conl Hearing on Application For
Preliminary Injunction

Robert J Elgee

MOTC

BOBBIE

Plaintiffs Motion To Compel

Robert J Elgea

NOHG

BOBBIE

Notice Of Hearing-Motion To Compel

Robert J Eigee

HRS:;

BOBBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
02126/2008 01 :00 PM) In Camas County

Robert J Elgee

12128/2007

DEOP

BOBBIE

DeciSion On Requirements of a "Transcribable
Verbatim Record" and Other Records For
Purposes Of A Preliminary Injunction

Robert J Eigee

1/14/200S

MOTN

BOBBIE

Motion For Permission To Appeallnteriocutory
Order

Robert J Eigee

HR~;G

BOBBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/29/200803:30
PM) In Blaine County Counsel For Def. will
initiate the call.

Robert J Eigee

1/1712008

NOTC

KORRI

Notice of Service of plaintiffs 1st set of requests
for admission propounded to Camas County def.

Robert J Eigee

1/2212008

AFFD

KORRI

Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs motion to hold
C.County Defendants in contempt of court for
violation of Preliminary Injunction

Robert J Eigee

MorN

KORRI

Plaintiffs motion to hold Camas county
defendants in contempt of court for violation of
Preliminary Injunction

Robert J Eigee

NOTC

KORRI

Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs motion to hold
Camas County Defendants in contempt of court
for violation of Prelim. Injunction

Robert J Eigee

MEMO

BOBBIE

Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion
To Hold Camas County Defendants In Contempt
Of Court For Violation Of Preliminary Injunction

Robert J Elgee

AFF'D

BOBBIE

Affidavit Of Stephanie J. Bonney In Support Of
Defendants' Objection To Plantiffs' Motion For
Contempt For Alleged Violation Of Preliminary
Injunction

Ro bert J Elgee

C~'IIN

BOBBIE

Court Minutes

Robert J Elgea

HF:HD

BOBBIE

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Robert J Eigee
02126/2008 01 :00 PM: Hearing Held Cont.
Hearing on Application For Preliminary Injunction

HFlHD

BOBBIE

Hearing result for Motion held on 01/29f2008
03:30 PM: Hearing Held In Blaine County
Counsel For Def. will initiate the ca/!.

Robert J Eigee

HHSC

BOBBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 03/07/2008
09:00 AM) In Camas County

Robert J Eigee

BOBBIE

Notice Of Trial

Robert J Eigea

BOBBIE

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J Elgee

BOSBIE

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J Eigee

1/2312008

1/31/2008

211/2008

NOHG

Judge
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Judge

late

Code

User

!l1/2008

MEMO

BOBBIE

Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To
Defendant's Motion For PermisSion To Appeal
Interlocutory Order

216/2008

OROFt

BOBBIE

Order Denying Motion For Permission To Appeal Robert J Elgee
Interlocutory Order

212212008

MOT~J

KORRI

Motion for acceptance of appeal by permission

MEMO

KORRI

Memorandum in support of motion

Robert J Eigee

SUBFJ

BOBBIE

Subpoena issued

Robert J Eigee

MOrC

BOBBIE

Motion To Compel

Robert J Elgea

M01N

BOBBIE

Motion To Shorten Time

Robert J Eigee

2125/2008

NOFG

BOBBIE

Notice Of Hearing-3-7-06 9:00 am Motion To
Compel

Robert J Elgee

2126/2008

HRH'D

BOBBIE

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
02/26/200801:00 PM: Hearing Held Continued
Evidentuary Hearing In Camas County

Robert J Elgee

ORDG

BOBBIE

Order Granting Camas County's Motion To
Shorten Time

Robert J Eigee

CMIN

BOBBIE

Court Minutes

Robert J Eigee

SUBP

BOBBIE

Subpoena issued

Robert J Eigee

SUBR

BOBBIE

Subpoena RetumedJButlin

Robert J Eigee

AHiR

BOBBIE

Affidavit Of Service/Sutlin

Robert J Eigee

AF~;R

KORRI

Affidavit Of Service

Robert J Eigee

SMRT

KORRI

Summons Returned

Robert J Elgee

CMfN

KORRI

Court Minutes Hearing type: Court Trial Hearing
date: 3f71200a Time: 9:00 am Court reporter.
Susan Isreal Audio tape number: 200807

Robert J Eigee

CTST

KORRI

Hearing result for Court Trial held on 03/07/2008 Robert J Eigee
09:00AM: Court Trial Started In Camas County

3/1112008

OF,lJR

BOBBIE

Order Following Contempt Hearing and Order
Expanding Preliminary Injunction

Robert J Eigee

3/1212008

ME:MO

BOBBIE

Post-Hearing Memorandum Objecting To
Plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary Injunction
(Conflict-Of-Intrest Allegation)

Robert J Eigee

3/13/2008

CMIN

BOBSIE

Court Minutes

Robert J Eigee

HHSC

BOBBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference
05/05/2008 02:00 PM) 1/2 Hr. In Blaine County

Robert J Eigee

HnSC

BOBBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 05/20/2008
09:00 AM) Set for 4 days in Camas County

Robert J Eigee

BOBBIE

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J Eigee

3/1812008

Mc;MO

KORRI

Plaintiffs response to defendant Camas county's
post hearing memo relating to eantlet of interest
allegation

Robert J Eigee

4/212008

DE:OP

BOBS:£::

Decision On Conflict Of Intrests Issue For
Purposes Of A Preliminary Injunction

Robert J Elgee

2/27/2008
2128/2008
212912008
3nl2008

g

Robert J Eigee

Robert J Eigee
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George Martin, Martin Custom Homes, LI. C. vs. Ed Smith, Camas County Board of Commissioners
Date

Code

User

5/13/2008

MOIS

KORRI

Motion To Dismiss

Robert J Eigee

ORD=t

BOBBIE

Order Granting Camas County's Motion To
Shorten Time

Robert J Eigee

CMIN

BOBBIE

Court Minutes

Robert J Eigee

SUB(='

BOBBIE

Subpoena issued X3

Robert J Eigee

SUBI=l

BOBBIE

Subpoena Returned X3

Robert J Elgee

AFS[;~

BOBBIE

Affidavit Of Service X3

Robert J Eigee

EXLT

KORRI

Exhibit List, defendants·

Robert J Eigee

WlTr,1

KORRI

Witness List. defendants

Robert J Elgee

CMI'"

KORRI

Court Minutes Hearing type: Court Trial Hearing
date: 5/20/20081lme: 9:00 am Audio tape
number: 20080520

Robert

WlT.'l

BOBBIE

Witness List

Robert J Eigee

NO~N

BOBBIE

Notice Of Service

Robert J Eigee

EXLT

BOBBIE

Exhibit List

Robert J Elgee

CH:T

KORRI

Hearing result for Court Trial held on 05/20/2008
09:00AM: Court Trial Started Set for 4 days in
Camas County

Robert J Elgee

APPL

BOBBIE

Plaintiff's Application For Temporary Restraing
Order, Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory
Relief

Robert J Eigee

NOTe

KORRI

Notice of service of plaintiffs suppl response to
interrogatories propounded by def camas county

Robert J Eigee

ROBR

KORRI

Request To Obtain Approval To Broadcast And
Or Photograph A Court Proceeding

Robert J Eigee

CMIN

KORRI

Court Minutes Hearing type: Court Trial Hearing
date: 5121/2008 Time: 8:28 am Court reporter;
Susan Isreal Audio tape number. 20080521 .

Robert J Eigee

STII:)

KORRI

Stipulation as to facts and admission of
documentary eVidence

Robert J Eigee

7/312008

HR:3C

KORR!

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
08/19/200801:00 PM)

Robert J Eigee

7/25/2008

HRSC

BOBBIE

Hearing SchedUled (Status 08/11/2008 11 :00
AM) By Phone

Robert J Eigee

8/8/2008

MOAM

BOBBIE

Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Amend Petition By Robert J Eigee
Adding Two Additional Causes of Action:
1) Declatory & Injunctive Relief Against
Resolutions 114 & 115 and Ordinances #157 &

511412008
5/1912008
5/20/2008

5121/2008

Judge

J Elgee

158
2) Damages For Violations of State & Federal
Law
PETN

e

BOBBIE

Second Amended Petition For Breach of
Robert J Eigee
Contract. Tortious Interference with contract, For
Declaratory relief, Damages For Violation Of
Procedural & Substantive Due Process Rights
and Equal Protection Of Law

17
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Date

Code

User

Judge

8/8/2008

APPL.

BOBBIE

Plaintiffs Verified Application For Temporary
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injuction And
Declaratory Relief

Robert J Elgee

8/1112008

HRHO

BOBBIE

Hearing result for Status held on 08/11/2008
11:00 AM: Hearing Held By Phone

Robert J Eigee

CON~i

BOBBIE

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
0811912008 01 :00 PM: Continued

Robert

HRS~~

BOBBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
08/20/2008 01 :00 PM)

Robert J Eigee

HRSG

BOBBIE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/20/2008 09:00
AM)

Robert J Elgee

J Elgee

BOBBIE

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J Eigee

SMIS

BOBBIE

Summons Issued X4

Robert J Eigee

8/13/2008

CMr\~

KORRI

Court Minutes

Robert J Eigee

8/14/2008

SMHT

BOBBIE

Summons Returned X4

Robert J Eigee

AFSI~

BOBSIE

Affidavit Of Service X4

Robert J Eigee

CMIN

KORRI

Court Minutes Hearing type: Court Trial Hearing
date: 8/20/2008 Time: 9:00 am Court reporter:
Maureen Audio tape number: 20080820

Robert J Eigee

BREF

KORRI

Plaitiffs Trial Brief

Robert J Elgee

HRHD

KORRI

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
08120/2008 01 :00 PM: Hearing Held

Robert J Eigee

8/27/2008

RE::::P

KORRI

Response to plaintiffs petition for leave to amend Robert J Eigee
complaint

9/1212008

REI:JL

BOBBIE

Plaintiffs Reply To Response To Motion For
leave To Amend Petition By Adding Two
Additional Causes Of Action

Robert J Eigee

9/15/2008

MEMO

BOBBIE

Plaintifs Post-Trial Memorandum

Robert J Eigee

9/2912008

BREF

KORRI

Def Camas County, etal Post Trial Brief

Robert J Eigee

10/8/2008

OF~.IJR

BOBBIE

Order On Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To File
Amended Complaint

Robert J Eigee

10/15/2008

ANGW

KORRI

Amended Answer

Robert J Eigee

8/20/2008

Ll

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR Bt;;:;IfNE COUNTY

LMAS

~

GEORGE MARTIN,

)
)

) Case No.: CV-2007-24
)

Plaintiff,
and

)

MARTIN CUSTOM HOMES, LLC,

) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
) LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED
) COMPLAINT

vs.

)

)
)

ED SMITH,

)
)
)

Defendant

and

)

{~
.-

AS COUNTY " IDAHO
I3Y; d through the duly elected
Bo~r f Commissioners in
Their,o cial and individual capacities,
-

KEN BAXTROM,
BILL DAVIS, and
RON CHAPMAN

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The procedural history and present posture of this case is particularly
important with regard to this motion. In his original complaint, Martin
brought causes of action against Camas County seeking judgment declaring
that certain zoning ordinances passed by Camas County in 2006/2007 were
Order on Plaintiffs Molion for Leave to File Amended Complaint -- I

invalid and violated existing law. Combined with the original declaratory
judgment are claims by which Martin seeks civil damages against Ed Smith
individually, and the Camas County commissioners in their official

capacities.
The court has heard the declaratory judgment action over the

200612007 amendments in toto. In the process of getting to trial on this first
declaratory judgment action, the court has issued 2 injunctions, one
detennining that the Board of Commissioners of Camas County failed to
keep a trancribable verbatim record, and the other determining that conflicts
of interest existed. Evidence obtained during hearings over these preliminary
injunction issues were combined with trial evidence pursuant to IRCP
65(a)(2).

Trial was held on this first declaratory judgment issue in Camas
County on August 20, 2008. Post trial briefs are currently being submitted,
and the court will take the matter under advisement immediately. By
agreement of counsel, all claims for money damages against all defendants
,

have been reserved for a subsequent trial at a later time, and those issues

have not yet been set for trial.
On August 8,2008, shortly before trial, Martin filed a Motionfor

Leave to Amend Petition by Adding Two Additional Causes of Action. This
motion was submitted on briefing submitted post-trial. This motion seeks to
add new claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as a part of the existing
case, as to new ordinances passed by Camas County in 2008. It also seeks
to add new civil damages claims against Camas County, and the Board of

Commissioners in their individual capacities, for violations of Section 1983

Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to fIle Amended Complaint
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of the Civil Rights Act, alleging both due process and equal protection
violations. As noted, the existing pending civil damage claims against these
same defendants have been split off from the declaratory judgment claims by
agreement of counsel, and have not yet been set for trial.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
One of the pending issues is whether the court should allow plaintiff
to amend his complaint, post-trial, on the declaratory judgment issues, to
incorporate new matters that have occurred since the original filing.
Although not specifically addressed by the parties, (because both parties
have taken an "all or nothing approach" to the proposed pleading
amendment) a separate issue is whether the court should allow a partial
amendment to the complaint as to the civil damage issues that are still
pending for trial. Another issue, addressed but unclear, is whether the court
can bifurcate the declaratory judgment issues, that have already been tried,
from the pending civil damages issues for purposes of an appeal, so that the
parties can get a resolution of the declaratory judgment issues at the
Supreme COUli, without having to wait for trial on civil damage issues that
have little in common factually or legally with the declaratory judgment to
be rendered.
The starting point for this analysis is IRCP 15. The court recognizes
under Rule 15(a) that in the ordinary case, if a trial is not pending, or there is
no prejudice, leave to amend should be freely given. The court also
recognizes this is a discretionary decision. Jones v. Watson 98 Idaho 606,
570 P.2d 284 (1977), Hines v. Hines 129 Idaho 847, 934 P.2d 20 (1997).

Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Fiie Amended Complaint -- :;

PiaintiffMal1in argues under Rule 15(d) that the amendment here
should be allowed as his new pleading involves occurrences or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be amended. That
much is true. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the evidence
necessary to address these new claims is entirely different from the original
cause of action, that the trial on the original cause of action has already been
held (at least as to the declaratory judgment issues), and thus any
amendment will open up new avenues of discovery and delay, citing Black

Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc, v. Idaho First National Bank 119 Idaho 171,
804 P.2d 900 (1991), and Hinkle v. Winey 126 Idaho 993,895 P.2d 594 (Ct.
App. 1995).
The court finds that the new allegations, at least as to the declaratory

judgment causes of action, are based on events that have happened since the
filing of the original complaint, but they will involve new evidence, new
discovery, and application of new legal theory or principles. To elaborate,
plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint, as to the relief seeking

declaratory judgment, that Camas County failed to properly enact
ordinances, and conduct administrative hearings involving zoning
amendments passed in 2008. Although it is true that plaintiffs original
complaint alleged some of the same general sort of legal defects as to
ordinances and hearings conducted in 2006 and 2007, the defects alleged in
the proposed amended complaint are not founded on the same facts as the
prior complaint- indeed, they are founded on allegations as to what Camas
County did or did not do in passing the 2008 amendments. The cOUI1 can
tell, simply from the attachments submitted with the Verified Application for

Order on Plaintiffs MOlion for Leave to File Amended Complaint -- 4
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Temporary Restraining Order, and the allegations of the new complaint, that
Camas County utilized a different, more thorough process in 2008 than it did
with the 2006, 2007 amendments. Whether this process (in 2008) was
adequate will not involve an examination of the same questions raised in the
attack on the 2006, 2007 ordinance amendments. It may involve some of the
same or similar questions, but it is apparent that it will involve, at a
minimum, new discovery based on new facts and events, and the application
of some difIerent legal principles. This is not as straightforward as Camas
County simply putting a new coat of paint over old defects. Moreover, the
declaratory judgment issues raised by the initial complaint have already been
tried, and briefed, and those matters are due to be taken under advisement
forthwith by the court. Finally, akin to the situation in Hinkle v. Winey,
supra, there is no showing of any prejudice to Martin ifhe is required to
resolve these new declaratory judgment claims in a separate action. This is
where they would be best resolved. As will be more fully addressed below,
there is simply no good reason to tie these new declaratory judgment claims
in with the old ones.

I

The motion for leave to file an amended complaint with regard to new
claims for declaratory judgment is DENIED.
The next issue is whether the new civil claims set forth by Martin in
his proposed amended complaint (violation of due process and equal

I Although in his proposed amended complaint Martin makes an altemative claim for a Petition for Judicial
Review, his pleading does not seem to address the judicial review factors. Whether it does or does not is of
no moment, however, as the Idaho Supreme Court recently determined an action for Judicial Review
could not be combined with a civil action. Euclid Avenue Trl/Sf v. City of Boise Supreme Court Opinion No.
107, Docket No. 33974, filed Sept 23, 2008. Accordingly, this court need not address where that
particular allegation falls under this motion.

Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint -- 5
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protection rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983) should be treated differently
than his claims for declaratory relief. As noted, these claims are directed at
the members of the Camas County Board of Commissioners personally and

individually. Also as noted, Martin has existing civil damage claims against
Ed Smith and Camas County seeking money damages, which claims are not
currently set for trial and remain pending. These civil rights claims allege
violations of Martin's rights from both the 2006/2007 amendments to the
county zoning, and the 2008 amendments as well. As such, if the coul1 did
not allow the amended complaint as to the alleged violations occurring in
2006/2007, Martin would probably lose the right to bring them. That is,

insofar as alleged violations are alleged to have occurred in 2006/2007, they
either needed to be brought along with the original claims made in this case,
or they would likely be barred. See Duthie v.Lewiston Gun Club 104 Idaho
751,663 P.2d 287, (1983) (Res judicata principles operate to prohibit
subsequent claims as to not only that which was litigated, but also to every
matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.)
A second reason to treat these allegations differently from the new
declaratory judgment claims is these involve questions of money damages,
are triable to a jury (jury trial is requested in the proposed amended
complaint), and there is no reason to require or allow two separate suits for
money damages between the same parties on the same facts.
The third reason to treat these claims differently is that there is no
viable claim of prejudice that can be made by the defendants. No trial date
has been set on the civil damage claims. Rule 15 (a) requires leave to amend
be freely given when justice so requires, and the court determines, for the

Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint -- 6
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reasons set forth above, at least with regard to the civil damages claims, that
justice requires leave be granted to amend the pleadings to allow the civil
rights claims to be pled and proved along with the other civil damage claims
now pending. See Sinclair A1ktg., Inc. v. Slepert 107 Idaho 1000, 695 P.2d
385. The motion to amend with regard to the new civil damage claims is

GRANTED.
Finally, Camas County has raised in its briefing the necessity or
advisability of having the court issue a Rule 54(b) certificate as to the
declaratory judgment issues resolved or to be resolved by the trial held in
August 2008. Camas County has already tried to appeal those issues once,
and the court has addressed this issue previously on the record with the
parties. As this issue implicates the procedure and posture of this case (the
court is in the process of rendering judgment on the declaratory judgment
claims, there may be a new declaratory judgment action filed, and a civil
trial for damages is still pending) this issue needs attention from both the
court and the parties. The court will make no rulings on this issue at this
point, but wants the parties to carefully consider their positions here.
From the court's perspective, it makes perfect sense to certify the
issues resolved by the declaratory judgment trial for appeal pursuant to Rule
54(b). They are unconnected legally from the civil damage claims, as they
involve entirely different questions of law. The declaratory judgment trial,
(and preliminary injunctions) revolved primarily around the failure to keep a
transcribable verbatim record, whether county officials are exempt from
conflict of interest statutes if their activity is "legislative" as opposed to
"quasi-judicial", and such things as whether a written recommendation was
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sent or received from the P&Z Commission to the Board before zoning was
changed. The civil damage claims will involve a jury trial, at least in part,
and will not occur for some period of time. Of equal significance, any
decision rendered by an appellate court in Idaho as to whether some of the
conduct of county officials (e.g.- the effect of alleged conflicts of interest) is
exempt from some provisions oflaw because it falls under the umbrella of
"legislative activity", or whether certain civil claims are viable under the
circumstances alleged can only help here. If guidance on the declaratory
action already tried comes before the civil trial on damages, it can only helpnot only the parties involved in this litigation but throughout Idaho. The
legal issues raised by the declaratory judgment are important questions that
need resolution-the sooner the better. If guidance is not forthcoming before
the civil trial, the parties are no worse off. If this court certifies those
declaratory judgment issues for appeal, and they are not appealed, they
become the law of the case, and the only issues that could be appealed later
would be those raised by the civil trial. In short, there are many good reasons
to certify a forthcoming judgment on the declaratory judgment issues, and
scant few to wait for the results of a relatively unconnected civil trial.
Finally, any issues as to claims or entitlement as to attorney fees should
probably be reviewed, resolved, and determined at this juncture rather than
after a civil trial, and a separate analysis conducted on the civil issues when
they are resolved. Any claims for attorney's fees against the county at this
point, and attorney's fees under civil damage claims that might be made
later, will likely involve completely different analyses under completely
di fferent statutes and standards, and the same is true under the appeal
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process. Combining those issues will only make them more complex and
harder to resolve in the future.
Having made those observations, the comi is concerned about the
application of Rule 54(b )(2) to this case. As the court has indicated, the court
would be reluctant to stay the civil trial until after an appeal of the
declaratory judgment issues, which would seem to be the result mandated
by Rule 54(b)(2). . The court believes the best course of action is if the

parties stipulate that the declaratory judgment issues already tried will be
certified for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), that any discovery conducted in
the declaratory judgment action need not be repeated for purposes of the
pending civil action, that the issues on the civil damage claims involve a
"separate action" under the meaning or Rule 54(b)(2), the civil action for
damages will not be stayed pending appeal of the declaratory judgment
issues, that the court may determine prevailing parties, attorney's fees, and
costs upon the declaratory judgment action upon entry of a judgment in this
case, and that there will be a separate and independent review of the
attorney's fee issue in the civil action once it is resolved. How you wish to
treat attorney's fees incurred to date that may relate solely to the civil action
is up to you. The court is not ordering any of this at this time; it is only
making suggestions as to what the most expedient and efficient method of
handling the case may be.
Although the head note under Rule 54(b )(2) says the exact opposite,
the procedure allowing an appeal with a Rule 54 (b) certificate, with a

bifurcated separate issue- a separate third party claim, was allowed in
Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen 107 Idaho 541, 691 P.2d 787

Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File
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(App.1984). What is unclear is whether this particular provision of 54(b )(2)
was in effect at that time, or came after the decision. I f the panies fail to
stipulate, the court does not know yet what action would be appropriate, but
a stipulation of some sort would eliminate uncertainty and avoid expensive
legal maneuvering on these procedural issues.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED THIS

~

day of October, 2008.

District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE
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Plaintiff

IN~, DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

TIlE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
I
I

I

GEORGE MARTIN,
I

I

PlaftitI,
I

and

i

I

I
MARTIN fUSTOM
HOMES, If-L.C-,

I
v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I
ED SMITIf
I

Defendant,

CAMAS gOUNTY, IDAHO,
By and thrpugh the duly elected
Board of gommissioners in
their
and individual
capacities,

omcir

£S/SZ

)
)
)
)

KENB~TROM,

)
)
)

BILL DAmS, and

)

RON CarMAN,

)

Defendants.

)
)
)

39~d

Case No_ CV-07-24

)

P1aintiff:

and

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

A1.1. \;;ISlt-IV.J I S:::l3Hd01.S I:::lH8

SECOND AMENDED
PETITION FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT, FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF, DAMAGES
FOR VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL &
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
AND EQUAL PROTECtiON OF LAW

JURy TRIAL DEMANDED

lZSLZZ9S0Z

L9:91

899Z/L9/8Q

I,

CO~S NOW,

Plaintiff George Martin, personally and on behalf of Martin

I

Custom HOfnes, L.L.C. as a member, and in SUppOlt ofhi5 Petition for Breach of Contract
and

Inlenti~nallmerferem;~ WiUl Contract against Defendant Ed Smith personally, and

his PetitioJ for Declaratory Judgment against Camas County, by and through its duly

I

elected Bo d of Commissioners, does state following:

FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
&
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
1.

George Martin (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintifi" jointly with Martin

q..:itstom Hqmes, L.L.C.) is a resident of and owner of real property

silual~d

in the COWlty

j

~

of Camas, [tate of Idaho.

7with

MIIl1.in Custom Homes. L.L.C (hereinafter referred to os "Plaintiff" jointly

2.

Geole
3.

resident

0

4.

Broker

Mat.tin) is an Idaho Limited Liability Company in good standing.
Defendant Ed Smlth (hereinafter referred to as

'~Defendant

Smith") is a

Camas County, State ofIdaho.
Defendant Ed Smi~ is Jicen~ed hy the State of Idaho as a Real Estate

dOirg bIL<in",,-,

lIS

Town and Country Realtors. and whose business address is 514

Soldier Ror' Fairfield Idaho 83327.
S.

within

All acts and activities alleged to have occurred in this Complaint occurred

COIty of Camas, State of Idaho.
6.

Damages claimed by Plaintiff are within the jurisdictional amount

required t be heard in the District Court for the State of Idaho, County of Camas.

I
Eg/6Z

3911d
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The 5th District Court for Ule State of Idaho, County of Camas, has

7.

jurisdictionlover thi~ Iuatter pursuant to Idaho Code, Seq,tiops 67-5270,67-5273,67-5278
I
.
.

I

and section 1-705.
I

I

[REP ORE, this lWnorabl.

CQurt

having jurisdiction Plaintiff prays thi< court

hear and dllemline the controversies presented herein.

COUNT!
BREACH OF CONTRACT

I

8.

Un or about September 8, 2004 Plaintiff e:nte:rc::c.l int.o au agl-ecmcnt with

Defendant ISmith, in Camas County, for which good and valuable consideration was

eXCbang4 whereby Defendant was to act as Plaintiff's "Exclusive Buyer's Broker,"
(hc:rreillafter referred to as the 4'Agcncy Agreement") for purposes of purchase of vacant
I

land in Cafas County Idaho.
Defendant Smith, by entry into said agreement, owed Plaintiff certain

9.

duties and rbligations, including bnt not limited to the following;

3. 1j'0 perfonn the terms of the written agreement
b. To exercise reasonable skill and care
c. 0 promote the best interests of the Plaintiff in good faith, honesty and fair
d ing including, but not limited to
.

(i) Disclosing to the Plaintiff all adverse material facts actually known
or which reasonably should have been known by the defendant;
(ii) Seeking a property for purchase at a price and under tenns and
conditions acceptable to the buyer and assisting in the negotiation
therefore
d. fI'0 immediately. upon receiving any offer to purchase signed and dated by
Plaintiff, provide a copy of the ofter to purchase to the buyer as a receipt
e. To make certain that all otters to purchase real property or any interest therein
ar9 in writing and contain all terms and conditions of the real estate transaction as
dirfeted by the pl~tiff
~

Ci·

I
E9/BE
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!
I

f.

4y

and all fiduciary duties.
On or about September 8, 2004 property for purchase was located, then

10.
I

owned by Ron and Deborah Pauls, Husband and Wife, (hereinafter, "Sellers"), which
said

proper

is situated in Camas County, Idaho, and fully d,,"'rihed in the "Legal

Descriptio! ' attached hereto and made a part hereof.

11.

Terms for an offer were defined by Plaintiff and submitted in writing to

Defendant fmith.

I

Defendant Smith thereafter failed to perfonn the terms of the written
I
agreement; to exercise reasonable skill and care; to promote the best interest of Plaintiff

12.1

in good

fair

honesty and fair dealing; failed to notify Plaintiff of all adverse facts known

or which r1asonablY should have been known by Defendant Smith; failed to make certain
the offer

t,

Plaintiff.

I

purchase real property contained all the terms and conditions as directed by

.
I

PlaintiF as a direcl <u,d proximate result of Defendant Smith's breach of

13.
1

agency coptract, su ered monetary damages in an amount exceeding Ten Thousand
I
I
Dollars ($ 0,000).

14.

Defen ant Smith acted in a manner without a reasonable basis in law

causing P intiff to ircur attorney fees recoverable under Idaho Code Sections 12-120
and

12-ll
J

'j

Defendant Smith acted in a manner that was an extreme deviation from

reasonabltj standards of conduct, and with an understanding or disregard for its likely

~

I
ES/IE

39\;1d
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I

i

I

consequenis. Defendant Smith acted with an eXtremely harmful state of mind whether

his conduct/was malicious or grossly ndgligent.
I

I

I

WiRFORE, Plaintiff prays this court enter judgment against Defendant Smith
in an amort in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars $10,000 for monetary damages, for
punitive drages and for attorney's fees.

COUNT II

I
16.

j

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
Upon further negotiations Seller and Plaintiff entered into a c.ontract. to

purchase r t property (hereinafter the "Real Estate Contract") subject to a ""ries of terms
and conditirns including a "contingent on rezone and replat" clause.

17.

Defendant Smith knowing of the contract between Plaintiff and Seller, and

the SPecifir. terms and conditions thereof, set about a course of action tha! further
breached is own contractual duties to Plaintiff and intentionally interfered with the
contract fOr purchase of real property with Seller by taldng all efforts possible to prevent
the real prjPerty in question from being rezoned in a manner satistactory to Plaintiff and
otherwise' tentionally obstructing closure on the Real Estate Contract.

18.

Defendant Smith actively enticed Sellers to breach the Real Estate

Contract ,erebY directly causing Sellers to declare the Real Estate Contract null and void
thereby br aching said Real Estate Contract.

19.

In addition to the above specifically described intentional interference

with conlfdct by enticing Sellers to breaoh the contract to purchase

I
£9/C;£
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i
1

i

Defendant jmith continued his malicious and illegal conduct under this cuwlla"d in his
ostensibly Qtticial capacity, as plead in Count fir below, by acting as Chair ofthc body
ostensibly ~cting as Camas County Plannin~ Md Zoning Commission that apparently
recommen~ed amemlmcuts to the Comprehensive Plan Dud Zoning Ordinance.

Plaintif( seeking to mitigate his damages and take advantage of the

20.

residual viue of his contractual rights, (i.e. diminished potential development rights and
or resale vfue in the real property) waived all conditions, tenus and contingencies and

closed on ie real property in question on or about September 26, 2005.

21.1

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Smith's intentional

1

interferenCf with the Real Estate Contract with Sellers that led to a breach of said
I

contract Plaintiff suffered monetary damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000)·1
1

22.

Detendant Smith acted in a manner without a reasonable basi::; in law

causing Pl{lintiff to incur anomey fees recoverable under Idaho Code Sections 12-120

I

and 12-12 I.

23.

Defendant Smith acted in a manner that was an extreme deviation from

reasonable standards of conduct, and with an understanding or disregard for its likely
consequenrs. Defendant Smith acted with an extremely harmful state of mind whether
his conduc was malicious or grossly negligent.

£9/££
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i

I

iRFOKE,

P~aintiff

prays this court rotcr judgment against Defendant Smith

in an amotplt in ~Xl:CSS of Ten Thousand Dollars $10,000 for monetary damages, for

punitive

~ag""
and for attorney's fees.
I
.
i

I
I

COUNT III
I
I

I

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

I

! OR IN THE AL TERNERATIVE

I

!

I

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Facnku Allegations Common to All Legal Theories
I

24.

During t~e period and within lh~ lime frame addressed by this Petition,
I

Camas corty, by and tbough its duly elected Board ofCommissioncrs, and through the
memb~s

uJr a body ostellsibly acting as, but not lawfully organized, Planning and Zoning

commissir undertook to exercise the mandatory powers authorized Title 61 Ch"l'ter
65, commr1Y referred to as the Local Land Use Planning Act,. by amending the Camas
County Ctpreheusive Plan, the Land U.e Map and Zoning Ordinance. text and Zoning
Map, and Idid thereby uniformly and systematically up-zone real property owned by

various mjmbers. relations and clients of members of the Board and Commission, and

downzone eal property owned by Plaintiff.
25.

The dates of approval or recommendation of the various aspects of the

comprehTive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Map, by the

unlawfulli organized Planning and Zoning Commission, are difiicult if not impossible to
discern be~ause no proper record was created or maintained.

I
£S/t:'£
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26.
Zoning

The Camas County Hoard of Commissioners did adopt an amended

Or~inance

No. 153, on April 18, 2007, but failed to altach a copy of the

ordinance, fext or map. Curiously, Zoning Onlinallcc; Map No. 150, was adopted by the
i

Board

Pci0l to the text, on March 29,2007, which did not include legal description of the
I

various zors,
Comprche~sive

Also on March 29, 2007 the Board passed a resolution adopted a
Land Use Map, but failed again to provide legal description of the areas

I
contemPlatd for future land uses.

No written record of recommendation from the

unlawfully ifonned Planning and Zoning Commission was created.
I
I

Conflict of Interest

27.

Defendant Smith, during the period addressed in this Petition, acted as an

appointed fovemment official serving on a body that purported to be a duly empowered
Camas CO'Jffity Planning and Zoning Commission.

28.

Detendant Smith owns, and frequently buys and sells, numerous parcels of
I

real properb situated within Camas County, Idaho.

29.

Defendant Smith is actively engaged in the purchase and sale of real

property siited in Camas County both for his own account and as a broker agent for the

purpose

OJ generating income through commission.

During the period addressed by this

Petition, i1 believed Defendant Smith has purchased, sold or been associated with the
purchase Tsale as a broker agent nwnerous parcels of real property.
30.

Defendant Smith and other members of the Planning and Zoning

CommissiCim and Roard of County Commissioners had an economic interest in the

~

jN

ES/S£
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outcome of] this legislative and quasi-judicial activity under Idaho Code Section 67-6506

and theref1re suffered a fatal conflict of interest requiring n:eusa! in tbeir capacity as a
member(s) I of the body purporting to btl the

C~Ul1as

COWlty Plruming and Zoning

CommissiJ limi lhe Board of COWlty Commissioners.

Planning and Zoning Commission Lacked Jurisdiction

During the period addressed by this Petition the

31.

and

Cama~

County Planning

ZOnini. Commi~.ion did not legally exist andlor was operating without authority in

th::.t no Orrinance was duly passed by the Board of County Commissioners creating a
I

Planning apd Zoning Commission and no organizational papers or bylaws had been
adopted asjrequired by Idaho Section 67-6504. Therefore, any and all acts dependant on
a valid 4ended Comprehensive Plan, including an amended zoning ordinance are
without Ie

Ia{ authority.
Fatal Procedural Infirmities ruue Process Violations)

32.

The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of

County Jmmissioners failed to follow the notice and hearing procedures required by
Idaho Cod in amending the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Ordinance.

33.

The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of

County C mmissioners failed to keep a transcribable verbatim record of proceedings as

required b Idaho Code in amending the Comprehensive Plan,

£9/9£
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34.

The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Boaru of

County Co missioners failed to keep a

transcribabl~

verbatim record of proceedings as

required by Idaho Code in amending the Zoning Ordinance.

35. The Camas County Plaruting and Zoning Commission and Board of County

commiSSiorers fuiled to comply with the substantive dictates of the Local Land Use

Planning APt.
I
i
I

The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of

36.

County C9mmissioners failed. in amending the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning

Ordinance.1 to f e findings of fact and conclusions of law or other documentation or
record of rromrendations as required by LC. 67-6508(b) thereby rendering impossible
a meaningful

r~view

whether the substantive requirements and mandatory Planning

duties undt Idaho Code were adhered to.
I

37.1
remand

1d

The Camas County Board of Commissioners, as governing board,

fail~u to

re-notice public hearing after material chang"" were made to the

Comprehe ive Plan and Zoning Ordinance.
Additional Fatal Procedural Infirmities
MA Y

25

38.

2006 AMENDMENT TO COMPREHENSIVE PLAN RESOLUnON 9
On or about May 25, 2006 Defendant Camas County adopted Resolution

#96 - Ne, Comprehensive Plan with revised Land Use Map, changing the permitted
future lan, use of the ~Ubject property from R-7 to Low Density Residential - was not

Allt1SWv·IIS;:!3Hd01SI;:!H:J

TZ6a:Z9SGZ

I

b~ proper notice pursuant to LC. Section 67-6509.

supported

Therefure, Resolution 96 is

I

lawfully defcient and should be stricken as void and held for naught.
More specifically the notice published failed to contain a summary of any

39. I

kind or m+er. including any sort of legal dcscription or map of the areas to be affected,

us~ and/or use designations; nor did Defendant Camas County provide a notice

the land

"r .
Ttent

. d"lction .clor use as a puhi"lC servIce announcement, nor was
10. servmg th'
e Juns

to 0 ther m

notice of

to adopt the amended plan sent to all political subdivisions providing

services wifhin the planning jurisdiction. including school districts.
40_

Moreover. Defendant Camas County failed to provide proper mailed or
I

lawfully a~orized alternative notice such as site posting.
II
41./ Furthennore, Defendant Camas County altered the proposed land use map
on the day

pf the hearing and thereafter failed to properly notice a subsequent hearing.

42./I

Additionally, Defendant Camas County failed, in relation to the planning

duties req,ired by I.e, Section 67-6508, to include "all land" and provide a map,
e entire county, indicating suitable projected land uses for the jurisdiction.

including
43.

1

Moreover. Defendant Camas County has not complied with 67-6509(c)

requiring copy of the plan to accompany each adopting resolution and to be kept on file
with the county clerk and said the portion of said Plan that is the land use is to this day

not aVail1le at the office of the County Clerk.
APRIL [8 2007 AMENDED ZONING ORDINANCE I ORDINANCES 150 & 153
44.

On or about March 29,

2007, and April 18, 2007 Defendant Camas

County a10pted Ordinances #150 & #153- Amended Zoning Ordinance and Map
providing

£9/8£

39t1d

Itar amended zoning districts and bolUldaries thereby, rezoning the subject
i
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I
I

~ublication for which failed to comply with the requirements of I.e. 31-715

property -

I

and/or 31-'115A. Therefore, Ocdillanees 150 and 153 are lawfully deficient and should be
sLrickeu as I oid and held for naught.
45.

More specificnlly, said publications did not an accurately and completely

summarize the ordinance nor did the publications provide a statement that the full text of
the ordinarres were available at a given location or time where a copy of ~ame could be

I

obtained.

I

46.1

Additionally, said publications

proPT

faile~

because the ordinances deal with

I

real

requiring legal description, to publish in full those sections containing the

legal ,ption or map thereof with sufficient detail to clearly define the area with
which the rdinance is concerned.

47.1
adopted

Mr

Moreover, Ordinance 150 adopting an Amended Zoning Map. was

29,2007 some twenty (20) days prior to adoption of Ordinance 153, the

Amended foning Ordinance text upon which the Map is supposedly based indicating a
unlawful

at decision to adopt was made prior to hearing.

WIIEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this court to enter its Judgment declaring null
and void

11

County PI

activities and ostensibly official actions under I.LUPA taken by the Cama.
. S and Zoning Commission and the Board of Commis.sioner" on and after

September 8, 2004. to restrain Defendant from processing land use applications under the
ostensibly adopted amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance and to enter
judgment

£9/6£
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COUNT IV.

~

J

I'J

r' '

j

i

DECLARATORY RELIEF

I

MAY ~2~ 2008 COMPREHENSIVE PLAN & ZONING ORDINANCE
I
AMENDMENTS
48.

new

On or about May 12, 2008, by Resolutions 114 and 115 illegally adopted a

Amenfd Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map. On that same date, by Ordinance

r

Nos. 157

159 the Camas County Board of Commissioners illegally adopted a new

amended Zjning Ordinance and Zoning Designation Map.
I

DEFENDANT'S
ACTIONS IN ADOPTING NEW AMENDED ORDINANCES IS IN
I
I

VIOLATlbN OF THE COURT'S PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AND THE CAMAS

I

i

49'1
Defendant

COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE
This Court, in its order of December 28, 2007, enjoined and prohibited

rm

proceeding under the Zoning Ordinance amended in MMch of 2007 and the

related zO,ing Map if the Zoning Map purportedly affected any sort of change in existing
zoning. Injthis Court's Order of March 10, 2008 the Court state~ on page three (3) ''until

such time rs a final Order is entered the County cannot treat the March 2007 Zoning
Amendmjts as void..."
50./

This Comt stated, "In the Comt's view the applicable zoning in Camas

County goreming land use applications cannot change week to week. as the case at hand
progresses At such time as a final order is entered the question of which County Zoning

Ordinance iPlies will have been settled, and not befOre."

51'1_
for in the

The only means to amend the Zoning Ordinance is the procedure provided

/Zoning Ordinance, Article X Vll, and in full compliance with LLUP A.

Defendantt actions in amending the Zoning Ordinance, again
AIHISl-'lvH S~3HdO.LS I

~H:J

a1t~riJlg

The

the zoning
LG:91

8GGZ/LG/88

designation in areas purportedly atIected by zoning (;hang,c by the 2007 amendments, arc in
violation oflthe Court's Order and/or Defendant's Zoning Ordinance.
1

PROCESS OF ADOPTING NEW AMENDED COMPREHENSIVE PLAN & ZONING

Ii
52.1

ORDINANCE IN VIOLATION OF LLUPA
The new amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance T,and Use

Map and zJning Map are substantially identical t.o that approved in May 2006. March and
April2007,jwith several minor exceptions.

i

53.

The draft date of the new amended Camas County Comprehensive Plan and

Orbance is March 10, 2008 before any meeting had been held, indicating

Zoning

unnoticed td illegal meetings of the Board of Commissioners

54./

The draft date of the new amended Camas C01.ll1ty Comprehensive Plan and

Zoning orrnance Land Use Map and Zoning Map is March 142008 before any meeting
had been hrld, indicating wmoticed and illegal meetings of the Board of Commissioners and

,d
I

Planning

55./

Zoning Commission.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued

by the Planning and Zoning

COmmissir were drafted and signed outside of any notice public meeting and not reviewed
in public
56.

the Planning and Zoning Commission.
Regarding the Zoning Map recommended for approval, the Findings of Fact

and ConCI/iOns of Law are signed by the Planning and Zoning Commission Chair, outside

. of any la11 meeting of the Planning and Zoning Commission, even though Mr. Ralph had
recused . self from participating in the Public Hearing wherein said Map was considered.

£9/117
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Ibe new Amended Comprehensive Plan is an incomplete document, in that

57.

maps and ~les referenced in the Table of Contents arc not contained within the approved
!

document.

i
i

The new Amended Comprehensive Plan approved by the Board of

58.

Commi.si0rets is not the same document that wa< made available to the public prior to
Public

Hers'
59.

The new Amended Zoning Ordinance and new Amended Comprehensive

Plan were crnsidered concurrently indicating a pr~determined outcome, illegal meetings of
I

the

P1anninrl and Zoning Commission and Board of Commissioners.
Among the additional procedural errors associated with the new process are;

60.
I

I

a Legal Notice of Public Hearing deficiencies in violation of I.e. Sections

i

!

,i

67 -6509 & 67-6511 because no summary of the proposed amendments,

I

that would reasonably apprise an individual of the nature or location of

I

I
I
I

the proposed land use zoning changes, was included in said Legal
Notice;
b. nor was said notice provided to all political subdivisions providing
services within the planning jurisdiction, specifically City of Fairfiel<L
and West Magic Fire District;
c. deficiencies under LC. Section 67-6511 and Camas County No. 142 in
providing additional or alternative notice in the case of zoning district
boundary change in that notice was not posted as required at the Camas
County Courthouse or Fairfield City Hall;

£g/Zt>
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d. deficiencies in lhc recommendations made by the Planning and Zoning
Commission to the Doard of County Commissioner regarding the new
amended Comprehensive Plan, Zoning Ordinance and related Land Use
Map and Zoning Designation Map in violation ofT.C.

~ections

67-6507.

67-6509 (a) & (b), 67 ..6511 (b), and in the findings issued by the Board
of C.ommissioners;

I

e. publication deficiencies under LC. Section 31-715A due to failure to

i

publish the entire text, including legal description of the rezoned land.

i

or alternatively a summary that actually describes the amendments

I

I

I

i

made; and
f.

failure to remedy the stench of pre-existing conflicts of interest as
found by this court.

61.

r

Idaho Code Sections 67-6502 provides the twelve (12) purposes for the

Local Lan~ Use Planning Act, including; (a) To protect property rights while making

accOmmOd~tions for other necessary types of development such as low-cost housing and
mobile hote parks. (b) To ensure that adequate public facilities and services are provided
to the P1le at reasonable cost, (c) To ensure that the economy of the state and localities

is protecti (d) To ensure that the important envirorunental features of the state and
localities ye protected. (e) To encourage the protection of prime agricultural, forestry.
and minini lands for production offood, fibre, and minerals, (t) To encourage urban and
urban-tyl development within incorporated cities. (g) To avoid undue concentration of
Populati01 and overcrowding of land, (h) To ensure that the development on land is
commensrate with the physical characteristics of the land, (i) To protect life and

I e ' )
E9/£t:>
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,
!

!
I
property iniareas subject to natural hazards and disasters, (j) To protect fish, wildlife, and
recreation Jesources, (k) To avoid undue water and au: pollution, (1) To allow local school

I

districts

to/ partidpate

in the community planning and development process so as to

address PUjllic school needs and impacts on an ongoing basis.
The legislature to ensure the purposes of the Act are met. provided for

62.

mandatory ruties, process, procedure and required criteria to he considered in I.C. Sections
I

67-6507. 6V-650R, 67-6528. 67-6535 and 67-6537. For example, I.C. Section 67-6528
i

states in re~vant part. •• .. .In adoption and implementation of the plan and ordinances, the

I

governing poard or commission shall take into account the plans and needs of the State of
Idaho and! all agencies, boards, departments, institutions, and local special purpose
I
I

'r
i

districts ...

No such accounting of said plans or needs was had in this case or appears in

I

the record 9f same.
63.

Likewise,

I.e. Section 67-651 I (a) provides

in relevant part, " ... Requests

for an amt1ndment to the zoning ordinance shall be submitted to the zoning or planning
and

ZOnin~ commission which shal1 evaluate the request to determine the extent and

nature of tp,e amendment requested. Particular consideration shall be given to the effects
of any prorsed zone change upon the delivery of services by any political subdivision
providing fbliC services, including school districts, within the planning jurisdiction... "
No such ruation of the extent and nature of the amendment has here occurred, or
appears in

64.

e record of same.

Similarly. I.C. Section 67-6511 (b) allows a Planning and Zoning

commiSSir to make a recommendation to amend a Zoning Ordinance only "After
considering the comprehensive plan and other evidence gathered through the public

I
All \;;ISlt-llt-IISCJ3HdOlSICJH8

Tl5LGZ:98Gl

I

I

pr~cess ... " No

hearing

such considerdtioll was made or appears anywhere in the record

of this nt:w!process.
I

i
65.1
repealing

Idaho Code Section 67-6537 (4), states "When considering amending.

o~ adopting a comprehensive plan, the local governing board shall consider the
I

effect the ~roposed amendment, repeal or adoption of the comprehensive plan would
have on

thf source, quantity and quality of ground water in the area."

Nothing in the

record herejof indicates that any such consideration of ground water issues was had by the
Camas

co~ty Board of Commissioners.
66.:

Finally, the legislature, to be certain the purposes ofLLUPA were adhered

I

I

to, adopt, 67-6535, requiring approvals of land use ordinances affecting a change in
I

I

zoning diSfct boundary, like that which has occurred here, to base the decision upon
standards

if writing. In full the statute provides,
(a) The approval or ueuial of any application provided for in this

chapter shall be based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth
in Ithe comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate
ordrance or regulation of the city or county.
) (b) The approval or denial of any application provided for in this
charter shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that
e~lains the criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant
co~tested facts relied upon, and explains the rationale for the decision
bas~ on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan. relevant
ordFance and statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and
facru information contained in the record.

f(~) It is the intent of the legislature that decisions made pursuant to this
cll,ter should he founded upon sound reason and practical application of
recpgnized principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, the courts of the
~ta~e are directed to consider the proceedings as a whole and to evaluate
thel adequacy of procedures and resultant decisions in light of practical
considerations with an emphasis on fundamental fairness and the
£9/9P
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I

I

i

es~tiaiS of reasoned decision-making. Only those whose challenge to •

dec~ion demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental rights, not
the mere possibility dIe-roof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of a
dec~ion. Every fmal decision rendered concerning a site-specific land use
r~4.~est

shall provide or be accompanied by notice to the applicant

reger-ding the applicant's right to request a regulatory taking analysis
pur~uant

to section 67-8003, Idaho Code.

None of jiS oocurred in the initial or new amendment process. Therefore. the new
amended Cpmprehensive Plan,. Zoning Ordinance and related Land Use Map and Zoning

DeSigMti0r Map. are void on the face of the record before the Court.

WIfREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court enter its Order declaring Resolutions
114 and

11~, new Amended Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map and Ordinance Nos.
I

.

i

157 and 15f' new amended Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Designation Map adopted on or

about May 112,2008 null and void without force or effect, and to award Plaintiffbis auomey
I

fees and

co~ herein.
i

I

I

COUNTY.

VIOL~TION OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE RIGHTS
Clf.S. Canst 14th Amend. Via 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; Id. Canst. Sec. 13)
67.j

Plaintiff possesse<L and possesses a property right based on ownership of

and contr+tual interests in. certain real property located in Camas County, State of

Idaho, and/development rights thereto.
68.

Plaintiff, pursuant to his ownership of and contractual rights in said real

property, fartiCiPated in and was part of the Camas County process of amending the
Camas corty Comprehensive Plan, the Land Use Map and Zoning Ordinance, text and

Zoning

~'

in both 2006-2007 and again in 2008, wherein the Defendant did thereby

uniformly and systematically up-zone real property owned by various members, relations

E9/91;>
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and clients of members of the Board and Commission, and downzone real property
I
I

owned by praintiff.
Plaintift: pursuant to his ownership of and contractual

69.

right.~

in said

real proper' filed for a rezone of the real property in question on which rezone

!was recommended for approval by the then existing Camas County Planning

application

I

and Zonin~ Commission, htlt which was later withdrawn by Plaintiff due to threats and
i

I

coercion frtm the individual defendants hereto.

70.1

Plaintiff: pursuant to his ownership of and contractual rights in said

real propemr, again filed an application for rezone of the real property in question in
I

April 2007/which said application Defendant has refused to act upon.

I

i

Plaintiff is and was entitled to fair consideration of the rezone

applicatio~

and the rezone process as described above, upon the facts in the record

71.

th1I Camas

before

County Board of Commissioners and Planning and Zoning

Commissiio, and objective criteria in the applicable Ordinances and Statutes.
72./
hear and p

Due process requires that only fair and unbiased decision-makers may

I icipate in the decision making process for the rezone application and rezone

process.
73.

The motive for the Defendants denial and/or refusal to consider

Plaintiff's rezone applications, and unequal treatment of Plaintiff in the rezone process,
was in whole or part predicated on animus toward Plaintiff and was a spiteful effort to

l

retaliate arainst Plaintiff for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate governmental
objective.

I
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The actions taken by lhe Defendants singled out Pinintifffor particular

74. ,
i

I

decision-m~ng not related to legitimate public goals.

!

75.

The actions taken by the County were arbitrary, capricious, irrational

I

r

. ted b l Improper
.
.
or tam
motive.

The actions taken by the Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his rights to

76.

procedural rod substantive due

proce~s

of law :in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

to the Unitdd States Constitution and Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, giving rise to a

I

I

act~on

cause 0

under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

77.

Plaintiff sustained damages as a proximate result of the conduct of the

Defendants~ the exact amount of which damages is not presently known but which
I

I

exceeds

thl' jurisdictional amount of this Court.

78.

As a result of Defendants violation of Plaintiffs rights to procedural
I

and substruttive due process of law, Plaintiff has incurred costs hereof and attorney fees.
I
WI-fEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants Camas County, and
I
the individually named Defendants in an amount reasonably calculated to satisfy the

I

damages sJffered by Plaintiff as a result of the illegal and unconstitutional conduct of the
!

defendantsi plus attorney fees and costs incurred herein.

Ir

COUNT VI.

_,

v~

til

I
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW
(U'l' Const., 14th Amend Via 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; Id. Const, Section 2)
79.

As a result of the

animu~

toward Plaintiff, the Defendant has treated the

Plaintiff dierently than similarly ,ituated landowners seeking to develop property within
Camas Corry.

I (\)
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80.

In addition to the other factual averments made herein Defendants have

adopted a shies uf moratorium directed at prohibiting the development or rezone of the
I

i

Plaintif.rs

10perty, while not affecting similarly situated properties.
I

81.

The different treatment by the County deprived the Plaintiff of the equal

I

protection ?f the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment tot eh United States
Constituti0Jjt and Section 2 of the Tdabo Constitution,. giving rise to a cause of action
under 42 ujs.c. Section 1983.
i

82.

r

Plaintiff has sustained damages as a proximate result of the conduct of the

i

Defendantsl the exact amount of which damages is not presently known but which
exceeds

thlIjurisdictional amount of this Court.

Wf:lEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants Camas County, and
I
I

the indivi~Ually named Defendants in an amount reasonably calculated to satisfy the
i

damages

s~ffered by Plaintiff as a result of the illegal and unconstitutional conduct of the

defendants) plus attorney fees and costs incurred herein.
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I

I

I

VERIFICATION

I

II

State ofId*o

I

CO\IDty of qamas

)
)
)

i

I G10RGE MARTIN, the Petitioner herein. declare WIder oath that the above is
true to the qest of my knowl edge.

I
I

Dated this

I -r
I

day of August, 2008.

I

!
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I

of"'-

The wrdersigncu hereby certifies that on the:;-

day of August, 2008. a copy

I
.
of PLAINlrIFF'S
SECOND AMENDED PETITION was served upon COllnse1 Via

facsimile

1d addressed to Phillip 1. CollBer, AttOrney for Oefendant Ed Smith, 250

South Fifth/Street, Ste. 700, P.O. Box 7420, Roise Idaho 83707-7426. facsimile number
208 344

58fo,

Sl

and Stephanie 1. Ronney. Attorney for Camas County Defendants 950 W.

I

Bannock

Ste 520, Boise. Idaho 83702, facsimile number 208 331 1202.

,
i

I

i

4
~~~--~--------------------

I
I

r

I

I
i

I
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Paul J. Fitzer, ISB 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise, 1D 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/33111202
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Attorneys for Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, LLC,

)
)

Case No. CV-07-24

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

v.

)
)

ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
and through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

VERIFIED SECOND AMENDED
ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS CAMAS
COUNTY, THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS
OF THE CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, AND ED
SMITH IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
MEMBER OF THE CAMAS COUNTY
PLANNING AND ZONING
COMMISSION

)

In its Order on Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, served on the
County Defendants on October 8, 2008, this Court denied in part and granted in part the
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Petition.

Plaintiff included as an attachment to said

motion, his proposed amended pleading. To date, the Plaintiff has not served County Defendants
with the amended pleading reflecting the Court's Order. Erring on the side of caution, County

AMENDED ANS~ER -- I
~e

a+-

\

Defendants hereby submit its response to Plaintiffs' proposed Second Amended Petition for
Breach of Contract, Tortious Interference with Contract, For Declarative Relief, Damages for
Violation of Procedural & Substantive Due Process Rights and Equal Protection of the Law. In
so doing, Defendants Camas County, Idaho (the "County"), by and through its duly elected
board of county commissioners, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the Individual
Commissioners) and Ed Smith, in his capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and
Zoning Commission (collectively, County Defendants), by and through their attorneys of record,
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, hereby submit this Second Amended Answer in
conformance with the Court's Order.

L

ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITION
The County Defendants admit, deny, and allege as follows:
Facts Common to all Counts & Jurisdictional Statement

1.

County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny Plaintiffs

Paragraph 1, 2, and 4, and therefore deny.
2.

County Defendants admit paragraph 3.

3.

With regard to Paragraph 5, County Defendants admits insofar as the legislative

actions of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and/or Camas County Board of
County Commissioners in enacting the County's comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, and
map occurred in Camas County but denies the remainder of the paragraph.

AMENDED AN~R -- 2

4.

County Defendants deny Paragraphs 6 and 7.

COUNT I - BREACH OF CONTRACT
5.

As Count 1 does not pertain to nor is it relevant to the County Defendants, County

Defendants are not required to answer.

However, to the extent that any such claim can be

asserted against County Defendants, Paragraphs 8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are denied in
their entirety.

COUNT II - TORTIOUS INTERENCE WITH CONTRACT
6.

County Defendants lack infonnation sufficient to admit or deny Paragraph 16, 17,

18, 20, and 21 and therefore deny same.
7.

County Defendants deny paragraph 19, 20, 22, and 23.

COUNT III - Petition for Declarative Judgment
8.

Count III has already proceeded to trial before the Court and is awaiting the

Court's final order and IRCP 54(b) certification of final judgment. Therefore, Defendant is not
required to submit an additional amended answer as to Count III. To the extent that any such
allegations remain, (due to the pending nature of the Court's Order and 54(b) certification),
County Defendants deny each and every allegation alleged by Plaintiff unless specifically

admitted herein including but not limited to, all allegations pertaining to Count III (Paragraphs
24-47) .

COUNT IV - Declarative Relief May 12, 2008 Comprehensive Plan & Zoning Ordinance
Amendments
9.

In its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, served

upon County Defendants on October 8, 2008, the Court specifically denied Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to Amend Petition as it pertains to this Count. Therefore, the matter is stricken from the
amended pleading and County Defendants are not required to answer this Count. To the extent
that any such allegation pertains to a triable issues, County Defendants deny each and every
allegation not specifically admitted herein including any and all allegations alleged in Count IV
(Paragraphs 48-66).

COUNT V - Violation of Procedural and Substantive Due Rights [sic1
10.

With regard to Paragraph 67, Defendant admits that Plaintiff does own property

within the County, but denies the remainder of the paragraph.
11.

With regard to Paragraph 68, Defendant admits that Plaintiff was a part of the

comprehensive planning process utilized in the amendment of the comprehensive plan and
zoning ordinance and map as Plaintiff attended and/or testified at every public hearing, meeting,
informational session, and workshop, but denies the remainder of the paragraph.
12.

County Defendants deny paragraphs 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, and 78.

AMENDED AN~ER -- 4

13.

With regard to Paragraph 71, Plaintiff does not appear to assert a factual allegation,

but rather assets a legal conclusion and therefore no response is required.

To the extent a

response is required, deny.
14.

With regard to Paragraph 72, Plaintiff does not appear to assert a factual

allegation, but rather assets a legal conclusion and therefore no response is required. To the
extent a response is required, deny.

COUNT VI - Equal Protection of Law
15.

County Defendants deny paragraph 79, 80, 81, and 82.

16.

[Prayer] Deny and affirmatively allege that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition is

wholly devoid of any merit whatsoever and that the County Defendants are entitled to costs and
attorney fees pursuant to I.C § 12-117 because this action has been brought without a reasonable
basis in fact and law.
II.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
First Affirmative Defense
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in their favor and
against the County Defendants.

Second Affirmative Defense
Plai ntiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Third Affirmative Defense

AMENDED ANSW;:;:R -- 5

0+

Plaintiffs' claims are barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel.
Fourth Affirmative Defense

Any injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are a direct and proximate result of their own actions
or omlsSlOns.
Fifth Affirmative Defense

Any injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are a direct and proximate result of the acts or
omissions of others for whom the County Defendants are not liable.
Sixth Affirmative Defense

Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the requirements of Title 6, Chapter 9, Tort Claims
against Government Entities.
Seventh Affirmative Defense

County Defendants have immunity pursuant to I.C §§ 6-904(1), 6-904(3), and 6904B(3).
Eighth Affirmative Defense

County Defendants are not liable for punitive damages pursuant to I.C § 6-918.
Ninth Affirmative Defense

The Plaintiffs have not suffered actual harm or a violation of a fundamental right as
required by I.C § 67-6535.
Tenth Affirmative Defense

The Plaintiffs' alleged claims are properly before the District Court of the United States
as said claims have original jurisdiction over such federal questions of law and therefore such
civil action should be removed to the United States District Court.

III.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, the answering County Defendants request that the Plaintiffs take nothing by
their Petition and each cause of action pleaded therein; that the County Defendants be awarded
their reasonable costs and attorney fees under I.e. §§ 12-117, 12-120,12-121, and 6-918A; and
that the Court provide the County Defendants any further relief as may be just and equitable.
Respectfully submitted this _ _ _ day of October, 2008.

XTON

& TURCKE, CHID.

itzer
eys for County Defendants

AMENDED ANSW .

VERlFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Camas
)
Ken Backstrom, being duly sworn, states as follows:
That he is the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioner for the County of Camas,
representing the County Defendants in the above-entitled matter; that, as such, he has read the
foregoing document, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be true and correct to
the best of his knowledge;

FURTHER, your Affiant sai~ not.

La~-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

------....\
c ______
~A.......c-"'-::"=~_~

C/:~

NOTARY PUBLIC ~OR IDAHO
Residing at: ~,( -b--e l d , ~
My Commission Expires: ::>-G -';;"'0 I (\

TRACY D. GILL
Notary Public
State of Idaho
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day of October, 2008.

***
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer was this

IStb

of October, 2008 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY
GEORGE MARTIN.

)

)

) Case No.: CV -1007-24

Plaintitl:
and

)
)

MARTIN CUSTOM HOMES. LLC,

) FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF
) LAW. and ORDER FOLLOWING TRIAL
)
)
)
)

vs.
ED SMITH.

)

Defendant
and
CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO.
By and through the duly elected
Board of Commissioners in
their official capacities.

)
)
)

)
)
)

)
)

KEN BACKSTROM.
BILL DAVIS. and
RON CHAPMAN
Defendants.

)

)
)
)
)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 4.2007. the plaintiff filed a petition alleging Breach of Contract. a claim
for Tortious Interference with Contract. and. in Count III. a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment or in the Alternative Petition for Judicial Review. This last claim has proceeded
primarily as a petition for declaratory judgment rather than as a claim for judicial review.
An amended petition was filed on or about December 13.2007.

Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law. and Order

Plaintiff George rvlartin applied for and was denied a temporary restraining order
and later a preliminary injunction on the issue ofv,:hether Camas County had a duly
constituted planning and zoning commission. The decision denying that relief was filed
on or about August 9,2007.
Thereafter, Martin applied for and was granted a preliminary injunction on the
issue of whether Camas County was required to or did maintain a .. transcribable verbatim
record" of certain proceedings as required by Idaho Code § 67-6536. That decision vvas
entered and filed on December 28, 2007.
Martin again applied for a preliminary injunction on the issue of whether certain
Camas County Commissioners, or others, had prohibited conf1icts of interest. This comi
entered a written decision on that issue along with a second injunction on April 2, 2008.
In that decision, the court also re-examined the question of whether at least some of the
proceedings before the Camas Board of Commissioners were quasi-judicial in nature. and
thus required that a verbatim record be maintained.
Pursuant to IRCP Rule 65(a)(2), and by virtue of stipulations between the parties.
the eourt ordered the hearings on the applications for preliminary injunctions
consolidated with the trial. The evidence from them has become part of the trial record
and thus did not need to be repeated at trial.
Trial was held before the court sitting in Camas County vvithout a jury on August
20.2008. The plaintiff has been represented throughout by Christopher Simms, Ketchum.
Idaho. Camas County has been represented throughout by the firm of Moore. Smith.
Buxton, & Turcke. Chartered, of Boise, Idaho. Phillip Collaer. of Anderson, Julian. &
Hull. of Boise, was excused from attending the trial. Following trial. the parties submitted
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briefs. the last coming on September 26. 2008. At that time. the court took this matter
under advisement.

INTERIM DECISIONS FROM THE IDAHO APPELLATE COtTRTS
While this case has been pending. the Idaho Supreme Court has entered a few
decisions in the area of land use planning; their affect on this case is unclear. Among
them are GiitnerDail}', LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630.181 P,3d 1238 (2008):

Highlands Dewlopmenl Corporation \', City oj'Boise, 145 Idaho 958. 188 P,3d 900
(2008): and Euchd Avenue Trust v, City ojBoise, 146 Idaho 306. 193 P.3d 853 (2008),
The Giltner Dairy and Highlands Development cases raise issues such as "vhether judicial
review of certain zoning decisions is available to aggrieved paliies. \vhile Euclid Avenlle
clarifies that a petition for judicial review. being an appellate proceeding. may not be
combined with other claims for relief

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Overview
1,) The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, Venue is
proper.
2,) This court reiterates and re-adopts its decision filed December 28.2007
regarding Camas County's failure to keep and maintain an adequate transcribable
verbatim record. and its decision filed April 2. 2008 on the issue of whether certain
conflicts of interest existed,
3,) This court will be the first to recognize that while the distinction between
"legislative" and "quasi-Judicial" activity has not always been clear, some of the Idaho
Supreme Court's recent decisions-notably Highland\' Dewlopmeflf Corporation \' Citl'
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oj/3oise-cast doubt on whether and under what conditions a court may re\iew quasijudicial zoning decisions under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IDAPA"). See

Highlands Development Corporation v. ('ity oj'Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 962-70. 188 P.3d
900. 904-12 (2008) (Jones. J. dissenting). This court also recognizes the distinction the
Idaho Supreme Court clearly made in Euclid A \'enue Trust that judicial review of
administrative activity should proceed as an appeal while. as different procedural rules
apply. the appellate and civil processes should not be allowed to proceed together. This
case was well underway before Euclid Avenue Trust was decided,
Although the court has paid significant attention to the issue of whether Camas
County's process of holding public hearings and maintaining a proper record was
legislative activity as opposed to quasi-judicial, most of that examination has focused on
determining what record the county was required to maintain. and not in determining
whether this case involves an appeal of arguably legislative activity. Admittedly. in its
decision on the "transcribable verbatim record" issue. the court paid a good deal of
attention to whether there could be an appeal from those administrative decisions. In its
next opinion, which concerned the conflicts of interest issue, this court clarified its earlier
decision by pointing out that at some time during the 2007 rezoning process. Camas
County clearly engaged in "quasi-judicial" activity when it held noticed public hearings
for the purpose of passing amendments to its Comprehensive Plan. and also when it
rezoned large pOliions of the county. if not all of it, during the March 2007 meetings.
The court's determination that a transcribable verbatim record was required turns
on its findings that the County engaged in deliberations leading lip to the quasi-judicial

puhlic hearings at Hhich the ('omprehensive Plan and new zoning were adopted. and that
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the ('ountJ' did so without making any record olthose deliherations. I Moreover. at the
time the court was reviewing the verbatim record issue. all of the e\'idence had not yet
heen presented. and there \vere at least two open questions. One question im'olwd
determining 11'hen the Board of Commissioners actually received a written
recommendation from the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission C'P&Z'"). so

that deliherations hy the Board olCol1lmissioners might hare thereafter ensued in
violation ol§ 6"'-6536. The second question concerned \\"hat the written recommendation
from P&Z might have contained.
The ans\ver to those questions is that no one from Camas County can provide that
information. In other words. no one knows exactly what the Board of Commissioners
received from the P&Z. and no one can tell when it was received. Thus. no one can tell
precisely when the Board commenced "deliberating toward a decision after compilation
of the record." It is evident from the court's prior findings that the Board of
Commissioners was certainly having discussions "offthe record" after it received P&Z's
recommendations, but before the public hearings commenced.
In this regard, the court wishes to clarify its view that Idaho Code ~ 67-6536
mandates a record

Of([l1Y

deliberations once P&Z's recommendations have been

received, and that such deliberations are not confined or limited to discussions among the
Board of Commissioners once they have heard all the public testimony. Othenvise. the
Board gets to deliberak all they \vant after P&Z's recommendations have arrived, but
prior to the public hearings. and with no record maintained as to what \vas discussed.
The Board then gets to come to whatever conclusions they desire. If that happens. the
! "When a statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effect of a zoning law upon propert: rights
the action uf the legislative body becomes quasi-judicial in character." .lerome Cmmtl' \' Hoi/OliO.\'. 118

Idaho 681. 799 P2d 969 ( 1')90).
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public hearings become a sham. Without a record, the public has no assurance this is not
exactly what has happened. The "record" here-P&Z's recommendations-was
obviollsly received and discussed by the Board in some fashion for quite some time
hef(xe any public hearings commenced.
The court also views Idaho Code § 67-6356 as requiring a verbatim record if a
hoard engages in a quasi-judicial proceeding, and deliberates with an objective of
reaching a decision. regardless olwhelher an appeal is ultimately availahle to some

party.
4.) Camas County has argued long and hard in this case that its actions were
legislative. not quasi-judicial, and thus are exempt from judicial review. While counties'
legislative actions are subject to collateral actions such as declaratory judgments. they
cannot be attacked by judicial review. Burt v. City of1daho Falls 105 Idaho 65. 665 P.2d
1075 (1983); Cooper v. Ada County Commissioners, 101 Idaho 407.614 P.2d 947 (1980).
A trial and several evidentiary hearings were held on three preliminary injunction issues.
Here, the plaintiff clearly indicated at the commencement of trial he was proceeding on
the declaratory judgment aspects of this case. and did so by going forward with trial and
by presenting evidence and testimony. For these reasons, and for the reasons set forth
ahove. the court will review the facts and law and enter a decision as a declaratory
judgment. and not as a judicial review proceeding. Thus, while the court agrees that large
portions of the County's challenged activities may be legislative, certainly not all of the
County's activities are. More importantly. however. is that simply because the County's
actions may haw been legislative in nature, and thus perhaps exempt from a judicial
reviev, proceeding. this fact does not mean those actions are exempt from lavv.

Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law, and Order Following

In order to accept Camas County's position. one must accept the proposition that

if a county acts on a broad enough scale and rezones enough property. it acts in a purely
legislati\e capacity. Thus. if it acts in a legislative capacity. it is essentially immune from
the legal requirements of LLUPA or any number of other statutory requirements. and
need not keep verbatim records of meetings or avoid conflicts of interest. Additionally.
under the county's position. its actions are not reviewable.
Camas County also suggests in its briefing that. in view of the recent decisions of
the Idaho Supreme Court. comprehensive plans. land use maps, zoning ordinances and
zoning maps rezoning property are no longer subject to the statutory revie\v procedures
of LLUPA. Time will tell.

B. New Findings and conclusions.
5.) The plaintiff still has civil causes of action pending against Camas County
based on whether the County acted appropriately in effecting the questioned rezones. The
issues in this case are not moot. and the plaintiff mayor may not be entitled to attorney" s
fees. Actions are not mooted by an amendment or replacement if the controversy is not
removed or the amendment or replacement does not otherwise resolve the parties' claims.

Idaho Schools/or Eelual Educational Opportunity v. Idaho State Board ojEducation 128
Idaho 276. 912 P.2d 644 (1995).
Two related principles bear on the mootness issue. The first is the public interest
doctrine. E\'en if a case is determined to be moot. if the issue presented is one of
substantial public interest. the issue may need to be addressed for future direction and
guidance. Johnson \'. Bonner COllnty S'chool District No. 82, 126 Idaho 490. 492. 887
P.2d 35.37 (1994); Idaho Schoolslhr Equal Edllcational Opportunity r. Idaho S'tale
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Boord oj Educalion 128 Idaho 276. 912 P.2d 644 (1995). The second principle is that.
en:n if a case could technically be deemed moot. it can fall \vithin the exception of
"capable of repetition yet evading re\'iew:' As the Court noted in Idaho Schools/or
Equal E'duco/ iOllal Opportllni/J', the county could pass nev,' ordinances e\'ery year.
making any prior determinations arguably moot. 128 Idaho 26. 912 P,2d 644. As the
Court there stated. ·'Then. as in this case, each time a declaratory judgment action is filed
claiming the method of school funding is not 'thorough' under that year's standards. the
district court could dismiss the case as moot claiming those standards had been
sunsetted:·ld. at 284. 912 P.2d at 65l. Thus. "a situation arises \vherein the case is
repetitive or continuing. but is incapable of being resolved." ld
The court notes that this situation has already presented itself here. On the heels
of this presently pending case, the plaintiff has already sought and been denied leave to
file an amended complaint alleging that the new ordinance passed in 2008-the one
Camas County claims renders this case moot-suffers from the same defects as the ones
being presently ruled upon. (See Plaintitf's l'v1otionfc)r Leave to Amend Petition hJ'
Adding

TJ.l'O

Additional Causes of Action, filed on or after August 7. 2008 herein. and

Plain/itT's Applicationfor Temporary Res/raining Order, Preliminary Injunction, ([nd
Dec/aratory Relic/filed herein on or after August 7. 2008.). In these new pleadings that
the plaintiff sought to be made a continuing part of this case. the plaintitf has attacked the
very 2008 ordinances that the defendant claims have mooted the present case, and for
many of the very same reasons. The plaintiff should be entitled to a determination of the
issues in this first case, as they directly impact the allegations in the second.

Findings of Fact Conclusions of La\v. and Order Following
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6.) Camas County claims that the plaintiff lacks standing. It is undisputed that the
plaintifl holds record interest in several parcels of real estate situated throughout various
portions of Camas County. (See attached Stipulation.). Pursuant to that stipulation. at
least some of the plaintiff s property was rezoned, apparently down zoned from AT to
A5. (See Paragraph 15 of Stipulation.). In addition. the plaintiff may be affected ifhis
neighbors are allowed to develop adjoining property in a rural area. S'ee Emns

1'.

Telon

('ollnly. 139 Idaho 71. 73 P.3d 84 (2003): ('owan v. Fremont ('olinly, 143 Idaho 501, 148

P.3d 1247 (2006). The plaintiflhas also claimed that the county \\ill allmv dewlopment
on several parcels near his. and that by allowing nearby properties to be upzoned
(including parcels belonging to commissioners that have been upzoned in violation of
conflicts of interest statutes). the county has acted with an evil motive and in a manner
that deprives the plaintifl of both of due process and equal protection. Those civil
damages claims. though tiled in this action. have yet to be resolved. For the above
reasons. the court concludes that the plaintiff has standing.
7.) In making amendments to the Comprehensive Plan in March. 2007. Camas
County used very little new information. The general consensus of the Board of
Commissioners was that old information was still valid. The Board felt the zoning
ordinances needed to be amended because of gro\V1h in Camas County. At least one
Board member admits that the Board permitted new density in ne\\" arcas 0 f the county
without knowing the impact of new zoning and without obtaining any new studies. In the
same breath. that same board member also admits that the Board did not analyze hm\"
new development would affect roads or transportation.

(
Find1l1gs of Fact. Conclusions of Law. and Order Following Trial --

l)

8.) A large-scale rezone of the county was effected in March. 2007. The county
claims that the original recommendation from the P&Z Board \vas for a large rezone and
that the County Board then gave public notice and re-zoned the entire county on or after
March 14.2007. This has not been the subject of testimony or argument, though it may
be ascertainable by lengthy and protracted review of the evidence. However, the court is
not resolving this issue. The March 2007 rezone involved a contemporaneous amendment
to the Comprehensive Plan and did etlect a rezone, at least by estimates, of 10.000 to
20.000 acres, if not the whole county.
9.) There is an area of Camas County known as the "recharge" area, which is the
area within the southern half-mile or so of the base of the Smoky Dome peaks. Prior to
the March 2007 rezone this was zoned '"Agricultural": after the rezone it has some
residential zoning. In some of this area. the county had a land use map that designated
this area as "Agricultural Transitional." or "Ag Tran." The parties seem to agree that
obtaining an actual rezone to Ag Tran required an application to P&l. and approval by
the Board. The Board. however, felt that because of the map, they had no way to deny
any applications for a rezone from "Ag" to Ag Tran. The Board apparently rezoned this
area in March. 2007 without any recommendation from P&Z. Large portions of the
recharge area have also been rezoned from Ag to "ResidentiaL" and to zoning allowing
one house per five acres. No studies were apparently done to determine the effects of the
rezone on water in the recharge area.
10.) In approximately 2006. the Board of Commissioners. or some of its
memhers. approached the Camas P&Z Commission and asked them to come up with a
nel,\ zoning map for Camas County. This may have been the Board' s response to its

0\\11
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opinion that they could not prohihit rezone applications from Ag to Ag Tran in those
areas of the county designated Ag Tran hy the existing map. The inference the court
draws is that this request hy the Board or some of its memhers '-vas oral and is not in the
record. If it is. the court has not heen directed to it.
11.) There is no written record of any recommendations in this regard that

the Camas P&Z Commission ever completed and sent to the Board. That is. there is
no record that P&Z ever prepared and sent to the Camas County Board of Commissioners
any written recommendation for a rezone or an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan
that the Board could either accept or reject.
12.) At least initially. P&Z was not attempting to rewrite the Comprehensive Plan.
hut only attempting to comply with the Board's request for a zoning map. Partway
through the process. P&Z determined it had to change the Comprehensive Plan and map
in order to get to the zoning map. P&Z chose not to gather new data because its members
felt not much had changed. P&Z did not consider the whole of the county in making
whatever recommendations it did make, and in fact, did not make any recommendations
as to changes in the Comprehensive Plan. According to the testimony, this failure to
consider the whole of the county was "rectified in 2007," apparently by the Board. The
court has not been directed to the record to confirm that any of that action was attributed
to the P&Z Commission.
13.) According to the testimony from P&Z members there is no \\Titten
recommendation from the P&Z to the Board. as noted above. What ,-vas sent to the Board
\\as a compromise consisting of a single big "proposed land use rnap." together with
additional maps submitted by each P&Z commissioner that contained what each would

Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law. and Order Following
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like to see. \Vhat is important is that whatever map(s) was sent to the Board, if such
a map hy ilsellcould constitute a written recommendation pursuant to Idaho Code

~

67-

6509, is not now before the court. Trial Exhibit 0 is not it. There is not, therefore, any
record maintained by Camas Count}· as required by Idaho Code § 67-6509(a) of the
"hearings, findings made, and actions

t~lken

b)" the commission." These maps went

to the Board sometime in ::?006, although it is impossible to say \vhen. At least one P&Z
commissioner testified that at the time he raised the issue that the law required the P&Z
commission to send a written recommendation to the Board to accompany the
documents, but that it never happened.
14.) This failure to identify a written recommendation from P&Z to the

Board precedes and precipitates a number of other legal difficulties. Because there is
no written recommendation that can be identified from the P&Z to the Board, it is
impossible to tell vvhen the Board received whatever it is they did receive, and therefore
impossible to tell when the Board commenced its "deliberations." It is obvious from the
court's prior findings made after the second injunction hearings-the transcribable
verbatim record issue-that the Board discussed these recommendations he/hre they ('1'er

got to public hearing or were even noticed/or public hearings. The minutes are clear that
on November 28, 2006, in a meeting at which no record was kept. the "Board continued
discussing the proposed new Zoning Ordinance." (Defendants Exhibits. Pg. 318.). The
same thing occurred on December 11,2006, vvhen the Board re\'iewed the Subdivision
Ordinance and proposed changes. and the Board "discussed the Camas County Zoning
Ordinance" and "The Board discussed the City Area ofImpact." Other unrecorded
meetings at which "the P&Z map" and the "proposed Zoning and Land Csc Map" and the
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proposed ordinances were discussed by the Board occurred on December 26.2007.
January 8. 2007. and February 20. 2007. (See Pgs 13 and 14 of the Decision on
Req1lirements o/'u Transcribable Verbatim Record und Other Reconh)hr Purposes o/'a
Preliminary Injunction filed herein December 28.2007.). Because there is no record of

what was discussed. it is impossible for the county to deny that these are "deliberations
tov;ard a decision after compilation of the record.""
In addition. because it is not possible to identify precisely 'what recommendations
the Board received. it is virtually impossible for the county to give proper legal notice as
to what would transpire at upcoming public meetings.

I.e. § 67-6509 states. "If the

governing board will conduct a subsequent public hearing. notice of the planning and
zoning commission recommendation shall be included in the notice of public hearing
provided by the governing board." Without a written recommendation from P&Z. this
requirement became almost impossible for the county to comply with. The County
attempts to get around these requirements by suggesting the proposed maps were on
display somewhere so that the public could go look at them in order to comment at public
hearings. However. unless the public has other maps available to illustrate what changes
are proposed. such a map would mean little. It is the written recommendation that the
public needs. and that the lav.: requires. in order to know what is proposed.
Finally. vvithout a written recommendation from P&Z that can now be identified.
it is difficult for the county to argue that they complied with

I.e. § 67-6509 by giving

notice ot: ami adopting. a proposed plan. If there was not a \vTitten proposed plan. what
did the Board adopt? Presumably. the Board adopted a map that cannot now be 10C({led
:Vloreover. it is impossible to tell whether any changes or how many changes \vere made
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to the proposed "map" after its receipt. \vhich \vould require additional hearings pursuant
to the same statute. There were at least some changes because the county claims it made
amendments on approximately March 14.2007 to include the whole county. It is also
evident from the minutes of the December 1 L 2006 meeting that Commissioner Ken
Baxtrom was directed to "meet with the attorney to make the recommended revisions and
forward on to the Planning and Zoning Commission." Were those changes the subject of
additional hearings as required? Without knowing what recommendations originally went
up to the Board. it is impossible to know whether the final result was the subject of
proper hearings or not.
15.) The plaintiff and Camas County entered into a written stipUlation filed herein
on May 21. 2008 entitled "Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of Documentary
Evidence." A true and correct copy of that stipulation consisting of 6 pages is attached
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. and the court adopts all of that
stipulation into these findings of fact. Alleged deficiencies in publication of legal notices
are set forth in the stipulation at paragraphs 8. 9.10.11. 12. and 13. When these
deficiencies are combined with the failure of the county to identify a written
recommendation from the P&Z Commission, the effect is exponential.
16.) The Camas County Comprehensive Plan was amended during the same
March 2007 hearings that the county was rezoned. There is no formal written
recommendation from the Camas P&Z to the Board to amend or adopt amendments to
the Comprehensive Plan. (See Stipulation. Paragraphs 5 and 6.). This would appear to
violate Idaho Code

~

67-6509. When asked at trial by the plaintitrs counsel where in the

record it appcared that the county considered the Comprehensive Plan and other evidence
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before adopting the amendments to the zoning code. Commissioner Backstrom gave an
answer suggesting that process occurred in his head. and if there had been discussions
about that issue vvith his fellov\' commissioners it had occurred ora the years from time
to time.
However, as the court advised counsel. the court would not listen to the tapes in
order to ascertain events. The tapes are in evidence. This answer. however. suggests that
the county may not have properly considered the Comprehensive Plan in making
amendments to the zoning ordinance, or may not have considered the Comprehensive
Plan and the zoning amendments in the proper order. Idaho Code § 67-6511 (c) provides
that ',[allier the plan has been amended. the zoning ordinance may then be considered
for amendment pursuant to section 67 -6511 (b). Idaho Code."

I.e.

§ 76-6511 (Emphasis

added). See also Price v. Payette County Bd. Of'Com'rs, 131 Idaho 426. 958 P.2d 583
(1998). The court makes no factual finding in this regard one way or the other, except to
the extent stipulated by the parties.
17.) This issue is magnified. however, by the failure of the county to "generate

any independent formal written record of decision of adoption of Ordinance 150 or
153 other than the Ordinance itself." (See Stipulation, Paragraph 7.). An amendment to
a zoning ordinance must be in accordance with the adopted plan. Love v. Board 0/( 'oullty
Commissioners. 105 Idaho 558. 671 P.2d471 (1983). Although the court recognizes the

county's assertion that the very nev, decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court hav'e modified
50 years of case law, this court is not so sure. As matters novv stand. it appears that cases
like Price v. Payette COllnty Board o/Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426. 958 P.2d 583
( 19981: Lore \', Board of' COllf1ly Commissiollers, 105 Idaho 558. 671 P .2d4 71 (1983):

I
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and CO\!'(m r. Fremont COllnty, 143 Idaho 501. 148 P,3d 1247 (2006). are still good law,

This cOllrt recogni::es that some oj"those decisions im'olrejudicial rnie1l' ol::onil1g
decisiol1s. The court also recognizes that the action of the county in rezoning large
portions of the county may be

entire~}'

legislative activity, See Burt \', Idaho Falls, 105

Idaho 65. 665 P,2d 1075 (1983), Hov.:ever. neither of those issues is the focus here,
Rather. the focus here is to determine.fi)r pUl]JOses oldeclaratoryjudgment,
whether Camas County complied with applicable law in enacting new zoning ordinances
in March of 2007, To this court. it appears that zoning decisions such as the one before
the court are quasi-judicial agency functions, in which the public is given notice and an
opportunity to be heard, and where evidence and testimony are taken, As such. it still
appears that "The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (LA,P,A,) governs the review of
local zoning decisions." Price r. Payette County Board oj"Commissioners, 130 Idaho.
426.958 P.3d 583 (1998) Therefore. this court believes that: 1.) because this is an action
for declaratory relief. and 2.) because the county is engaged in a quasi-judicial function
\vhen exercising its authority here. it matters not whether the county was acting on a
request from a particular landowner for a change in zoning or whether the Board was
considering a request or recommendation from its own P&Z Commission to amend
zoning. The/act is the cOllnty has taken evidence and testimony in the exercise oj"a qu([si-

judicial/imction and therej'ore due process considerations apply. Thus, the cOllnty must

muke \tTittenjindings oj/act and conclu.siolls ollwr. The Price case and numerous Idaho
decisions say as much. Whether the county is acting on a particular application or on its
own recommendation from its P&Z affects whether a party might be able to seek
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judicial review, but it does not affect the requiremellts imposed by statutes (Iml case law
(IS

to whether the county mllst make written findings (lnd conclusions.
The county suggests that the recent decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court in

llighlunds Development Corp. v. Boise and Gillner Daily v. Jerome ('ollnty change this
result. In addressing whether findings of fact or conclusions of law are required. the
county states that "[a]s the Supreme Court has made patently clear in Giltner and
Highlands, there must be an application or permit to invoke the quasi-judicial review
provisions ofLLUPA." (Defendant's Trial Briet pg. 12.). In other words. the county's
position is that as long as no one is able to seek judicial review of a county zoning
decision. even though the county Board has taken evidence and testimony in the exercise
of a quasi-judicial function. the Board does not need to identify the evidence or testimony
on which it relies in rezoning 10.000 to 20.000 acres. or an entire county.
This court does not believe Giltner and Highlands Development stand for so
broad a proposition. If it was the Idaho Supreme COU11's intent to overrule significant
case law on point they would have more explicitly done so. Instead. it appears to this
court that both Giltner and Highlands tum on much narrower grounds-i.e .. the right to
judicial review. Each case says as much. In Giltner Dairy the issue is directly stated as:
""Did Giltner Dairy have a right to tile a petitionjhrjlldicial review of an amendment to
the comprehensive plan map"? GiltnerDaif)" LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630. 632.
181 P.3d 1238. 1240 (2008) (Emphasis added). In Highlands Del'elopmel1l, the Supreme
Court again phrased the issue as. ""Did the District Court Err in Dismissing the Petition
fhr Judicial Review?" Highlands' De1'elopment COil) \'. Boise. 145 Idaho 958. 960. 188
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PJd 900, 902 (2008) (Emphasis added). In each case the Supreme Court determined that
the allegedly aggrieved party had no right tojudicia/ review.
There is. unfortunately, language in Giltner Dairy that could be interpreted to
mean that IDAPA does not apply at all to zoning decisions. If that were so. then the
Supreme Court. \vithout saying so. has overruled a number of Idaho cases and done away
with any requirements that zoning bodies keep records or identify the basis of their
decisions. Such a decision would eliminate even declaratory relief actions such as this
one. The Supreme Court stated in Highlands' that they did not intend to eliminate other
causes of action. It is this court's belief that the language quoted in Giltner Dairy about
the applicability of IDAPA to the issue before the Supreme Court was not intended to
eliminate a county's responsibility to make findings of fact in quasi-judicial zoning
matters. It was instead intended to clarify that the APA conferred 110 separate right to

an appeal of coullty zoning activity by way ofjudicial review. That is \vhat (iiltna DaiJT
was about. No more and no less. The case starts with that discussion and never varies
from it. There, the Court stated:

In its brieting. Giltner Dairy contends it is entitled tojudicial
review under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act .... The
language of the lAP A indicates that it is intended to govern the
judicial review of decisions made by state administrative agencies,
and not local governing bodies. During oral argument, Giltner
Dairy admitted that the right to ohlainjlldicial review in this case
must come/i'om a stalute other than the IAPA. During oral
argument. Giltner Dairy relied upon Idaho Code 67-6521 jor Cl
right to appeal. ..
(;il!nerDaitv. 145 Idaho 630, 632, 181 P.3d 1238. 1240 (emphasis added).
In GilTner Dairy. the Idaho Supreme Court clarified only that (iiltner Dairy was
not an aggrieved party for purposes of appeal by \vay of judicial revievv. Highluncl, did
not change this result. but in fact reinforced it.
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·,
On the other hand, there is a wealth of Idaho case 1m\' on the question of whether
zoning bodies must enter \vritten findings and conclusions of law on zoning decisions.

,"lee e.g. E'wns v. Teron COllnty, 139 Idaho 71. 73 P.3d 84 (2003). \Vhether Giltner
and Highlands' are intended to overturn all aspects of cases such as Emns
<- 'ollnly.

1'.

D(/i'~\'

Tl!ton

Price \'. Payette County, and Comer v. County ojTwin Falls is anyone's guess.

Until the Supreme Court has explicitly said that this has happened, this court believes its
obligation is to follow existing law.
The following language is taken from COvl'Cln v. Board oj'Com 'rs oj'Fremont
('ollnty decided less than 2 years ago:

For effective judicial review of the quasi-judicial actions of zoning
boards, there must be .. ,adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Conclusory statements are not sufficient; instead, what is needed for
adequate judicial review is a clear statement of what, specifically, the
decisionmaking body believes, after hearing and considering all the
evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon which its decision is
based. (Citation omitted), However, a board of commissioners may adopt
a planning and zoning commissions' findings and conclusions because
I.e. § 67-6535 requires only that findings and conclusions be made.
143 Idaho 501. 148 P.3d 1247 (2006) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
Because

I.e.

§§ 67-6535(a) and (b) refer to "applications," the county suggests it

is exempt from requirements to enter findings and conclusions imposed by existing case
law. Historically, land use and zoning decisions have been appealable pursuant to
LL UP A and the APA, and findings of fact and conclusions of lay\' have been required in
order to facilitate these appeals. Whether the Supreme Court has intended to do away
with requirements that counties enter findings of fact and conclusions of law following
quasi-judicial zoning hearings in cases that do not involve specitic "applicants" remains
to be seen. Until that happens. this court believes they are stilL and should be, required.
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If they are only required in cases where there is a nan-owly qualified right to
judicial review. a county \vould be free to engage in "legislative activity" and rezone an
entire county without stating any standards and without indicating in any fashion what
e\idence. if any. has been accepted and/or relied upon from public hearings. This would
also empower counties to rezone without reciting \vhether the zoning amendments in any
\vay contlmll to or have even been compared with a comprehensive plan. In that event.
the right to bring an action for declaratory relief in order to determine whether the county
has functioned according to 1m\' is worth little. Working back further into the whole
hearing process-without a requirement that there be a record and findings of fact and
conclusions of lav\'-there would seem to be little benefit to having hearings or giving
notice.
This court believes these issues have already been addressed. though the same
sticky question sometime arises as to whether the zoning board is addressing a particular
rezone application. This court does not believe that should be the determinative factor.
From the case law. it appears that a county that engaged in purely legislative activity has
always been exemptjromjudicial review. However, in Jerome County v. Holloway. the
Idaho Supreme Court states flatly that ""[w]hen the statute requires notice and hearing as
to the possible effect of a zoning law upon property rights the action olthe legislu/i\'e

ho(zv hecomes

qu(/si~jlldicial

in character .... ,. 118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 ( 1990)

(emphasis added). The Cowan court likewise addressed this issue in the passage quoted
above. In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Chamhers \', Kootenai

('OUJ1IJ'

Hoard ojCol11missioners that once there is a quasi-judicial decision. procedural

sateguards must be tl)l1owed:
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This Court. in ",effing a standard o{dlle process fiJr ({u([si-iudicial
proceedings, held that: (a) a board of commissioners' failure to provide
notice of its second meeting regarding an application (after the public
hearing) where statT views were expressed: (b) the absence of a
transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings: and (c) the{clilure 10
make specijicfindings of/act and conclusions lIpon ll'hich a dec;sion \\'LIS
hased did /lot comport ll'ith notions o(procedural due process, In
addition. the opportunity to present and rebut evidence, which is inferred
from the right to notice and specific findings of fact. is an element of due
process.
125 Idaho 115. 867 P .2d 989 (1994 ) (emphasis added).
Thus, it is this court's conclusion that the question of whether a county
board must produce written findings and conclusions when changing county
zoning laws is not connected to whether there is an identified "applicant." or
whether most of the activity to a given point is legislative activity. or eyen
whether an appeal pursuant to a judicial review proceeding is possible. Instead.
once proceedings reach the quasi-judicial stage-which. it did here because the
county engaged in hearings and took evidence and testimony pursuant to statutory
notice and hearing requirements-due process. if nothing else. requires the county
to make specific findings of fact and conclusions upon which a decision is based.
18.) There is no written record of what the Board did in amending the
Comprehensive Plan in March. 2007. There is nothing in writing to confirm that
the Board did or did not consider amendments to the Comprehensive Plan before
amending zoning throughout the county. There is nothing in writing to contlrm
what evidence or findings or data or criteria or rationale. if any. the county relied
upon in amending the Comprehensive Plan. There does not appear to be any
record of when or ifor hov,' any P&Z commission's recommendations regarding
changes to the Comprehensive Plan actually came into the hands of the Board.
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19.) The legal notice of public hearings published on April 19.2006. bef()re the
Camas County Board of Commissioners public hearing held initially on May 17.2006
and continued until May 22. 2006. at \vhich time an Amended Comprehensive Plan and
Land Use Map \vere adopted as Resolution #96. failed to contain the Planning and
Zoning Commission recommendation.

I.e.

§ section 67-6509(a) requires inclusion of the

P&Z commission' s recommendation in the notice provided by the governing board if the
board will conduct another public hearing. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit C6.).
20.) The governing board made material changes to the Comprehensive Plan
Land Use Map under consideration at meetings held May 3. 2006. May 10.2006. May
12.2006. May 17,2006. and May 22, 2006. Yet further notice and hearing were not
provided. This would violate

I.e. § 67-6509(b). (,)'ee Plaintiffs Exhibits H2, B4. B5. B6.

and B7.).
21.) Legal notices of public hearing before the P&Z Commission and before the
Board to consider recommendation or adoption of Resolution 96, and Ordinances 150
and 153. did not contain a summary of proposed amendments.

I.e.

§ 67-6509(a) requires

publication of a "summary of the plan to be discussed". (See Plaintiffs Exhibits

e. C L

C4. C6. C7. and C8.).
22.) The legal notice of public hearing published February 2 L 2007. before the
Board's public hearing held March 14.2007. at \vhich the Board adopted Ordinance 150.
Amended Zoning Designation Map. failed to include the P&Z recommendation.

I.e.

§

67-6509(a) requires inclusion of the P&Z" commission's recommendation in the notice
prO\ided by the governing board. (See Exhibit C8.).
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23.) Resolution #96, the Amended Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map
adopted on !vlay 22, 2006 included only the southern half of Camas County. I.e.

~

67-

6508 requires that .. [t]he plan shall include all land vvithin the jurisdiction of the
governing board." (5,'ee Plaintiffs Exhibit G, and Finding #13 above.). It would appear the
Board adopted Resolution #103, to include all of the land within the county. Pursuant to

I.e. §§ 67-6507, 6508, and 6509, it is the duty of the P&Z commission to conduct the
process to prepare and update the Comprehensive Plan, to hold public hearings on it prior
to amending the plan, to send out public notice of the hearings, and to make
recommendations to the Board. The court cannot see where that process was ever
undel1aken by the P&Z Commission and recommended to the Board with regard to the
northern half of the county.
The Board can, under § 67-6509(b), make material changes to the P&Z
recommendations and give notice and amend the plan. Purportedly the public hearing to
amend the plan occurred on March 14,2007. However, all of the agenda notices, the
legal notices, and the minutes, refer to amendments to the Comprehensive Plan Map. (See
Plaintiff s Exhibit B31 (minutes of meeting); Exhibit C8 (legal notice for the March 14
meeting); and Exhibit F, pg. 25, (agenda for the meeting).).
24.) At least part of the importance of adequate legal notices to the public is so
members of the public can make an informed determination of what will be discussed and
decide whether they wish to attend a particular public meeting. If legal notice is
inadequate. there are members of the public that would not attend. simply because they
had no knO\vledge that particular topics would be discussed. In that event. it is not
possible to measure or know what evidence or testimony from the public is missed: all
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that can be measured or known is the eyidence or testimony from those who attelllkd.
With that in mind it is no answer to those who allege that legal notices of public hearings
were inadequate, to counter that "you attended that meeting" and therefore "you were
heard." and therefore "never mind that notice to the rest of the world was improper. or
never given." While that mayor may not be the rule in evaluating due process

considerationsfhrilldicial review plilposes (""You were not aggrieved by a lack of notice
because you [often as a party] were able to attend and present your el'idenliary case.").
that is not the rule that should be follovved if public legal notice is inadequate in the
context of enacting ordinances such as these. Statutory notice requirements are conditions
precedent to the enactment of valid ordinances and may not be dispensed with.
25.) This case was tried on August 20. 2008. On August 8. 2008. plaintiff filed a
MOlionfor Leave to Amend Petilion hy Adding Two New Callses oj'Acliol1. The court by

vvritten order denied this motion as to new allegations seeking declaratory judgment
relief The court allovved plaintitTto amend his complaint in this action to add claims
against the individual members of the Board, and to add claims for alleged due process
and equal protection violations. In that same order the court addressed, but did not rule
upon. the advisability of attaching a Rule 54(b) certificate to this decision. Following
entry of that order. and the filing of plaintiff s amended complaint, defendants removed
the remainder of this action to federal court (presumably all the civil damage claims that
had remainded pending). by yirtue of a Notice of Removal filed November 10. 2008.
Therefore, after the entry 0 f this decision, there is and v\i II be nothing further pending in
this action. EYen if the entire pending case has not been remoyed to federal court. or in
the e\'Cnt federal jurisdiction is lost and some or all civil damage claims are once again

r~~
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pending in district court in Camas County. a Rule 54(b) Certiticate is proper in this case.
Any and all other pending claims are bifurcated for separate triaL and involve separate
issues. See 5-,'nake River Equipment

('0.

v. ('hristensen 107 Idaho 541. 691 P .2d 787

(App. 1984) For the foregoing reasons. and the reasons set forth in its order allov\ing the
filing of the amended complaint. this court will attach a Rule 54( b) certificate to this
decision. and it \vill become a tinal order subject to appeal.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER
In summary. in addition to any conclusions that appear above. with regard to the
ordinances in question. the court concludes:
1.) The Board of Commissioners of Camas County failed to keep a transcribable
verbatim record of deliberations they engaged in, leading up to quasi-judicial public
hearings. after they received recommendations from P&Z and had compiled at least part
of the record.
2.) In recommending and passing Ordinances #153 and #150 at least one P&Z
commissioner and one county commissioner acted with a conflict of interest as set forth
in this court's Decision on Conflicts alInterests Issue tiled April 2, 2008. The court can
tind no exception in the law for members of these bodies if they are acting in a
legislative. as opposed to a quasi-judicial capacity.
3.) The P&Z Commission failed to keep and maintain adequate records ufthe
hearings. findings made. and actions taken by the commission. and failed to send a
\\Titten recommendation to the Board as required by lavv. The map or maps that were sent
as recommendations cannot not be identified. and no one can identify when any
recommendations with regard to changing the Comp Plan or zoning \vere received.

1
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Because of these failures, and the failure to keep verbatim records of meetings. it
is impossible to tell when the Board commenced deliberations to\vard a decision. or what
changes or hmv many changes were made to the zoning or comp plan amendments by the
Board. Consequently. it is not possible to tell if requirements for additional public
hearings were met.
.f.) The Board failed to make any written record of its decision. No findings of

fact or conclusions of law were entered on a decision that purportedly effected a rezone
of at least portions of the entire county. These are required after the Board has made a
quasi-judicial decision.
5.) The Comprehensive Plan includes far more than a Comp Plan Map. In

amending the Comprehensive Plan, the county has failed to follow proper legal
procedures and to provide proper legal notice. In amending zoning in Camas County. the
county has failed to follow proper legal procedures and provide proper legal notice.
6.) This is a civil judicial proceeding between a county and a person as defined in

Idaho Code 12-117. That same section provides the court shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees if the court finds the party against whom judgment is entered
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. For the reasons set forth herein. the court
concludes Camas County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. and plaintiff
may make application for an a\vard of attorney's fees.
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ORDER
THE COURT HEREBY DECLARES. ADJUDGES. AND DECREES:
1.) The amendments to the Comp Plan adopted May 25. 2006 and March 19.
2007 as Resolution 96 are null and void.

2.) The amendments to the Camas County Zoning Ordinance. adopted April 18.
1007. as Ordinance #153. and the Zoning Designation Map adopted March 29. 2007 as
Ordinance # 150 are aIL and each of them. null and void.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 2nd day of December. 2008.

.Irtt) zr

Robert
District Judge

RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATE
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order is it hereby
CERTIFIED. in accordance with Rule 54(b) I.R.C.P .. that the court has determined that
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and
does hereby direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which
execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
DATED this 2. day of December. 2008.

District Judge
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IN 11HE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIm STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIm COUNTY OF CAMAS
GEORGE 'MARTIN,
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and
MARTIN CUSTOM
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and

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO,
By and through the duly elected
Board of Commissioners in
their (,meial capacity,

KEN BACKTROM.
BILL DAVIS, and
RON CHAPMAN,
Df.lfendants.
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COttles now the parties hereto, through counsel, and hereby stipulate to the
followL11g f~ts for purposes of submission of the legal issues herein;
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
1.

The parties stipulate to the admission into evidence of Plaintiff's Exhibits A -

A29, B- B36~ C - CII, D, ~ F, 0.·03, II-HI2, 11-14, J, ~ L, M, N-N7, 0, P &;
Q, all as included in Plaintifrs Trial Exhibit Bindel.

2.

The parties stipulate to the admission into evidence of Defendant's Exhibits
A 1 through AlB, Bl~7, C68 -224, D226-226, E227-238, F239.286, 0287-

332, H333, 1336-343, J344-420, K421-423. U24-425, M426-428, N429-497,
0498, P499-500, Q501-570, RS71-854 and S855-870. all as included in the
Defendant's Trial Exhibit Binder pages 1-870.

STIPULATION OF FACTS
3.

The parties stipulate that the Defendant's Exhibits admitted into evidence, as

referenced in paragraph 2 above, comprise the entire administrative record in
possession of Camas County.

4.

The Planning and Zoning Commission nor the Board of Commissioners
I!rl'.-.cr

+1'I"c...

+h~.4- ~o,J'"

aenerated or considered new studies or new data tin adoption. of the
Comprehensive Plans of 2006 or 2007. The studies and data within the 1997
Com.prehensive Plan was the data and infonnation considered by the Planning
and Zoning Commission and Board of Commissioners in adopting the Plan.
:5.

Although no independent formal written recommendation from the Plannhtg
and Zoni.ng Commission to the Board of County Commissioners to adopt the
Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map, in 2006 or 2007, Defendant submits
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':hat maps, notes and other materials in the record submitted complies with any

legal requirements.
No independent formal written recommendation from the Planning and

6.

Zoning Commission to the Board of County Commissioners to adopt the
amended Zoning Ordinance or Zoning Designation Map exist. Defendant
submits that a draft Ordinance and draft Map were transmitted to the Board of
CoImnissioners and satisfy any legal requirements.

The Board of County Commissioners did not generate any independent formal

7,

written record of decision of adoption of Ordinance 150 or 153t other than the
Ordinance itself.
Legal Notice of Public Hearing, pursuant to Camas County Ordinance 142

8.

was posted at all designated locations except the City of Fairfleld City Hall.
Notice was posted insid~ not outside the Camas County Courthouse.
9.

No written verification exists regarding Legal Notice of Public Hearing,
PW'SU8Ilt to IC 67-6509, to political subdivisions providing services within the

plannjng area, as to Planning and Zoning Commission meetings or hearings.
1. O.

At the Board of County Commissioner level Legal Notice of Public Hearing,
pursuant to IC 67-6509, was purportedly mailed to all political subdivisions
providing services within the planning

ar~

except West Magic Fire

Protection District and the City of Fairfield No written verification of notice
(,.~

;, \t~t

exists.

I ,.'J D.II, 0.1 14 "-

11. ,\ Legal descriptions of the various zoning designations on the 2006-2007
Comprehensive PlBIlt Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance and Zoning
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::>esignation Map were not considered in adoption of same nor published with
rhe Ordinances.
12,

Publication of Zoning Ordinance 153 adopted April 18,2007 did not include
any legal descriptions or map. The publication directed the reader to fmd the
full text of the ordinance at the Planning and Zoning Office during regular

office hours.
D.

Publication of the Zoning Designation Map Ordinance No 150 adopted March
29, 2007 did not include any legal descriptions or map.

1LI.

Plaintiff owns in fee simple the folJowine parcels of real property in Camas
County as of May 20. 2008: a) 40+ acre parcel 770 E 240 N., b) 29 acre parcel
west of Soldier Road and South of Baseline

Ro~

c) lots 3 and 4 Blk. 5

Homestead Subdivision,. within an existing approved and platted subdivision
of one acre lots.
] :5.

The above parcels of real property, in order were located within the named
zoning district prior to and after the rezone process of 2006·2007 a)

agricu1tura11 agricultural, b) agriculturalJRl c) ATlAS
1. 6.

Plaintiff had a fee simple ownership interest in two (2) 80 acre parcels, in
section 4, that were sold to third parties while retaining a contractual fiscal
interest in the development, marketing. and building potential thereon. The

north parcel, was zoned AT before and after the 2006·2007 rezone process.

~If t.-''''

The southern parcel was rezoned from AG to R1 as a result of the 2006-2007
zoning amendment process.
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Plaintiff holds a first right of refusal as to a 67 acre parrel in Section 4 that
(.,.~ ~.sf

was rezoned from AG to R1 as' a resuh of the 2006-2007 zoning amendment
process.
1~;.

The parcels generally described in the two preceding paragraphs. numbered
16 and 17. were included in the R-7 land use designation in the

Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map existing prior to the 2006·2007
Comprehensive Plan Amendments and R-t land use designation in the post
2006-2007 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments.
19.

The 29 acre parcel described in paragraph 14 subparagraph b. was included in
the R..7 land use designation in the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map

existing prior to the 2006-2007 Comprehensive Plan Amendments and R-I
land use designation in the post 2006-2007 Comprehensive Plan Land Use

Map amendments.
::.0.

The two tape series labled March 26, 2007 also includes an audio recording of
the March 27, 2007 deliberative proceedings at Board of Commissions
meeting of those same dates.
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
Attorney at Law
US Bank Bldg .. Ste 209
191 Sun Valley Road
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum. ID 83340
Tel: 208622 7878
Fax: 208622 7921
ISB#7473
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
GEORGE MARTIN.
Plaintiff:

)
)
)

)

and
MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, L.L.c..
Plaintiff.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

v.

)

ED SMITH.

)
)

)

Defendant.
and
CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO.
By and through the duly elected
Board of Commissioners in
their official capacities.

KEN BAXTROM.
BILL DAVIS. and
RON CHAPMAN.
Defendants.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

)
)

)

PLAINTIFFS' COST MEMORANDUM

Case No. CV-07-24

COST MEMORANDUM

COMES NOW PETITIONER. through his attorney of record and files this.
his COST MEMORANDUM. claiming as costs the items stated and totaled herein belo\v.
and further states that to the best of counsel's kno\\ledge and belief the items are correct
and that the costs claimed are in compliance with law.
Filing Fee
Attorney Fees
Paralegal Costs

88.00
79,171.50
961.00

TOTAL

$80,220.50

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
A TTOREY F R PLAINTIFF
/ //",
//

Christopher P. Simms

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this

/1

day of

Pi: C.

2008. I served

a true and correct copy of the foregoing PlaintitT s Reply to Response to Motion for
Leave to Amend Petition by delivering same, to Phillip J. Collaer. Attorney for
Defendant Ed Smith. 250 South Fifth Street. Ste. 700. P.O. Box 7426. Boise Idaho
83707-7426, and Paul Fitzer. Attorney for Camas County Defendants 950 W. Bannock
St.. Ste 520. Boise. Idaho 83702.

Christopher Simms

PLAI0JTIFFS' COST MEMORAl\;DUM

ATTORNEY FEE AFFIDAVIT AND CERTIFIC ATE OF AUTHENTICITY
L the undersigned Christopher P. Simms, Attorney at Law, ISB #7473, am the attorney of
Record of George Martin regarding his claims against Camas County, and I familiar with and
m\are of prevailing charges for legal services, that agreed to be charged Mr. Martin for services
rendered in the instant matter. and the actual time expended in said representation, all of which
are reflected on the attached records and further I am the Official Custodian of Records for the
Simms Law Firm, related to all reports, records, or data compilations, and specifically as to the
Attorney Fee Summary attached hereto, a data compilation, the basis and method of computation
of which were computer entries of professional time expended on the Martin v. Camas County
matter, excluding any time expended related to co-Defendant Ed Smith, which said entries each
relate to acts and events, made at or near the time by myself, or the legal assistant working under
my supervision having direct knO\vledge of the act or event, and compi led into its present form
from said data entries by use of simple arithmetic by adding the individual time entries from each
calendar month. I make this \/Hitten declaration under oath subject to the penalty of perjury. I
certify that the documents attached hereto are authentic exact dupl icates of records systematically
kept of regularly conducted business activity.

LA W & CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS

Subscribed and sworn to before me on the

Ij

.i!::. day

Of'~U=1M..6~.:....2008.

~JSc~J

NO' AR Y PUBLIC

My Commission Expires:

-~-----~'~----~--~-+--~

Donna J Simms
Notary Public
State of Idaho
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STATEMENT NO.

P.O. Box 3123

DATE

Ketchum, Idaho 83340
2086227878

CLIENT

cpslaw@gmail.com

December 19, 2008
GEORGE MARTIN

FEE $150 Hourly

TO

MATTER

Martin v. Smith, et at

Summary of Legal Hours

HOURS

DATE & DESCRIPTION

RATE

AMOUNT

Attorney Billable Hours
51.29

Nova: Dec-06

$150.00

$7,693.50

13.25

Jan-07

$150.00

$1,987.50

2.92

Feb-07

$150.00

$438.00

4.36

Mar-07

12.51

Apr-07

21.66
7.00

$150.00

$654.00

$150.00

$1,876.50

May-07

$150.00

$3,249.00

Jun-07

$150.00

$1,050.00

32.99

Jul-07

$150.00

$4,948.50

23.99

Aug-07

$150.00

$3,598.50

44.64

Sep-07

$150.00

$6,696.00

47.48

Oct-07

$150.00

$7,122.00

27.74

Nov-07

$150.00

$4,161.00

2.84

Dec-07

$150.00

$426.00

$150.00

$3,198.00
$2,260.50

-

-

-

--~-----,

21.32

Jan-OS

15.07

Feb-OS

$150.00

37.84

Mar-OS

$150.00

$5,676.00

18.99

Apr-OS

$150.00

$2,848.50

82.75

May-08

$150.00

$12,412.50

3.50

Jun-08

$150.00

$525.00

-~~

14.00

Jul-OS

41.67

Aug-08

$150.00

$2,100.00

$150.00

$6,250.50

SUBTOTAL

$79,171.50

,--.-~

527.81

AMOUNT DUEL

Make check payable to CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR BUSINESS!

o L.j

$79,171.50

CHRIST

s
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Al"TORN
STATEMENT NO.

P.O. Box 3123

DATE

Ketchum, Idaho 83340

CLIENT

2086227878

cpslaw@gmail.com

December 19, 2008
GEORGE MARTIN

FEE $150.00 Hourly

TO

MATTER

Martin v. Smith, et al

Summary of Paralegal Hours

HOURS

DATE & DESCRIPTION

RATE

AMOUNT

Paralegal Billable Hours

0.40

Aug-07

$50.00

$20.00

9.16

Apr-OS

$50.00

$458.00

5.66

May-OS

$50.00

$283.00

0.50

Jul-OS

$50.00

$25.00

3.50

Aug-OS

$50.00

$175.00

19.22

SUBTOTAL

I

$961.00

AMOUNTDUE~
Make check payable to CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR BUSINESSI

Paul J. Fitzer, ISB 5675
:Y100RE SMITH BuXTON & TLRCKE. CHTD.
950 \V. Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise. ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/331/1202
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES. LLC,

)
)

Case No. CV-07-24

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)
)
)

ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO. by
and through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY
FEES UNDER RULE 54(e)(6)
OF THE IDAHO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE

)

COMES NOW Defendants Camas County, Idaho (the "County"), by and through
its duly elected board of county commissioners, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron
Chapman (the Individual Commissioners) and Ed Smith, in his capacity as a member of
the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission (collectively, County Defendants).
by and through their attorneys of record. Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke. Chartered. and
objects by rv10tion under Rule 54(e)(6) to the Motion for Attorney Fees by Plaintiffs in
the above entitled action for and on the following grounds and reasons as set forth herein.
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1.

Removal - ,Jurisdiction is properly before the United States District Court
This Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend its complaint to include federal

U.S.c. Section 1983 civil claims. Defendant timely removed the cause of action to the
United States District Court before the Honorable Candy Dale in Case No. 1:08 CV00470-CWD on or about November 5, 2008. Subsequent to this removal. on or about
December 2, 2008, this Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. and Order
Following Trial.

Plaintiff filed its Notice of Hearing for attorney fees on or about

December 9, 2008 and its Cost Memorandum on or about December 22.2008.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.c. 1441(c) all state law claims are removed to federal court
upon a notice of removal which includes all state law claims as well. While the federal
court has the discretion to remand, it has sixty days upon which to do so. The United
States District Court has not done so. The provision further provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the
jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case
may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or,
in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates.
Thus, the discretion remains with the federal court to determine whether it will
preside over all of the claims or remand the state law claims back to the state court. At
this juncture. this Court lacks jurisdiction to award attorney fees.

2.

Plaintiff's Request is Untimely pursuant to (RCP 54
Pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(5) and 54(e)(5) a court may award attorney fees only \',-hen

a memorandum of costs is served upon adverse parties no later than fourteen days after
entry of judgment.

The Plaintitf failed to do so. On or about December 2. 2008. this

OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER RULE 54(e)(6) OF THE IDAHO RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - Page 2

Court issued its Findings of Fact Conclusions of Layv, and Order Following Trial.
PlaintitT did not file its Cost Memorandum with the Camas County Courthouse until
December 22, 2008 at 2:40 p.m.

The rule is quite clear:

"[flailure to file such

memorandum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall be a waiver of the
right of costs:' LR.C.P. 54(d)(5). Plaintiffs motion is untimely and he has therefore
waived any right to attorney fees.

3.

Plaintiff's Request does not provide sufficient specificity to support an award
for reasonable attorney fees.
Pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(e)(l) a court may award only reasonable attorney fees to

the prevailing party. Additionally, a memorandum of costs is required to be served upon
adverse parties itemizing each claimed expense.

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) (Emphasis Added).

Why would the rule require that attorney fees be itemized to each claimed expense? Why
limit attorney fees to only those that are found to be "reasonable"? Pursuant to I.R.C.P.
54(e)(6), due process requires that the non-prevailing party must have an opportunity to
object to the allowance of attorney fees either in its entirety. or to a certain portions
thereof that may be unreasonable, duplicative, or for some other basis.
Plaintiffs Cost Memorandum, in addition to being untimely, additionally does not
provide any information. The memorandum of costs merely includes the dollar amount
and the month said fees were allegedly accrued. but otherwise fails to include v.. hat the
accrued costs pertained to. Distinctly absent is an itemized accounting of each claimed
expense. If the non-prevailing party has the right to contest all or part of the requested
mvard, how is he, of the Court for the matter, able to determine the reasonableness of the
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request? There might be a duplication of services. Some of the fees may pe11ain to case
CV -08-40 or the United States District Court action.

Because Plaintiff has procedurally

and substantively failed to comply with I.R.C.P. 54. he has waived any claim to attorney
fees.

....

Plaintiff has failed to assert that Defendant acted without a reasonable basis
in fact or law

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 a court may award attorney fees to the
prevailing party only where the court finds that the non-prevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.

This case involves multiple claims and multiple

defenses; some of which are cases of first impression. Attorney fees are not appropriate
unless all defenses and claims were asserted frivolously or without a reasonable basis in
fact or law. Turbo W Corpac, Inc. 119 Idaho 626, 809 P.2d 487 (1991). Where some of
the claims or issues are subject to argument, attorney fees are inappropriate. Indeed, the
novelty of the issues presented in this cause of action were the subject to three Idaho
Supreme Court decisions in 2008 alone.
In its Order, this Court asserted thirty-one different findings of facts. conclusions
of law. Throughout its Order. the Court asserts conclusions that it believes are wellgrounded in law, but acknowledges other conclusions that are subject to argument and
future direction by our supreme court. Being subject or open to argument or differing
perspectives means that there is a reasonable basis in law to make such argument.
For example. in considering the three 2008 Idaho Supreme Court decisions. the
Court espouses that "Time will tell" whether LLUPA's judicial revic\v provisions are
OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER RULE 54(e)(6) OF THE IDAHO RULES
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applicable in a declarative judgment action where a party seeks to enJOIn a
comprehensive plan. land use map, zoning ordinance, and zoning map ... governmental
activity historically viewed as legislative in nature.
This Court clarifies a possible interpretation of the Giltner and Highlands
decisions which purportedly hold that a land use map and annexation rezone are not
subject to the judicial review provisions of LLUP A. Perhaps this Court is correct and all
cities and counties will hereinafter be required to keep transcribable verbatim records and
issue written findings of fact, conclusions of law for all public informational sessions,
meetings, and hearings in which legislative comprehensive planning and zoning are
discussed.

At this juncture, no cities or counties adhere to such an interpretation to

LLUPA's requirements and, if this court IS correct, then nearly all cities and counties in
the state will need to readopt said ordinances and resolutions.
The key word here, however, is ·'interpretation". LLUP A, in general, is far from
providing perfectly clear guidance and where, as here, we have a number of statutory
provisions which mayor may not be applicable to certain government activities, there is a
reasonable basis in law to litigate these issues and attorney fees are unwarranted. This
Court provided: ·'[t]here is, unfortunately, language in Giltner Dairy that could be
interpreted to mean that IDAPA does not apply at all to zoning decisions."

If there is

such equivocal language in these cases to lead to such differing interpretations, then it is
inappropriate to award attorney fees against one pat1y declaring that that party had no
reasonable basis in la\v or fact to argue the point of law.
It is certainly open to argument whether Plaintiff is an "affected party" sufficient

to invoke LUJPA's judical review provisions in the County's adoption of its
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comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. It is even open to argument whether Plaintiff
is an affected party with regard to the County's adoption of a county-wide zoning map.
Perhaps the Court is correct and everyone in the county is an atlected party in a quasijudicial adoption of a zoning map. There has never been such a finding pertaining to a
county-wide zoning map. comprehensive plan. and zoning ordinance. nor has a county
official ever been deemed to have a conflict of interest by virtue of its ownership of
property in the county.

These are cases of first impression which potentially contradict

the Supreme Court's latest guidance.
This Court has found that the judicial review provisions of LLUPA are applicable
outside of a petition for judicial review but in a declarative judgment action seeking to
enjoin a county comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance because the County itself is
deemed to have submitted an application or permit to satisfy LLUP A's plain textual
limitations. This conclusion is an alternate interpretation of the applicability and nature
of LLUPA's judicial review provisions to legislative activity in a declarative judgment
action. It is a case of first impression in Idaho and. is certainly subject to argument as our
own supreme court seems to have limited the judicial review provisions to five and only
five types of permits by affected persons.
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5.

Additional Arguments in which the County had a reasonable basis in Fact

and Law

The Defendant respectfully asserts that it proceeded \vith a reasonable basis in
fact and law in the the following additional arguments:
a. Plaintiffs Cause of Action
At the outset of the case. Plaintiff sought both a petition for judicial review and a
declarative judgment action. Given the subsequent actions by our Idaho Supreme Court.
the County had a reasonable basis in law and fact to defend itself from Plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief under both such cause of actions.

It: as the Court declares. the County

was acting in a quasi-judicial matter, a prospective plaintiff must exhaust administrative
remedies by filing a timely petition for judicial review.

Plaintiff failed to do so.

Additionally, a petition for judicial review is limited to the record. Here, Plaintiff was
allowed to present evidence. Thereafter, to award attorney fees would essentially punish
the parties for failing to settle the case.

b. Judicial Review Standards Applicable in a Declarative Judgment Action
While the cause of action allegedly proceeded only as a declarative judgment
action. the Plaintiff nonetheless sought to invoke LLUPA's judicial review provisions in
a declarative judgment action. The County had a reasonable basis to contest this attempt
to invoke the judicial appellate provisions outside the context of a petition for judicial
reView.

The legal standards differ. the procedures differ. and Plaintiff failed to timely

bring a petition and is therefore barred from invoking its protections.

LLUPA 's judicial

revie\v provisions are inapplicable in a declarative judgment action.
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c. Actual Notice
Plaintiff alleged numerous due process violations pertaining to alleged legal
notice defects by the county. The County had a reasonable basis in 1m\! to argue that
Plaintiff cannot assert alleged legal notice defects as a basis to permanently enjoin the
County's Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map
where the Plaintiff had actual notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard at each
and every public hearing and did so. The Plaintiff cannot bring an action for the benefit
of the general public.

d. Standing / Actual Harm
The County had a reasonable basis in law and fact to defend itself from Plaintiffs
sought after injunction based upon the fact that Plaintiff had not sufTered actual harm
sufficient to have standing to bring said action in the first instance and thereafter
necessitating the injunction of the county's comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, and
zoning map due to said ham1. All of his properties either remained the same or were
upzoned other than one one acre lot in a legally vested subdivision permitting RI
densities. Along with being a vested use, the property has been rezoned to Rl.

e. Due Process / Nexus
The County had a reasonable basis in law and fact to challenge whether Plaintiff
was denied due process of law. Outside of the legal notice issue, it is unclear whether he
had a substantial right impaired or had suffered actual harm by l'irfllc oj' an alleged
OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER RULE 54(e)(6) OF THE IDAHO RULES
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procedural or substantive error. Any argument that he has been downzoned is limited to
the zoning map.

What is the relationship between Plaintiffs alleged harm and a

comprehensive plan? a land use map? or a zoning ordinance'?

f. Transcribable Record

The County had a reasonable basis in law and fact to defend itself from PlaintitTs
challenge that Idaho Code §67-6536 requires Camas County keep and maintain an
adequate transcribable verbatim record during all public workshops, informational
sessions, and public meetings pertaining to the adoption of a comprehensive plan, zoning
ordinance, and zoning map.

It is a case of first impression that all public meetings

leading up to a public hearing must also be recorded in addition to the public hearing as
well.

g. Conflict of Interest
The County had a reasonable basis in law and fact to defend itself from Plaintiffs
assertion that it has the requisite standing to enjoin the County's comprehensive plan,
zoning ordinance, and even a county-wide zoning map based upon a perceived
government official's conflict of interest by virtue of ownership of property in the county.
While the Court can find no exception in law for legislative as opposed to quasi-judicial
activity. the fact remains that it is the quasi-judicial nature of such activity that enables a
particular plaintiff' to challenge such a contlict. which is absent here. Additionally, no
court has ever deemed a county official to have a conflict of interest in the adoption of a
comprehensive plan. land use map. or zoning ordinance.

Where would the conflict
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attach? Even for a county-wide zoning map. the County has a reasonable basis to argue
that a county official is not conflicted from conflicted from passing a county-wide map

by virtue of ownership of property within the county absent some other nexus connecting
a true conflict.

h. IDAPA
Given the possible interpretation of our Supreme Court's recent decisions, the
County acts with a reasonable basis in law in defending itself from Plaintiffs attack that
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IDAP A") applies to the enactment of a countywide comprehensive plan, land use map, zoning ordinance, and zoning map. which is
arguably legislative in nature and not subject to LLUPA's judicial review provisions or
IDAPA.

1.

Planning and Zoning Recommendation
The County acts with a reasonable basis in fact and law to defend itself from

Plaintiffs assertion that, pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6509, the county board cannot
conduct a public hearing without first receiving a written recommendation from the
planning commission, other than the legislation itself.

,. Written Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law
The County acts with a reasonable basis in fact and law to defend itself from
Plaintiff s assertion that the County's Comprehensive Plan. Land Use Map. Zoning
Ordinance, and Zoning Map are quasi-judicial in nature and thus its failure to adopt
OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER RULE 54(e)(6) OF THE IDAHO RULES
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written findings of fact, conclusions of law pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6535 and §676509 enables the Plaintiff to seek their permanent injunction.

The County has a

reasonable basis to argue that such legislative activity is not an application or permit
under LLUPA nor does 67-6509's requirement that a "record of the hearings, findings
made, and actions taken ... be maintained" mandate that such record, other than written
evidence submitted, be in writing versus an audio recording.

k. Material Changes requiring remand to Planning and Zoning Commission
The County acts with a reasonable basis in fact and law to defend itself from
Plaintiffs assertion that it has the requisite standing to enjoin not only the land use map,
but the comprehensive plan as a whole in asserting that the planning commission only
amended the bottom half of the land use map, which was later "rectified in 200T' by the
Board of County Commissioners in amending the entire land use map without first
remanding it back to the planning commission. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any
harm by virtue of this perceived defect as his property is not located in the northern
portion of the county which is mostly uninhabited. Further while Idaho Code §67-6509
requires a subsequent hearing where material changes are made by the county board,
there is no requirement to remand back to the planning commission.

1. In Accordance with the Comprehensive Plan
The County had a reasonable basis in fact and law to defend itself from Plaintiffs
assertion that he has standing to enjoin the County's zoning ordinance and zoning map
based upon his assertion that the County did not consider a written recommendation nor
OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER RULE 54(e)(6) OF THE IDAHO RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Page 11

generate written findings in determining that the zoning ordinance and map were adopted
in accordance with the comprehensive plan.

m. LLUPA Planning Duties
The County had a reasonable basis in fact and law to defend itself from Plaintiff s
assertion that he has standing to enjoin the County's legislation on the basis that the
County did not conduct any subsequent studies, generate new maps, etc. in amending its
comprehensive plan pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6508.

The County may reasonably

decide an existing comprehensive plan' s findings, maps. and other information are still
valid without having to revise each planning component anew every time the
comprehensive plan is amended; It is the plan itself that must contain each component;
that the Plaintiff and even the Court could not substitute its acumen/judgment for that of
the elected officials.

n. Mootness
The County had a reasonable basis in fact and law to maintain its position that the
enactment of new legislation that purportedly corrects certain alleged procedural errors
renders the decision whether to enjoin its predecessor moot.

DA TED this 29 th day of December 2008.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to
Attorney Fees \vas this

l '1

day of December. 2008 served upon the following

individuals and in the corresponding manner:
Christopher P. Simms

P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum. 10 83340

Via United States mail
Hon. Robert Elgee
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers)
202 S. Second Ave. S. Suite 110
Hailey. 10 83333

Via United States mail
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Paull. Fitzer, ISB No. 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 W. Bannock S1., Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/33111202

FILED
1
/-12-- ZOo
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CLEf

Attorneysfor Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES,LLC,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.

ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
and through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,
Defendants-Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-07-24

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT(S), GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN
CUSTOM HOMES, LLC, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS,
P.O. BOX 3123, KETCHUM, ID 83340, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 1

I

I INAL

1.

The above named appellants, Ed Smith and Camas County, Idaho, by and through the

duly elected Board of Commissioners in their official capacity Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and
Ron Chapman, appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from
the final judgment certified pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(b) entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order Following Trial entered in the above-entitled action on the 3rd day of December,
2008, Honorable Judge Robert 1. Elgee presiding.
2.

The Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and

order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable judgment and order under and pursuant to
Rule II(a)(l), LA.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant now intends to assert

in the appeal is as follows:
(a)

Whether the District Court, before the Honorable Robert Elgee, erred in ruling

that it had jurisdiction over this matter where the case was properly removed to the United States
District Court before the Honorable Candy Dale in Case No. 1:08 CV-00470-CWD. Subsequent
to this removal, the District Court issued its ruling in this matter.
(b)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the case was still a justiciable case

or controversy and not rendered moot by Camas County's enaction of subsequent legislation
repealing the challenged legislation.

NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 2

(c)

Declaratory Judgment Action: Whether the District Court erred in permanently

enjoining the County's legislation in a declaratory judgment action where Respondent wholly
failed to carry its burden and the evidence could not support a court's finding that:
1.

Standing / Harm: Respondent suffered a distinct palpable injury differentiating
him from the citizenry at large; and

11.

Nexus: The injury suffered was by virtue of, or has a fairly traceable connection
between, the claimed injury and the challenged conduct;

111.

Challenged Conduct: The County committed a procedural! substantive error or
the challenged legislative activity is confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, or
capricious in nature as applied to the Respondent.

(d)

Whether the District Court erred in holding that the enactment of a comprehensive

plan, land use map, zoning ordinance, and zoning map are quasi-judicial rather than legislative in
nature;
(e)

Whether the District Court applied the wrong standard of review, ruling that the

County's legislative activity was governed by, and Respondent had standing to bring a
declaratory judgment action under, LLUPA'sjudicial review provisions including I.e. §67-6521,

I.e.

§67-6535,

I.e.

§67-6536, and the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, I.C. §67-5201 et

seq.:

(0

Whether the District Court erred in basing a permanent injunction on finding that

Respondent was entitled to and was denied due process of law for defective notice where the

NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 3

evidence is uncontradicted that Respondent had actual notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard, and did, in fact, attend, testify, and present evidence at each and every public hearing.
(g)

Whether the District Court erred in basing a permanent injunction on a finding

that while Respondent's actual notice might be a defense against challenges by affected persons
in a judicial review context, the County is held to an even higher due process standard where
legislative activity is applicable to the general public as a whole.
(h)

Whether the District Court erred in finding that LLUPA's judicial reView

provisions are applicable in this case in the absence of evidence demonstrating that, pursuant to
Idaho Code §67-6521, Respondent had an interest in real property adversely affected by the
issuance or denial of a permit authorizing development.
(i)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that I.C. §67-6536 was applicable to the

governmental activity in this matter, and, if applicable, that the County did not comply with the
statutory requirements.
(j)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that I.C. §67-6535 was applicable to the

governmental activity in this matter requiring a written decision in amending the zoning
ordinance, zoning map, comprehensive plan, and land use map, beyond the legislation
themselves;
(k)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County failed to comply with

I.C. §67-6509;
(I)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County failed to comply with

I.e. §67-6508;
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(m)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County failed to comply with

I.C. §67-6511;
(n)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County violated I.C. §67-6506;

(0)

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in finding that Respondent is

entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117.
(p)

Whether Appellant is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under I.e.

§ 12-117.
4.

No order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellant requests the preparation of the

following portions of the reporter's transcript: the reporter's standard transcript pursuant to Rule
25, I.A.R. supplemented by the following:
(a)

June 27,2007, hearing

(b)

July 19,2007, telephonic hearing (held in Blaine County)

(c)

September 25,2007, hearing

(d)

October 23,2007, telephonic hearing

(e)

November 13, 2007, hearing

(e)

December 11,2007, hearing

(1)

January 29,2008, telephonic hearing (held in Blaine County)

(g)

February 26, 2008, hearing

(h)

March 7,2008, hearing

(i)

May 5, 2008, telephonic status conference (occurred in Blaine County)
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6.

(j)

May 20-21, 2008, hearing

(k)

August 11, 2008, telephonic status conference (held in Blaine County)

(I)

August 20, 2008, hearing

Appellant requests that those documents which are automatically included under Rule 28,

I.A.R., be included in the clerk's record. Appellant also requests the following documents be
included in the clerk's record:
(a)

06/20/2007

Answer of Defendants Camas County, The Individual Members of

the Camas County Board of County Commissioners, Ed Smith in his Capacity as a Member of
the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission
(b)

07/06/2007

(c)

07/1312007 - Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order and

Memorandum

Preliminary Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Records
(d)

07116/2007 - Motion to Strike and Objection to Plaintiff's Verified Application

for a TRO and Pre-Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Record

* * * Note: This

document is erroneously entitled as described, but it is in substance a Reply Post-Hearing
Memorandum filed by Defendants*
(e)

**

07119/2007 - Objection to Plaintiff's Verified Application for a Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Records
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(t)

07/1912007 - Affidavit of Dwight Butler In Support of Defendants' Objection to

Plaintiffs' Verified Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to
Destruction of Public Records
(g)

07/27/2007 - Order Denying Plaintiffs' July 13,2007 Verified Application for

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public
Records
(h)

08113/2007 - Decision on Status of Camas County Planning and Zoning

Commission for Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction
(i)

10109/2007 - Post Hearing Memorandum Supporting the County Defendants

Objection to Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction
(j)

10/22/2007 - Motion to Strike Affidavit of George Martin In Support of

Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memorandum (Second Evidentiary Hearing)
(k)

10/22/2007 - Memorandum Supporting Motion to Strike Affidavit of George

Martin in Support of Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memorandum (Second Evidentiary Hearing)
(f)

1211 112007 - Order Granting Leave to Amend Petition for Declaratory Judgment

(m)

12/13/2007 - Amended Petition for Breach of Contract

(n)

12/28/2007 - Decision on Requirements of a "Transcribable Verbatim Record"

and Other Records for Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction
(0)

0 1/22/2008 - Plaintiffs Motion to Hold Camas County Defendants In Contempt

of Court for Violation of Preliminary Injunction
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(p)

01/23/2008 - Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Hold Camas

County Defendants In Contempt of Court for Violation of Preliminary Injunction
(q)

01/23/2008 - Affidavit of Stephanie 1. Bonney In Support of Defendants'

Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt for Alleged Violation of Preliminary Injunction
(r)

0311112008 - Order Following Contempt Hearing and Order Expanding

Preliminary Injunction
(s)

03112/2008 - Post-Hearing Memorandum Objecting to Plaintiffs' Motion for

Preliminary Injunction (Conflict of Interest Allegation)
(t)

04/02/2008 - Decision On Conflict of Interests Issue for Purposes of a

Preliminary Injunction
(u)

0511312008 - Motion to Dismiss

(v)

05/19/2008 - Exhibit List, Defendants

(w)

05/20/2008 - Exhibit List

(x)

05/20/2008 - Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order,

Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief
(y)

05/2112008 - Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of Documentary Evidence

(z)

08/08/2008 - Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Petition by Adding Two

Additional Causes of Action: 1) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Against Resolutions 114 and
115 and Ordinances # 157 and 158; 2) Damages for Violations of State and Federal Law
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(a a)

08/08/2008 - Second Amended Petition for Breach of Contract, Tortious

Interference With Contract, For Declaratory Relief, Damages for Violation of Procedural and
Substantive Due Process Rights and Equal Protection of Law
(bb)

08/08/2008 - Plaintiffs' Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order,

Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief
(cc)

08/27/2008 - Response to Plaintiffs' Petition for Leave to Amend Complaint

(dd)

09/29/2008 - Defendants Camas County, et al Post Trial Brief

(ee)

10108/2008 - Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

(ft)

10/15/2008 - Amended Answer

(gg)

12/22/2008 - Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees

(ft)

12/2912008 - Objection to Attorney Fees

Pursuant to I.A.R. 31, Appellant requests that all tapes, exhibits, including charts, graphs,
maps, or other documents, offered and admitted during the proceedings, whether hearing or trial,
be included as exhibits to the record.

7.

I certify that:
(a)

A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a

transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Rollie Bennett
Clerk of the Court, Fifth Judicial District, Camas County
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield, Idaho 83327
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(b)

The Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the

clerk's record because Appellant is an officer of the State ofIdaho acting in his official capacity,
and Section 31-3212(2), Idaho Code, provides that county officers shall not charge any fee for
any services rendered in any action or proceeding in which any state officer in his official
capacity is a party.
(c)

The Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because Section 67-

2301, Idaho Code, provides that no filing fee shall be charged for services rendered to any state
officer in the performance of his official duties.
(d)

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20,

I.A.R.
Respectfully submitted this

1

day of January, 2009.

MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
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***
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was this

4- day of January, 2009 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding
manner:
Christopher P. Simms
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, ID 83340
Via United States mail
Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON JULIAN

& HULL, LLP

P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707
Via United States mail
Hon. Robert Elgee
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers)
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110
Hailey, ID 83333
Via United States mail
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, LLC.
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

)
)
)
)

V.

)

ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO, by
And through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

Defendants-Appellants.

Court No. Cv-07-24

CLERK'S CERTIFICA TE OF
OF APPEAL

Appeal from: Fifth Judicial District, Camas County. Honorable Robert Elgee presiding.
Case number from court: CV 07-24
Order or judgment appealed from: December 3,2008 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order Following Trial
Attorney for appellant: Paul J. Fitzer
Attorney for Respondent: Christopher P. Simms
Appealed by: Defendants
Appealed against: Plaintiffs
Notice of Appeal filed: January 12, 2009
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed:
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal filed:
Appellate fee paid: None-Exempt
Respondent's Request for additional clerk' s record tiled:
Respondent's Request for additional reporter's transcript filed:
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? Yes
!'lame

Reporter: Susan Israel, 20] 2 nd Ave S, Ste 106, Hailey, Id 83333
Maureen Newton. Box 368, Rupert. ID. 83350

A

L-

Request for additional reporter's transcript: Yes
Dated: January 14.2009

F.R. BENNETT
Clerk of the District Court

~

By
Deputy Clerk

CI<iX:,VT:

L-

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMiv1S
Attorney at Law
US Bank Bldg .. Ste 209
191 Sun Valley Road
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum. ID 83340
Tel: 208622 7878
Fax: 208 622 7921
ISB# 7473
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
GEORGE MARTIN.
Plaintiff.

)
)
)
)

and

)

MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES. L.L.c..

)
)
)

Plaintiff.
v.

ED SMITH.
Defendant.
and

CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO.
By and through the duly elected
Board of Commissioners in
their official and individual
capacity.
KEN BACKTROM.
BILL DAVIS. and
RON CHAPMAN.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-07-24

PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST
TO SUPPLEMENT CLERK'S
RECORD ON APPEAL

I.A.R. 19

)
)

Defendants.

)

PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

COMES NOW Plaintiff. through counseL and files this, his REQUEST to
SUPPLEMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL. and in support thereof states as
fo11o\vs:
I.

Defendants-Appellants.

Camas

County

by

and

through

the

Board

of

Commissioners. by counsel. filed a Notice of Appeal herein on or about January 12,
2009.
2.

Said Notice of Hearing failed to designate any of the legal memorandum tiled by

PlaintitT during the course of the proceedings and thereby fails to join the issues herein
presented.
3.

Idaho Appellate Rule 19 provides for a Respondent to request additional materials

to supplement the Clerks Record identified by Appellant, and does therefore request the
following documents
a.

6.13 .07 Plaintiffs Response to Defendant Camas County's Objection to
Plaintiffs Application for TRO, Preliminary Injunction & Rule 11
Sanctions

b. 7.16.09 Plaintiffs Response to Post-Hearing Memorandum Supporting
County Defendant' s Objection to Plaintiff s Application for TRO &
Preliminary Injunction
c.

10.16.07 Plaintiffs Reply to Camas County Defendant's Post-Hearing
Memorandum

d. 3.18.08 Plaintiffs Response to Defendant Camas County's Post-Hearing
Memorandum Relating to Conflict of Interest Allegation
e. 8.20.08 Plaintiffs Trial Brief

re')

PLAINTIFF'S Rl:::QUEST TO S( ;PPLEMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON i\PPEAL
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f.

9.15.08 Plaintiffs Post-Trial Memorandum

g.

12.3.08 Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
FOR PLAINTIFF

Christopher P. Simms

Dated

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this
true

and

correct

copy

of the

l.:y

day of

foregoing

)

1I;v1'

PLAINTIFF'S

2009, I served a
REQUEST

TO

SUPPLEMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL by delivering same, via US Mail
to Phillip 1. Collaer. Attorney for Defendant Ed Smith, 250 South Fifth Street, Ste.
700, P.O. Box 7426, Boise Idaho 83707-7426, facsimile number 208 344 5800, and
Moore, Smith Buxton & Turke, Paul Fitzer. Attorneys for Camas County Defendants
950 W. Bannock SL Ste 520. Boise, Idaho 83702. facsimile number 208 331 1202,
and the Clerk of the Court, Fifth Judicial District. Camas County, Rollie Bennett. PO
Box 430, Fairfield. Idaho 83327.

PLAINTIFF'S REQCEST TO SUPPLEMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON

A~~~AL

3

Paul J. Fitzer. ISB No. 5675
MOORE SvlITH BUXTON & TURCKE. CHTD.
950 W. Bannock St.. Suite 520
Boise. ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/33111202
Attorneysfor Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, LLC
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.
ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO, by
and through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their ot1icial capacity.
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON
CHAPt\lAN,
Defendants-Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-07-24

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT(S), GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN
CUSTOM HOMES, LLC AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY. CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS.
P.O. BOX 3123. KETCHUM. ID 83340. AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN Tl fAT:
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1.

The above named appellants, Ed Smith and Camas County, Idaho. by and through the

duly elected Board of Commissioners in their otlicial capacity Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and
Ron Chapman. appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from
the tinal judgment celiified pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law. and Order Following Trial entered in the above-entitled action on the 3rd day of December.
2008. Honorable Judge Robert 1. Elgee presiding.
2.

The Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and

order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable judgment and order under and pursuant to
Rule 11 (a)(1), I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant now intends to assert

in the appeal is as follows:
(a)

Whether the District Court, before the Honorable Robert Elgee, erred in ruling

that it had jurisdiction over this matter where the case was properly removed to the United States
District Court before the Honorable Candy Dale in Case No. 1:08 CV -004 70-CWD. Subsequent
to this removal. the District Comi issued its ruling in this matter.
(b)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the case was still a justiciable case

or controversy and not rendered moot by Camas County's enaction of subsequent legislation
repealing the challenged legislation.
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(c)

Declaratorv Judgment Action: Whether the District Court eITed in permanently

enjoining the County's legislation in a declaratory judgment action vvhere Respondent wholly
failed to caITY its burden and the evidence could not support a court's finding that:
I.

Standing / Harm: Respondent suffered a distinct palpable injury differentiating
him from the citizenry at large; and

11.

Nexus: The injury suffered was by virtue of, or has a fairly traceable connection
between. the claimed injury and the challenged conduct;

Ill.

Challenged Conduct: The County committed a procedural! substantive eITor or
the challenged legislative activity

IS

confiscatory. arbitrary. unreasonable, or

capricious in nature as applied to the Respondent.
(d)

Whether the District Court erred in holding that the enactment of a comprehensive

plan. land use map. zoning ordinance, and zoning map are quasi-judicial rather than legislative in
nature;
(e)

Whether the District Court applied the wrong standard of review, ruling that the

County's legislative activity was governed by, and Respondent had standing to bring a
declaratory judgment action under. LLUPA's judicial review provisions including I.e. §67-6521,
I.C §67-6535. I.e. §67-6536. and the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, I.C. §67-5201 et

seq. :
(t)

Whether the District Court eITed in basing a permanent injunction on finding that

Respondent \vas entitled to and was denied due process of law f()r defective notice where the
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evidence is uncontradicted that Respondent had actual notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. and did. in fact. attend, testify, and present evidence at each and every public hearing.
(g)

Whether the District Court erred in basing a permanent injunction on a finding

that while Respondent's actual notice might be a defense against challenges by affected persons
in a judicial review context, the County is held to an even higher due process standard where
legislative activity is applicable to the general public as a whole.
(h)

Whether the District Court erred in finding that LLUPA's judicial reVIew

provisions are applicable in this case in the absence of evidence demonstrating that, pursuant to
Idaho Code §67-6521, Respondent had an interest in real property adversely affected by the
issuance or denial of a permit authorizing development.
(i)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that

I.e.

§67-6536 was applicable to the

governmental activity in this matter, and. if applicable. that the County did not comply with the
statutory requirements.
(j)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that

I.e. §67-6535 was applicable to the

governmental activity in this matter requiring a written decision in amending the zoning
ordinance. zoning map, comprehensive plan, and land use map, beyond the legislation
themselves:
(k)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County failed to comply \vith

I.C. §67-6509:
(I)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County failed to comply with

I.e. §67-6508:
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(m)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County failed to comply vvith

I.e. §67-6511:
(n)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County violated I.e. §67-6506:

(0)

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in finding that Respondent is

entitled to an avv-ard of attorney fees pursuant to
(p)

I.e. § 12-117.

Whether Appellant is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under I.C.

§12-117.
4.

No order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellant requests the preparation of the

following portions of the reporter's transcript: the reporter's standard transcript pursuant to Rule
25, I.A.R. supplemented by the following:
(a)

June 27, 2007, hearing

(b)

July 19,2007, telephonic hearing (held in Blaine County)

(c)

September 25, 2007, hearing

(d)

October 23,2007, telephonic hearing

(e)

November 13.2007. hearing

(e)

December 11. 2007, hearing

(1)

January 29, 2008, telephonic hearing (held in Blaine County)

(g)

February 26, 2008, hearing

(h)

March 7, 2008, hearing

(i)

May 5. 2008. telephonic status conference (occurred in Blaine County)
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6.

U)

May 20-21, 2008, hearing

(k)

August 11,2008, telephonic status conference (held in Blaine County)

(I)

August 20 , 2008, hearing

Appellant requests that those documents which are automatically included under Rule 28,

I.A.R., be included in the clerk' s record. Appellant also requests the following documents be
included in the clerk's record:
(a)

06/20/2007 - Answer of Defendants Camas County, The Individual Members of

the Camas County Board of County Commissioners, Ed Smith in his Capacity as a Member of
the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission
(b)

07/06/2007 - Memorandum

(c)

07113 /2007 - Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Records
(d)

07116 /2007 - Motion to Strike and Objection to Plaintiffs Verified Application

for a TRO and Pre-Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Record

* * * Note: This

document is erroneously entitled as described, but it is in substance a Reply Post-Hearing
Memorandum filed by Defendants*
(e)

**

07119/2007 - Objection to Plaintiffs Verified Application for a Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Records
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(1)

07119/2007 - Affidavit of Dwight Butler In Support of Defendants' Objection to

Plaintiffs' Verified Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to
Destruction of Public Records
(g)

07/27/2007 - Order Denying PlaintiiIs' July 13,2007 Verified Application for

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public
Records
(h)

08/13/2007 - Decision on Status of Camas County Planning and Zoning

Commission for Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction
(i)

10109/2007

Post Hearing Memorandum Supporting the County Defendants

Objection to Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction

U)

10/2212007 - Motion to Strike Affidavit of George Martin In Support of

Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memorandum (Second Evidentiary Hearing)
(k)

10/22/2007 - Memorandum Supporting Motion to Strike Affidavit of George

Martin in Support of Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memorandum (Second Evidentiary Hearing)
(I)

1211112007 - Order Granting Leave to Amend Petition for Declaratory Judgment

(m)

12/13/2007

(n)

12/28/2007 - Decision on Requirements of a "Transcribable Verbatim Record"

Amended Petition for Breach of Contract

and Other Records for Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction
(0)

01122/2008 - Plaintiffs

~1otion

to Hold Camas County Defendants In Contempt

of Court for Violation of Preliminary Injunction
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(p)

01123/2008 - Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Hold Camas

County Defendants In Contempt of Court for Violation of Preliminary Injunction
(q)

01123/2008

Affidavit of Stephanie 1. Bonney In Support of Defendants'

Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt for Alleged Violation of Preliminary Injunction
(r)

0311112008 - Order Following Contempt Hearing and Order Expanding

Preliminary Injunction
(s)

03112/2008 - Post-Hearing Memorandum Objecting to Plaintiffs' Motion for

Preliminary Injunction (Conflict of Interest Allegation)
(t)

04/02/2008 - Decision On Conflict of Interests Issue for Purposes of a

Preliminary Injunction
(u)

05/13/2008 - Motion to Dismiss

(v)

05/19/2008 - Exhibit List. Defendants

(w)

05/20/2008 - Exhibit List

(x)

0512012008 - Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order.

Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief
(y)

05/2112008 - Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of Documentary Evidence

(z)

08/08/2008 - Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Petition by Adding Two

Additional Causes of Action: 1) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Against Resolutions 114 and
115 and Ordinances #157 and 158: 2) Damages for Violations of State and Federal Law
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(aa)

08/08/2008

Second Amended Petition for Breach of Contract, Tortious

Interference With Contract, For Declaratory Relief, Damages for Violation of Procedural and
Substantive Due Process Rights and Equal Protection of Law
(bb)

08/08/2008 - Plaintiffs' Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order,

Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief
(cc)

08/27/2008 - Response to Plaintiffs' Petition for Leave to Amend Complaint

(dd)

0912912008 - Defendants Camas County, et al Post Trial Brief

(ee)

10108/2008 - Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

(ff)

10/15/2008 - Amended Answer

(gg)

12122/2008

(ff)

12/2912008 - Objection to Attorney Fees

Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees

Pursuant to I.A.R. 31, Appellant requests that all tapes, exhibits, including charts, graphs,
maps, or other documents, offered and admitted during the proceedings, whether hearing or trial,
be included as exhibits to the record.

7.

I certify that:
(a)

A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a

transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Rollie Bennett
Clerk of the Court, Fifth Judicial District, Camas County
P.O. Box 130
Fairfield, Idaho 83327
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Susan Israel
Court Reporter
Fifth Judicial District, Camas County
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield, Idaho 83327

(b)

Maureen Newton
Court Reporter
Fifth Judicial District. Minidoka County
P.O. Box 368
Rupert, Idaho 83350

The Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the

clerk's record because Appellant is an officer of the State ofIdaho acting in his official capacity,
and Section 31-3212(2), Idaho Code, provides that county officers shall not charge any fee for
any services rendered in any action or proceeding in which any state officer in his official
capacity is a party.
(c)

The Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because Section 67-

2301, Idaho Code, provides that no filing fee shall be charged for services rendered to any state
officer in the performance of his official duties.
(d)

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20,

I.A.R.
Respectfully submitted this

11-

day of January, 2009.

MOORE SMITH

Paul 1. F
Attorneys
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Bux

N & TURCKE, CHTD.

***
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a tme and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Notice of Appeal
\vas this

J!f-- day of January, 2009 served upon the follow"ing individuals and in the

corresponding manner:
Christopher P. Simms
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, ID 83340

Via United States mail
Phillip J. Collaer
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL,

LLP

P.O. Box 7426
Boise. ID 83707

Via United States mail
Hon. Robert Elgee
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers)
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110
Hailey. ID 83333

Via United States mail

Paul J.
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